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Abstract
There is a continued interest among economists on the interconnections between nancial
markets, credit markets and the real economy. The three main chapters of this dissertation
contribute to the understanding of how nancial and credit frictions - either at the rm
or household level - can aect the real economy, and even trigger a nancial crisis.
Chapter 1 studies the causes of nancial crises. I show that shocks to the volatility of
total factor productivity (TFP) can generate endogenous variations in loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios and trigger credit crunches, without appealing to nancial shocks. Using a panel
of countries, I nd that nancial crises coincide with the reversal of a long period of low
volatility of TFP. To explain this new fact, I develop a general equilibrium model in which
volatility shocks to TFP interact with an occasionally binding borrowing constraint and
housing serves as collateral. I introduce search frictions in the housing market to capture
the liquidity of housing and endogenize the LTV ratio: households borrow at higher LTV
ratios when the collateral is more liquid. In this environment, volatility shocks cause
nancial crises by changing the liquidity of the collateral. In a quantitative exercise, I
feed the model with the stochastic volatility of the U.S. Solow residual. I nd that the
interaction of volatility shocks and search frictions in the housing market increases the
frequency of nancial crises by 47% and the associated output drop by 30%. In addition,
volatility shocks generate volatile LTV ratios, thus providing a foundation for nancial
shocks.
Chapter 2 studies whether households’ limited attention to the stock market can quan-
titatively account for the bulk of asset prices. I address this question introducing an ob-
servation cost in a production economy with heterogeneous agents, incomplete markets
and idiosyncratic risk. In this environment inattention changes endogenously over time
and across agents. I calibrate the observation cost to match the observed duration of
inattention of the median agent in the data. The model generates limited participation
in the stock market, a weak correlation between consumption growth and stock returns,
and countercyclical dynamics for both the stock returns volatility and the excess return. It
also generates forms of predictability in stock returns and consumption growth. Nonethe-
less, the level of the equity premium is still low, around 1%. Finally, I nd that inattention
aects asset prices if borrowing constraints are tight enough.
Chapter 3 - which is joint work with Alessandro Peri - studies the series of US annual
corporate default rates from 1950 until 2012. We document the presence of one structural
break in the unconditional mean, which is dated in 1986. Meanwhile credit spreads hardly
moved. We present a dynamic equilibrium model where the development of credit markets
accounts for this empirical evidence. Financial development increases both the default rate
and rms’ expected recovery rates. These two eects oset each other and translate into
constant credit spreads. In the model nancial development explains 64% of the rise in
iv
default rates and predicts just a 2 basis point increase in the credit spreads. Furthermore,
the model accounts for a number of trends that characterized public rms over the last
decades: the fall in the number of rms distributing dividends, the rise in the degree of
dividend smoothing, and the increase in the volatility of public rms.
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chapter 1
The Calm Before the Storm:
Time Varying Volatility and the
Origins of Financial Crises
1.1 Introduction
What causes nancial crises? Major credit crunches are usually considered events which
originate in the nancial sector. In this paper, I show that shocks to the volatility of to-
tal factor productivity (TFP) can generate endogenous variations in loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios and trigger nancial crises, without appealing to nancial shocks. My focus on
volatility links to the nancial instability hypothesis of Minsky (1992), which conjectures
that long periods of low uctuations can lead to a crisis. This is a phenomenon that Brun-
nermeier and Sannikov (2013) refer to as the volatility paradox: it is the calm that generates
the storm.
I rst establish in the data an association between the volatility of TFP and nancial
crises which is consistent with the volatility paradox. I build a panel of crises across coun-
tries and nd that the volatility of TFP is around 12% below trend over the two years
preceding a nancial crisis, before jumping up. This rise in volatility leads the burst of the
crisis.
To explain this new fact, I develop a general equilibrium model in which volatility
shocks interact with an occasionally binding borrowing constraint and housing serves as
collateral. I introduce search frictions in the housing market to capture the liquidity of
housing and endogenize the maximum LTV ratio (i.e., the maximum amount households
can borrow given the value of their assets). Households borrow at higher LTV ratios when
the housing market is more liquid. In the model, nancial crises happen when the LTV
ratio drops and the borrowing constraint becomes binding, which forces households to
deleverage. The constraint binds with a probability that depends on the optimal choices
of the households.
In this environment, volatility shocks aect the frequency of credit crunches by chang-
ing the liquidity of the collateral. A long period of low volatility sows the seeds of the crisis
by boosting housing liquidity, which raises both the LTV ratio and households’ leverage;
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then a sudden volatility spike freezes out the liquidity of the housing market and reduces
the LTV ratio, forcing households to sharply deleverage.
In a quantitative exercise, I feed the model with the stochastic volatility of the Solow
residual of the U.S. economy, which I estimate by Bayesian techniques. I use global nu-
merical methods to solve the model and preserve its non-linear dynamics. I nd that the
interaction of volatility shocks and search frictions in the housing market increases the
frequency of nancial crises by 55% and the associated output drop by 58%. I show that -
nancial crises are characterized by deationary spirals à la Fisher (1933) in both the house
price and the LTV ratio, a novel mechanism which amplies the severity of a downturn.
The initial drop in the LTV ratio forces households to deleverage, generating a decline in
both house prices and housing liquidity, which eventually decreases even further the LTV
ratio in a deationary loop. Furthermore, the model accounts for around half of the ob-
served time variation in LTV ratios. Hence, the interaction of volatility shocks and search
frictions in the housing market provides a rationale for nancial shocks.
The mechanism of the paper works through changes in the liquidity of housing, which
eventually modify the maximum LTV ratio at which households borrow. In the model,
periods of low volatility boost housing investment. As more households look for a house,
sellers are more likely to meet with a buyer. The higher liquidity of housing relaxes the
LTV ratio and generates a credit and an investment boom which reinforce each other. This
spiral builds up systemic risk because the economy becomes fragile to the realizations of
adverse shocks at high levels of households’ leverage. Indeed, the dynamics of the model
are non-linear. As in Mendoza (2010), Bianchi (2012) and Bianchi and Mendoza (2013),
negative shocks generate only mild recessions at low levels of leverage. Instead, when
households are highly indebted, a sudden peak in volatility can dry up the liquidity of
housing and lower the LTV ratio down to the point that the borrowing constraint becomes
binding. Agents are then forced to deleverage and re sell their houses, triggering a debt
deationary spiral in both the house price and LTV ratio, which turns the credit boom
into a bust.
The search frictions in the housing market creates a direct link between the liquidity of
the collateral and households’ borrowing capacity, a novel mechanism in the literature of
general equilibrium models with nancial frictions. While standard models à la Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) usually assume that the LTV ratio is exogenous, in this paper the ratio
is endogenous. The link between housing liquidity, collateral values and the LTV ratio
follows Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), in which market liquidity directly determines
households’ funding liquidity, that is, the ease at which households can access new loans.
More precisely, a house has a high collateral value if lenders can sell it both quickly and
at a high price in case they seize it.1 In equilibrium the LTV ratio is the ratio between
1The role of the collateral liquidity is already pointed out in Del Negro et al. (2011) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (2012). These papers exogenously impose the degree of collateral illiquidity, ruling out any feedback
eect between market liquidity and households’ funding liquidity.
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the option value of a vacant house - the value of a house on sale that is expected to be
sold in the future and does not yield any dividend or utility to its owner - and the market
value of housing. The wedge between these two prices widens in illiquid markets because
houses are expected to be on sale for a longer time. Through this channel, changes in the
liquidity of the housing market alter the value of the collateral asset and aect households’
borrowing capacity. From this perspective, this paper follows the contributions of Fostel
and Geanakoplos (2008) and Geanakoplos (2010) on the importance of endogenizing the
LTV ratio to match of the dynamics of macroeconomic and nancial variables.
How can volatility aect housing investment? The volatility shocks propagate into
the real economy through the frictional housing market. Indeed, search frictions gener-
ate adjustment costs and partial irreversibilities in housing investment. On the one hand,
households incur search costs whenever they look for a house. On the other hand, agents
sell their properties at a discounted price when the housing market is illiquid. Hence hous-
ing investment is expensive to reverse. As shown in Bloom (2009), in this environment
agents become more cautious in uncertain times: agents reduce ex-ante their investment
propensity to avoid incurring ex-post the costs of frequently adjusting the housing stock.
In the quantitative analysis, I show that volatility shocks barely change the frequency of
nancial crises if there are no search frictions in housing market. Even in the case I con-
sider a frictional housing market, volatility shocks matter only if households’ LTV ratio
is not constant and does depend on housing liquidity. From this point of view, this pa-
per contributes to the literature on the real eects of volatility shocks (e.g., Justiniano and
Primiceri, 2008; Bloom, 2009; Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2011) on two dimensions. First, I
nd a new propagation mechanism for the volatility shocks: the interaction of search fric-
tions in the market of the collateral asset and an endogenous LTV ratio. Second, I show
that changes in the exogenous volatility of productivity may generate sharp movements
in the endogenous volatility of output and credit when households’ leverage is excessively
high.2
The presence of the volatility shocks and its eect of house prices relates to Bansal
and Yaron (2004), where the stochastic volatility of consumption growth accounts for the
time variation of risk premia. The importance of aggregate volatility is also stressed in
Bansal et al. (2014), who point out that macroeconomic volatility is a primary source of
risk aecting asset prices. I complement this literature by showing that the introduction
of a stochastic volatility in a production economy with CRRA preferences can generate
sharp uctuations in house prices around a nancial crisis.
Finally, this paper provides a quantitative theory of nancial crises which sheds lights
2What is the interpretation of the volatility shocks? Carvalho and Gabaix (2013) show that the changes
from the manufacturing sector towards the service and nancial sector can account for the movements in
the volatility of U.S. macroeconomic variables over the last decades. Alternatively, Bloom (2009) nds that
time variations in aggregate volatility are correlated with changes in the cross-sectional dispersion of rms’
growth rates. Christiano et al. (2014) shows that shocks to the dispersion of rms’ productivity are a key
source of business cycle uctuations.
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on the debate on the causes of the last recession. For instance, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) show that the recent crisis has been driven by
a large negative nancial shock that generated a credit crunch and consequently a sharp
drop in investment and employment. These results have consolidated the view that the
cause of the recent crisis is the disruption of credit supply due to the breakdown of banks.
Yet, this explanation is at odds with the empirical evidence provided by Mian and Su
(2009, 2011), who nd that the housing market in the U.S. started to slump around 2006,
much earlier than the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. In this vein, the
deterioration of the balance sheet of the households - rather than the one of the nancial
intermediaries - has triggered the Great Recession.
To reconcile these dierent views, I propose a mechanism which is only based on real
shocks - especially on innovations to the volatility of TFP - and works entirely through
variations in credit demand. In the model there is no bank. However, volatility shocks
drive changes in housing liquidity, which aect households’ collateral values and eventu-
ally modify the LTV ratio. This mechanism makes households’ leverage to move over time
even when the house price does not change. Hence, the interaction of volatility shocks
and a frictional housing market generates dynamics in the LTV ratio that are observation-
ally equivalent to a nancial shock, although they entirely hinge on credit demand. This
result suggests that nancial shocks should not necessarily be interpreted as if they were
originated in the nancial sector, and could rather be caused by shifts in credit demand.
1.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is connected to three strands of literature. First, I complement the empirical
evidence provided by Reinhart and Rogo (2009), Mendoza and Terrones (2012), Schular-
ick and Taylor (2012), and Jorda et al. (2013, 2015) on the dynamics of macroeconomic
variables around nancial crises. These authors show that nancial crises are actually
credit booms gone bust. I document that although aggregate volatility does not display
strong comovements with recessions, it is characterized by large swings around nan-
cial crises. Second, this paper contributes to the debate on the recent house price boom
and bust. Global imbalances are often referred to as the main cause of the house price
boom. For instance, Justiniano et al. (2014) show that the global savings glut accounts for
around one fourth of the increase in U.S. house prices in the early 2000’s. Yet, Favilukis
et al. (2013) argue that the boom and bust in the housing market is explained by nancial
development in the mortgage market. While there is a burgeoning evidence on the im-
provements in nancial markets in recent years, it is harder to understand the reversal of
the process of nancial development amidst the nancial crisis. In my model movements
in the LTV ratio - due to changes in housing liquidity - provide a rationale to both the
process of nancial development and its reversal. The relaxation of credit conditions in
the mortgage market can be explained by the high liquidity of the housing market in the
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2000’s. Analogously, the liquidity freeze around the crisis can account for the reversal of
the process of nancial development. Third, this paper relates to the literature on search
frictions in the housing market, which follows the contribution of Wheaton (1990). For
example, Diaz and Jerez (2013) show that a model with a frictional housing market can
reproduce the house price volatility. I add to this literature by showing that changes in
housing liquidity aect the frequency of nancial crises.3
1.2 Evidence on Volatility and Financial Crises
In this Section I document a new stylized fact on the dynamics of the volatility of TFP
around nancial crises. I nd that crises coincide with the reversal of a long period of low
uctuations.
1.2.1 Data on Volatility and Financial Crises
I build a panel of 20 developed countries from 1980 until 2013 to understand how volatil-
ity is related to nancial crises. The countries covered are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
For any of these countries, I consider an indicator of aggregate volatility at an annual fre-
quency: the stochastic volatility of total factor productivity (TFP). I compute the series of
TFP zt for each country using data from the Penn World Tables. Then, I posit that in each
country TFP follows a rst-order autoregressive process with stochastic volatility
zt = ρzzt+1 + eσt z,t , z,t ∼ N (0, 1) (1.1)
σt = (1 – ρσ)σ¯ + ρσσt–1 + ησ,t , σ,t ∼ N (0, 1)
where ρz denotes the persistency of the level equation of TFP, ρσ is the persistency of
the volatility equation, σ¯ is the long-run mean of the volatility of TFP and η captures the
degree of stochastic volatility in the process. z,t and σ,t denote the innovations to the
level and volatility of TFP, respectively. I assume that both z,t and σ,t are independent
to each other.
Since the innovations z,t and σ,t are unknown to the econometrician, I need to apply
a lter to the data to estimate the parameters of the process (1.1). In this framework the
Kalman lter is unsuitable because it applies only to linear series, while here the shocks
to the volatility enter non-linearly in the level equation of TFP. I evaluate the likelihood of
3The setting of the housing market in my paper follows Ungerer (2013), which shows that monetary
policy aects aggregate leverage through a borrowing margin that depends on housing liquidity. Instead,
I focus on the link between volatility, housing liquidity and nancial crises, and emphasize the Fisherian
deation in LTV ratios amidst a crisis.
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this process by appealing to the Sequential Importance Sampling particle lter introduced
in Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011).
The estimation of the stochastic volatility of TFP closely follows Born and Pfeifer (2013).
I use Bayesian techniques to estimate the likelihood of the process of productivity. I elicit
some unrestrictive priors, and after deriving the likelihood of the process for some given
parameters with the SIS particle lter, I maximize the posterior likelihood using a random
walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with 20000 replications, out of which the rst 5000
represent burn-in draws. Finally, I recover the historical distribution of the volatility of
TFP using the backward-smoothing routine of Godsill et al. (2004).
I also consider dierent measures of volatility as robustness checks. First, following
Bloom (2009), I proxy aggregate volatility with the logarithm of the variance of daily stock
returns within a year. Second, I compute the volatility of quarterly GDP growth over a
moving window of 20 quarters.
Finally, I take the dates of nancial crises from multiple sources, that is, Bordo et al.
(2001), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Reinhart and Rogo (2009), Laeven and Valencia
(2012), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Jorda et al. (2015). Financial crises are dened as
credit crunches in which the nancial sector experiences large losses and bank runs, that
eventually lead to a spike in bankruptcies, forced merged and government intervention.
The dates of recessions are instead given by the OECD recession indicators. Overall, the
panel covers 29 events of nancial crises and 118 events of recessions. I report the dates
of crises and recessions by country and all the sources of the data in Appendix 1.A.
1.2.2 The Dynamics Around Crises and Recessions
This Section studies the dynamics of volatility around nancial crises and recessions. For
any country and for any nancial crisis and recession, I take the series of aggregate volatil-
ity in a time window of nine years around the event of interest, that is, from four years
before either the nancial crisis or the recession up to four years afterwards. Then, I
consider the series dened by the average observations across events for any year of the
window as the typical pattern around nancial crises and recessions. For example, to de-
ne the typical level of volatility the year preceding a nancial crisis, I take the volatility
of the Solow residual one year before each of the 29 nancial crises of my sample and then
compute the mean.
Figure 1.1 displays the typical dynamics of aggregate volatility around nancial crises
and recessions. The gure documents that aggregate volatility asymmetrically varies
around crises and recessions. While there are negligible deviations from trend during re-
cessions, the behaviour of volatility around crises is characterized by large swings. Crises
tend to be preceded by years in which volatility is around 10% below trend and the burst
of the crisis pushes volatility up to around 13% above trend.
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Figure 1.1
Aggregate Volatility around Crises and Recessions.
The gure plots the average values of the deviations from the trend of the stochastic volatility of countries’
total factor productivity around recessions and nancial crises (9 year window). The continuous line
indicates the dynamics around nancial crises, while the dashed line refers to recession. The dates of
nancial crises are taken from Reinhart and Rogo (2009). Recessions are derived from the OECD recession
indicators.
Figure 1.2 shows that aggregate volatility maintains the same dynamics around crises
and recessions even when it is measured as the variance within a year of daily stock returns
or as the variance of quarterly GDP growth rates over a moving window of 20 quarters.
I also nd a similar dynamics when using yet other measures of volatility, see Appendix
1.B.
Figure 1.2
Different Measures of Aggregate Volatility.
(a) Volatility of Stock Returns (b) Volatility of GDP Growth
Note: The gure plots the dynamics of dierent measures of aggregate volatility around recessions and nancial
crises (9 year window). In Panel (a) the volatility is measured as the variance of daily stock market returns within
a year. In Panel (b) the volatility refers to the variance of quarterly GDP growth rates computed over a moving
window of 20 quarters. The continuous line indicates the dynamics around nancial crises, while the dashed
line refers to recession. The dates of nancial crises are taken from Reinhart and Rogo (2009). Recessions are
derived from the OECD recession indicators.
I argue that this evidence points out a new stylized fact on the dynamics of volatility
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around nancial crises which is consistent with the volatility paradox of Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2013). 4
1.2.3 Volatility Shocks and the Housing Market
The previous analysis points out that changes in the level of aggregate volatility tend to
coincide with the build-up of risk and the burst of a nancial crisis. What is the mecha-
nism behind this result? In this Section I show that volatility shocks are propagated into
the real economy through the housing market. I run a structural VAR model, in which I
compute the response of house price, the quantity of house sold and a measure of liquidity
of housing to an unexpected increase in volatility.
The VAR is estimated using with monthly data from January 1963 until December
2013 on the level of S&P 500 returns, an indicator of volatility, the Federal Funds Rate, the
consumer price index, industrial production and three variables on the housing markets
related to price, quantity and liquidity.
I borrow the volatility indicator from Bloom (2009). This variable identies a number
of large and arguably exogenous peaks of stock market volatility, and is dened such that
it equals 1 in each of these dates and zero otherwise. These dates coincide with events like
the assassination of Kennedy, the Arab-Israeli War, the Gulf War and the 9/11 attack. The
identication restriction posits that within a month the volatility indicator reacts only to
the level of the S&P stock returns, but not to any of the aforementioned macroeconomic
variable. The presence of the stock returns allows me to disentangle volatility shocks from
any change in the level of stock market data. As housing market variables, I consider the
median sales price of new one family homes sold5, the number of new one family homes
sold and the months supply provided by the Census Bureau. The latter is the ratio of
houses for sale to houses sold and measures the number of months a house for sale is
expected to last on the market. Hereafter I refer to this variable as the time on the market.
The benchmark ordering of the VAR considers the level of S&P 500 returns and the
indicator of volatility rst, then the interest rate, the consumer price index and the house
price index, and nally the quantities with the industrial production, the level of sold
houses and the time on the market. Figure 1.3 reports the response of house prices, the
number of houses sold and the time on the market to a positive one standard deviation
shock to volatility. Panel (b) shows that house prices respond very sluggishly to an in-
crease in volatility, and start declining only around 10 months after the realization of the
shock. At the peak, the response is around –0.001% below the baseline, which gives an
4Do volatility shocks cause nancial crises? Figure 1.1 cannot identify whether the rise in the volatility
of TFP causes the nancial crisis or vice versa. Figure 1.2 shows that rises in aggregate volatility tends to
lead the occurrence of nancial crises. In Appendix 1.B, I plot the VIX index amidst the Great Recession,
and I show that the VIX rose by around 60% at the beginning of 2007, well before the burst of the crisis.
5Results do not change when using the Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index, see Appendix 1.B.1.
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annualized rate of –1.21%. Instead, an increase in volatility reduces the number of houses
sold at peak by around –0.0065% on a monthly basis, which gives an annualized rate of
–8.08%. Finally, a volatility shock raises the expected time on the market of a house in
sale by 0.005% on a monthly basis, which corresponds to an annualized rate of 6.17%. This
evidence suggests that volatility shocks do aect the housing market, mostly through
changes in the number of houses sold and the time on the market of a house on sale.
Figure 1.3
Volatility Shocks and the Housing Market.
(a) Volatility (b) House Price
(c) House Sales (d) Time on the Market
Note: VAR estimated from January 1963 to December 2013. The dashed lines are 1 standard-error bands around
the response to a volatility shock. The coordinates indicate percent deviations from the baseline. The time on the
market is measured by the monthly supply of homes, that is the ratio of houses for sale to houses sold.
This evidence is consistent with the dynamics of GDP growth volatility and hous-
ing market liquidity over the last decades. Figure 1.4 shows that the volatility of GDP
growth rates has decreased starting from the 1980’s, a phenomenon which is known as
the Great Moderation. Stock and Watson (2002) document that in those years the stan-
dard deviations of GDP, consumption and investment have decreased by 41%, 38% and
22%, respectively. This trend has been partially reversed during the last recession. Figure
1.5 displays that the behavior of the housing market liquidity comoves with the volatility
of the macroeconomic environment. Periods of low uctuations experience a low time
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on the market, while turbulent periods - such as the oil crises in the 1970’s and the Great
Recession - have a much lower liquidity. Interestingly, the last period of the Great Moder-
ation coincides with a historical low time on the market of a house of sale, at around 3.5
months. In the Great Recession, the time on the market peaked up to an all-time maximum
of around 12 months.
Figure 1.4
U.S. GDP Growth Rate
Note: The gure plots the quarterly series of US GDP growth rate from 1970Q1 until
2013Q4. The series is computed as the rst dierence of the log real GDP.
Figure 1.5
Time on the Market of Houses on Sales in the U.S.
Note: The gure plots the quarterly series of the time on the market of houses on sale from
1963Q1 until 2013Q4. The time on the market series is given by the month supply of new
one family houses from the Census Bureau.
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1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Environment
In the economy there is a continuum of identical families that consist of a continuum
of members. Although members live in dierent dwellings, there is perfect risk-sharing
within the family. Families access a production function which assembles labor and hous-
ing to produce a consumption good. The technology is subject to aggregate productivity
shocks with stochastic volatility.
Family members trade real estate properties on a frictional market, such that there is
a probability that a house on sale will not be matched with a buyer.
Families borrow from foreign lenders, and lack of commitment to repay debt. If fam-
ilies renege on debt, lenders seize their housing stock. To avoid the repudiation of debt,
lenders impose a constraint on families’ borrowing capacity. In equilibrium, families can-
not borrow more than the collateral value of housing.
The role of housing is threefold: it provides utility services, it is a production input
and it acts as the collateral asset.
Timing
Every period is split into four dierent stages. In the rst one families observe the current
realizations of the shocks. In the second one families borrow from the foreign lenders.
This stage serves as a rationale for having in equilibrium a borrowing constraint that de-
pends on current values of families’ collateral. In the third stage production takes place
and family members trade real estate properties on a frictional housing market. Finally, in
the fourth stage a fraction of homeowners is hit by a mismatch shock and forced to leave
the houses, which become vacant.
Realization
Shocks
1st Stage
Borrowing
2nd Stage
Production, Consumption
& Frictional Housing
Market
3rd Stage
Mismatch
Shock
4th Stage
1.3.2 Families
The economy is populated by a continuum of families i ∈ [0, 1]. Each family consists of
a continuum of ex-ante identical innitely-lived members of measure one. Each member
lives in a dierent dwelling and can own at most one house. Although family members
individually trade houses, they pool their revenues within the family.
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Each family maximizes the sum of their members’ life-time utilities
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
ci,t , li,t , hi,t+1
)
(1.2)
where β is the time discount factor of family members, ci,t denotes the consumption of
the family, li,t is the level of leisure and hi,t+1 is the end-of-period level of housing services
which is assumed to be proportional to the end-of-period stock of occupied housing.
Families access a decreasing return to scale technology that uses labor force ni,t , rented
at the equilibrium wage wt , and the stock of occupied housing hi,t to produce a homoge-
neous consumption good, as follows
yi,t = eztF
(
ni,t , hi,t
)
. (1.3)
The consumption good yi,t is sold on a frictionless market, and is the numeraire of the
economy. The production function is subject to an aggregate productivity shock zt , which
follows an autoregressive motion with stochastic volatility
zt = ρzzt–1 + eσt z,t (1.4)
σt = (1 – ρσ) σ¯ + ρσσt–1 + ησ,t (1.5)
where ρz denotes the persistence of the level of productivity, ρσ is the persistence of the
volatility of productivity, σ¯ is the long-run mean of volatility and η captures the degree
of stochastic volatility of the process. When η = 0, the process reduces to a standard au-
toregression motion. Finally, z,t and σt denote the innovations to the level and volatility
of productivity. I assume that they are i.i.d. following normal distributions N
(
0,σz
)
and
N
(
0,σσ
)
, respectively.
I appeal to this specication for aggregate productivity because the dynamics over time
of the level and the volatility of aggregate productivity are pinned down by two dierent
shocks, z,t and σ,t , respectively. The two dierent sources of uncertainty, one related
to the level and the other one linked to volatility, allows me to disentangle the role of
volatility shocks and their contribution to the quantitative results of the model.6
1.3.3 The Housing Market
In the model houses are either occupied or vacant. Each family i ∈ [0, 1] has a fraction
of hi,t members which occupy a house and a fraction of vi,t members which own a house
that does not t their needs. I refer to the latter as vacant housing. I assume that vacant
houses cannot be used as a production input, do not provide utility services and cannot
6E.g., in a GARCH model a unique shock drives the dynamics over time of both the level and the volatility
of the process. I refer to Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) for further discussion on the topic.
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be pledged as collateral. I further consider a xed unit supply of houses.7
Real estate properties are traded on a frictional housing market. The search frictions
capture in a reduced form the fact that matching in the housing market is time consuming.
On one side of the market, each family has vi,t members who own vacant housing, which
are put up on sale. On the other side of the market, there are 1–hi,t members which do not
occupy a house and seek to buy one on the frictional market. Family members exercise
a search eort si,t - in units of time - in order to match with a seller. I assume that every
unit of search eort comes at a monetary cost κs2i,t . The ratio between the total amount
of buyers (measured in eciency units) to the total supply of houses on sale denes the
tightness of the housing market
θt =
∫ 1
0
(
1 – hi,t
)
si,t di∫ 1
0 vi,tdi
. (1.6)
A high market tightness θt indicates that the housing market is hot, that is, there are more
buyers than sellers.
Following Wheaton (1990), the aggregate number of successful matches mt is dened
by a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas matching function
mt =
(∫ 1
0
(
1 – hi,t
)
si,t di
)1–γ (∫ 1
0
vi,tdi
)γ
(1.7)
where γ ∈ (0, 1). Upon a match, the transaction price of the house qmktt is dened by a
Nash bargaining problem, which I describe in Section 1.3.6. The matching function (1.7)
stipulates that not all the houses supplied to the market are matched to a buyer. Indeed,
the probability at which family members sell houses is
Psellt =
mt∫ 1
0 vi,tdi
= θ1–γt
which is increasing in the market tightness θt . The probability at which family members
meet with buyers raises in hot housing market because there is a disproportionately larger
amount of buyers exerting a high eort. Instead, the probability that a family member
meets with a seller equals
Pbuyt =
mt∫ 1
0
(
1 – hi,t
)
si,t di
= θ–γt .
The probability of buying a house negatively depends on the tightness of the market. In
a hot market, there are much more buyers than sellers, and any given family member is
7Davis and Heathcote (2007) nd that the trend and volatility of US house prices are mostly driven by
uctuations in the price of land. Liu et al. (2013) show that uctuations in land prices are a driving force of
business cycle. In this vein, the housing stock in xed supply of my model can be interpreted as land.
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less likely to meet with a seller.
In this environment a family member manages to sell its house only with a probability
Psellt . With the remaining probability 1 – Psellt , the house keeps being on sale on the future
period. Since vacant houses cannot be used either as production input and as collateral
asset, I can dene the option value of a house qoptt - the value of a house on sale that does
not yield any utility service or dividend to the owner - when the frictional market opens
as
qoptt = P
sell
t q
mkt
t +
(
1 – Psellt
)
Et
[
Λt+1q
opt
t+1
]
. (1.8)
Equation (1.8) stipulates that the option value of housing depends on the liquidity of the
housing market, the housing price and the continuation value of a vacant house. On the
one hand, vacant houses have no option value when their selling probability in any future
period goes to zero. On the other hand, the option value of vacant houses equals the
market value of houses - as priced by the frictional market - when the current frictional
market is perfectly liquid, that is, Psellt = 1. Notice that the option value q
opt
t is the actual
value of houses put up on sale by the family members which sell their shelters. As long as
the frictional market is partially illiquid, then qoptt ≤ qmktt , and the relevant house price
for a seller is lower than the relevant house price for a buyer. Hence, the structure of the
housing market endogenously generates a bid-ask spread qmktt – q
opt
t which depends on
the liquidity of the frictional market.
Finally, I assume that a fraction ψ of homeowners is hit by a mismatch shock after
that trading in the housing market has taken place.8 Sellers cease to occupy their own
dwelling, which adds to the stock of vacant housing that is carried over the next period.
The laws of motion of occupied housing and vacant housing are
hi,t+1 = (1 – ψ)
(
hi,t + P
buy
t si,t
(
1 – hi,t
) )
(1.9)
vi,t+1 =
(
1 – Psellt
)
vi,t + ψ
(
hi,t + P
buy
t si,t
(
1 – hi,t
) )
(1.10)
1.3.4 Borrowing Constraint
At the beginning of each period families observe the realizations of the aggregate shocks
and then decide how much to borrow di,t+1. Families borrow from risk-neutral foreign
investors, which inelastically supply funds at the gross interest rate R.9 Families need
8The presence of the mismatch shock is often assumed in the literature of search frictions in the housing
market, and dates back to Wheaton (1990). The shock allows to have always some vacant house in equilib-
rium. The mismatch shock can be interpreted by job mobility across locations, which forces homeowners to
sell their real estate before relocating to a new city. Also a change in the number of people within a family
could force homeowners to sell their house and buy a dierent one. The mismatch shock is analogous to
the exogenous separation shock used in the search models of the labor market, see Pissarides (2000).
9This assumption is consistent with the analysis of Mendoza and Quadrini (2009) and Warnock and
Warnock (2009) on the eects of US foreign capital inows on the Treasury bill interest rates since mid
1980’s.
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also to purchase a fraction ν of the labor cost wtni,t in advance of production. Hence,
they receive a working capital loan from the foreign investors. Working capital loans are
repaid within the period and do not carry interest payments.
Families lack full commitment and can immediately decide to renege on their debt. In
such a case, the lenders seize the housing stock hi,t . Under the further assumptions that
nancial contracts are not exclusive, families can renege on their debt only at the begin-
ning of each period and there is no additional penalty in repudiating the debt, Appendix
1.D.1 shows that in equilibrium the collateral constraint equals
di,t+1
R
+ νwtni,t ≤ qoptt hi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collateral Value of Housing
. (1.11)
As in Iacoviello (2005), families’ borrowing capacity is determined by the collateral value
of the housing. In Iacoviello (2005) the collateral value of housing equals to an exogenous
fraction of its market value. In my model the collateral value of families’ housing stock is
always lower than its market value, as long as the housing market is not perfectly liquid,
and there is a spread between the house price qmktt and the option value of a house q
opt
t .
Multiplying and dividing the right-hand side of the constraint by the price of occupied
housing qmktt , the constraint becomes
di,t+1
R
+ νwtni,t ≤ q
opt
t
qmktt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Maximum Loan-to-Value Ratio
× qmktt hi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Market Value of Housing
. (1.12)
Equation (1.12) shows that the collateral value of agents depends on the market value of
their housing stock, multiplied by a factor which denes the maximum LTV ratio. Stan-
dard models usually assume that the degree of pledgeability of the collateral is an exoge-
nous parameter. Instead, in this framework the LTV ratio is endogenous and depends on
the liquidity of the housing market. When the housing market liquidity freezes out, the
low probability of selling vacant houses raises the wedge between the prices of occupied
housing qmktt and vacant housing q
opt
t . As a result, the LTV ratio
qoptt
qmktt
decreases. There-
fore, Equation (1.12) denes the direct link through which the liquidity of the housing
market endogenously determines agents’ borrowing capacity. In this environment the
LTV ratio moves over time because of the changes in the liquidity of the housing market.
1.3.5 Decentralized Equilibrium
The families use output net of the labor cost ztF
(
ni,t , hi,t
)
–ni,twt , the revenues from sup-
plying labor (1 – li,t)wt , the new amount of borrowing
di,t+1
R and the revenues from selling
houses qmktt Psellt vt , to nance consumption ci,t , the searching cost κs2i,t , the repayment
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of debt di,t , and the purchases of new occupied houses qmktt P
buy
t si,t
(
1 – hi,t
)
. Therefore,
families’ budget constraint reads
ci,t + κs2i,t + qmktt P
buy
t si,t
(
1 – hi,t
)
+ di,t =
[
eztF
(
ni,t , hi,t
)
– ni,twt
]
+ . . .
· · · + (1 – li,t)wt + qmktt Psellt vt +
di,t+1
R
. (1.13)
Hereafter, I focus on a symmetric competitive equilibrium. Since families are all ex-
ante identical and there is no source of idiosyncratic uncertainty, families face the same
budget and borrowing constraint, and take identical optimal choices. Therefore, I drop
the subscripts from all the variables of the model.
The states of the families’ problem are given by its stock of occupied houses ht , the
level of debt dt , aggregate bond holdings Dt , the aggregate stock of occupied houses Ht
and nally the level and volatility of productivity, zt and σt . Since the stock of housing is
in xed supply, families do not need to take in account the stock of vacant houses vt .
As long as prices depends on the aggregate level of bond holdings, and optimal deci-
sions depend on current and future prices, families have to forecast also future aggregate
bond holdings. I denote by ΓD (H ,D, z,σ) the law of motion of aggregate bond holding D
perceived by any family, and ΓH (H ,D, z,σ) is the law of motion of the aggregate stock of
housing occupied by the families H . Then, the individual maximization problem is
V (h, d;H ,D, z,σ) = max
c,l,n,s,d′
{
U
(
c, l, h′
)
+ βEz′,σ′|z,σ
[
V
(
h′, d′;H ′,D′, z′,σ′
) ]}
s.t. c + d + Ch = ezF (n, h) +
d′
R
+ Gh (1.14)
Ch = κs2 + qmkt (H ,D, z,σ) Pbuy (H ,D, z,σ) s (1 – h) (1.15)
Gh = qmkt (H ,D, z,σ) Psell (H ,D, z,σ) v (1.16)
h′ = (1 – ψ)
(
h + Pbuy (H ,D, z,σ) s (1 – h)
)
(1.17)
d′
R
+ νw (H ,D, z,σ) n ≤ qopt (H ,D, z,σ) h (1.18)
D′ = ΓD (H ,D, z,σ) (1.19)
H ′ = ΓH (H ,D, z,σ) (1.20)
subject to the law of motion for the TFP shocks as described by Equation (1.4). Equation
(1.14) denotes the budget constraint, Equation (1.15) denes the total cost of trading hous-
ing Ch, Equation (1.16) is instead the total gain from trading housing Gh, Equation (1.17)
denotes the law of motion of occupied houses, Equation (1.18) is the borrowing constraint
and Equations (1.19) - (1.20) stipulate the perceived laws of motion for total bond holdings
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and occupied housing. Note that in the symmetric equilibrium nt = 1 – lt .
Upon observing the states of the economy, agents decide the optimal policy on con-
sumption cˆ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ), working hours nˆ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ), the search eort in the hous-
ing market sˆ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ), and the amount of resources to borrow from the foreign in-
vestors dˆ′ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ). In equilibrium, the perceived level of aggregate bond holdings
ΓD (H ,D, z,σ) has to coincide with the individual policy dˆ′ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ), and the same
applies for the law of motion of the aggregate stock of occupied housing ΓH (H ,D, z,σ).
Appendix 1.C reports the denition of equilibrium and the rst-order conditions of the
problem.
1.3.6 Nash Bargaining
The price qmktt of an occupied house hi,t which is sold on the frictional market is deter-
mined through the following Nash bargaining problem
qmktt ≡ arg max
qmktt
{
S
(
qmktt
)ζ
B
(
qmktt
)1–ζ }
(1.21)
s.t. S
(
qmktt
)
= qmktt – Et
[
Λt+1q
opt
t+1
]
≥ 0 (1.22)
B
(
qmktt
)
= VHt – qmktt ≥ 0 (1.23)
where S
(
qmktt
)
is sellers’ surplus in case of a transaction, B
(
qmktt
)
denotes buyers’ sur-
plus, ζ is sellers’ bargaining power, and VHt is the fundamental value that families attribute
to a new unit of occupied housing. The expected future price of vacant houses is the out-
side opportunity for a family member that does not manage to sell its house.
In the symmetric competitive equilibrium each family has the same fundamental value
of occupying a house and therefore the identity of the buyer does not matter on the spec-
ication of the house price. Indeed, in equilibrium the price of a occupied house is
qmktt = ζVHt + (1 – ζ)Et
[
Λt+1q
opt
t+1
]
. (1.24)
Families’ fundamental value of housing can be derived using the envelope condition
on the optimal stock of occupied housing, which yields
VHt =ψEt
[
Λt+1
(
Psellt+1q
mkt
t+1 +
(
1 – Psellt+1
)
qoptt+1
)]
+ . . .
· · · + (1 – ψ)Et
[
Λt+1
(
VHt+1 +
Uht+1
Uct+1
+ ezt+1Fht+1 +
φt+1
Uct+1
qoptt+1
)]
(1.25)
where Yxt denote the derivatives of the function Y (·) with respect the term xt and φt is
the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint. The fundamental value
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of a marginal house bought by a family member can be interpreted as follows. First, with
probability ψ the new homeowner is hit by the mismatch shock and forced to sell the
house. The house is successfully matched with a buyer with a probability Psellt+1 and keeps
being on sale with the remaining probability. If the family member is not hit by the mis-
match shock, then she will eectively occupy the house over the following period. In this
case, the family receives the utility service from occupying the house, uses the house as an
input in the production function and gains the marginal productivity ezt+1Fht+1 . Moreover,
the family enjoys the continuation value of owning the house VHt+1. Finally, the ownership
of an additional house increases the collateral value of families’ housing stock, relaxing
its borrowing constraint. Thereby, families can access a larger loan, increase consumption
and raise its utility level by φt+1Uct+1 q
opt
t+1.
1.3.7 Characterization of the Decentralized Equilibrium
Proposition 1. In a steady-state equilibrium the LTV ratio q
opt
t
qmktt
positively depends on the
liquidity of the housing market. Proof. See Appendix 1.D.2.
In this model the LTV ratio is endogenous and depends on the liquidity of the housing
market. When the market heats up, the ratio increases and therefore families’ borrowing
capacity increases. Analogously, a liquidity freeze tightens the LTV ratio, decreasing fam-
ilies’ borrowing capacity. This result implies that the observed movements in maximum
LTV ratios could be partially accounted for by changes in the liquidity of the housing
market.
Proposition 2. The house price qmktt negatively depends on the current shadow value of
families’ borrowing constraint. Proof. See Appendix 1.D.3.
When families become borrowing constrained, they decrease the level of search eort
on the housing market generating a re sale spiral which is detrimental for house prices
qmktt . In this environment re sales negatively aect both families’ collateral value and
their LTV ratio, triggering a deationary spiral in both the house price and the LTV ratio.
Proposition 3. The tightness of the housing market equals family members’ search eort.
The behaviour of the frictional housing market is starkly simplied in a symmetric com-
petitive equilibrium. Indeed, in this equilibrium every member opts for the same level of
search eort, implying that
∫ 1
0
(
1 – hi,t
)
si,tdi = (1 – ht) st . As a result, the equilibrium
market tightness becomes
θt =
(1 – ht) st
vt
= st
since the total housing stock is an unitary xed supply. The tightness of the housing
market entirely depends on the search eort exerted by buyers. Hence, the housing market
is hot as long as the level of eort is high. This result further implies that in each period the
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probability of selling a house is Psellt = θ
1–γ
t = s
1–γ
t . Hot housing market are characterized
by a high level of eort from buyers and a high probability of selling a house. The opposite
applies in cold markets.
Instead, the probability of buying a house equals Pbuyt = θ
–γ
t = s
–γ
t . Given this prob-
ability, the total amount of houses bought by a family member becomes Pbuyt st (1 – ht) =
s1–γt (1 – ht), which is increasing in the level of search eort exerted by family members.
Implication 1. The frictional housing market generates partial irreversibilities in housing
investment.
The price at which families purchase housing qmktt is higher than the expected price at
which they sell houses qoptt . As in Due et al. (2005), the bid-ask spread depends on the
presence of the search frictions. This spread implies that the housing investment is par-
tial irreversible (i.e., the marginal gain of disinvestment is lower than the marginal cost of
investment) and the degree of irreversibility uctuates over time as a function of housing
market liquidity. Investment is more irreversible in cold housing market.
Implication 2. Partial irreversibilities in investment together with the presence of a de-
creasing to scale production function allow volatility shocks to have real eects: an increase
in volatility freezes housing investment.
Partial irreversibilities in investment coupled together with a decreasing return to scale
production function make changes in volatility to have real eects. When it is expensive
to reverse housing investment, family members become cautious and lower their search
eort in uncertain times. Thus, a high volatility reduces the liquidity of the housing mar-
ket. Instead, in a stable macroeconomic environment, agents increase their search eort
and the housing market heats up. Decreasing returns to scale are key for this result. Ca-
ballero (1991) shows that a higher uncertainty decreases investment only in environment
in which asymmetric adjustment costs interact with either imperfect competition or de-
creasing returns to scale technologies. If prots are convex in demand or costs, then a
higher uncertainty actually rises expected prots leading to an investment boom.
1.4 Quantitative Analysis
I calibrate one period of the model to correspond to one quarter. To understand the quan-
titative relevance of the link between volatility, liquidity and nancial crises, I estimate
the shocks to both the level and the volatility of the aggregate total factor productivity of
the U.S. economy using quarterly data from 1947Q2 until 2013Q4. The level and volatility
shocks are estimated using Bayesian Sequential Monte Carlo methods.
I calibrate most of the parameters of the model to the values either estimated or used
in previous papers. The main parameters which I calibrate to an empirical targets is the
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cost of searching eort in the housing market. Indeed, in Section 1.3.7 shows that the
probabilities of buying and selling a house in the frictional market depend on the search
eort exerted by the families. If the eort was costless, then the search frictions would be
oset by an innitely amount of search eort exerted by family members, and the liquidity
of the housing market would be perfect. I calibrate the cost of search eort to match the
long-run mean of the time on the market of a house on sale.
The model is solved numerically using global methods, which do not rely on approx-
imations based on Taylor expansions around the steady state. Although the algorithm is
much more time intensive, it preserves the non-linear dynamics of the model.
1.4.1 Estimating the Volatility of Total Factor Productivity
In the model the ultimate source of the build-up of risk and burst of nancial crises is
given by shocks to the level and the volatility of TFP. To understand the quantitative rel-
evance of this mechanism, I take the actual series of level shocks and volatility shocks to
TFP from the data. Namely, I derive the Solow residual of the economy using quarterly
data on output, capital and labor from 1947Q2 until 2013Q4 and apply a one sided HP lter
with parameter λ = 1600.As in Section 1.2, I estimate the process using Bayesian meth-
ods. I elicit some unrestrictive priors, and after deriving the likelihood of the process for
some given parameters with the Sequential Importance Sampling (SIS) particle lter in-
troduced in Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) and Fernandez-Villaverde et
al. (2011), I maximize the posterior likelihood using a random walk Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm with 25000 replications, out of which the rst 5000 represent burn-in draws. Fi-
nally, I recover the historical distribution of the time varying volatility using the backward-
smoothing routine of Godsill et al. (2004).
1.4.2 Estimation Results
I elicit Beta priors centred around 0.90 for both the autocorrelation coecients of the level
equation ρz and the volatility equation ρσ . The implicit assumption is that both the level
and the volatility are known to be highly persistent over time. For the degree of stochastic
volatility η, I elicit a a Gamma prior with mean 0.315 and standard deviation 0.03 following
the posterior estimate of Born and Pfeifer (2013), who derive the stochastic volatility of
the U.S. Solow residual using data from 1970 on. Finally, I dene a uniform distribution
between –11 and –3 for the long-run log volatility σ¯.
Table 1.1 reports the median, the 5-th and 95-th quantiles of the posterior distribu-
tion of each parameter. I nd a strong persistence in both the level and volatility of TFP.
The latter is very important because the mechanism of the model relies on the existence
of a long period of low volatility which fosters a credit boom, and boosting households’
leverage. The process is also characterized by a high degree of stochastic volatility. A one
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standard deviation increase in the volatility shocks raises the volatility of the innovation
to the level of TFP by (eη – 1)× 100 = 32.4%.
Table 1.1
Estimation of the Stochastic Volatility of TFP
Parameter Prior Posterior
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Median 5 Percent 95 Percent
ρz Beta 0.90 0.10 0.8137 0.7500 0.8734
ρσ Beta 0.90 0.10 0.7949 0.6071 0.9065
η Gamma 0.315 0.03 0.2805 0.2362 0.3267
σ¯ Uniform -7.00 2.30 -5.3869 -5.5792 -5.2130
Note: ρz denotes the autocorrelation parameter of the level equation, while ρσ is the autocorrelation of the volatility equation. η
captures the degree of stochastic volatility in the process, and σ¯ denotes the long-run log volatility.
1.4.3 Calibration Exercise
Most of the parameters of the model are targeted to values estimated or used in previous
papers. In particular, the calibration closely follows Bianchi and Mendoza (2013). The
crucial parameter which is calibrated is the cost of exerting search eort on the housing
market, which determines the behavior of the tightness of the market and eventually the
level of housing liquidity.
I consider the following utility function for the families
U (ct , lt , ht+1) =
(
cξt h
1–ξ
t+1 – µ
(1–lt )1+ω
1+ω
)1–δ
– 1
1 – δ
The parameters δ, µ and ω denote the risk aversion, the degree of disutility from working
and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of family members. The parameter ξ governs the
substitutability between consumption and housing.10 This utility function belongs to the
class of preferences introduced in Greenwood et al. (1988), and rules out any wealth eect
on the labor supply, which would counter-factually lead to an increase in labor supply
during a crisis. I set the disutility of work as µ = αn to have mean hours that equal 1.
10The Cobb-Douglas function in consumption expenditures reects the fact that expenditure shares on
housing are constant over time and across metropolitan areas, see Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011).
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Then, the Frisch elasticity is dened as 1/ω = 1 and I set the risk aversion δ = 2 as in
Bianchi and Mendoza (2013), whereas ξ = 0.76 as in Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011), who
nd that the share of households’ expenditure in housing is constant over time around
a value of 24%. The subjective time discount factor is set to the standard value at the
quarterly frequency of β = 0.99.
I stipulate a decreasing return to scale production function
yt = eztnαnt h
αh
t
where αn + αh < 1. The parameter αh is calibrated to match the ratio of housing stock
value over the GDP. Using data from the Flow of Funds from 1952Q1 until 2013Q4, the
ratio of the market value of the real estate of the private nonnancial sector over GDP is
2.24. In the model, this average is matched by a value of αh = 0.11. Instead, the labor share
is set to the standard value of αn = 0.64. Overall, the returns to scale of the technology
sum up to 0.75. Finally, the productivity process zt inherits the data generator process
estimated in the previous Section.
I calibrate the gross real interest rate to R = 1.0065, that is the value that Bianchi and
Mendoza (2013) estimate for the average of the ex-post real interest rate on three months
Treasury Bills over the last three decades. Instead, the working capital coecient is set
to ν = 0.17. To compute this value, I use rms’ M1 money holdings to proxy for their
working capital. Since two-thirds of the total M1 stock are held by rms, M1 accounts on
average for 16% of annual GDP over the period 1959Q1-2013Q4, and the 0.64 labor share
dened above, I set ν = 4 ∗ (2/3) ∗ 0.16/0.64 = 0.68. Hence, rms maintain 68 percent of
their quarterly wage bill in cash. This number is very close to the value of 0.63 used in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
Finally, I calibrate the parameters characterizing the dynamics of the housing market
as follows. I dene the mismatch shock to be equal to ψ = 0.0278 to match the average
stay in a house of 9 years reported by Ngai and Tenreyro (2014). The parameter of the
matching function which refers to the houses supplied to the market by the real estate
sector is set to γ = 0.21 following the value estimated in Genesove and Han (2012). The
bargaining power of the seller is set such as ζ = γ so that the Hosios (1990) condition
holds. Finally, the monetary cost of exerting searching eort in the frictional market is
calibrated to match the average time on the market of a house on sale using data from
1963Q1 until 2013, which is 6.21 months. In this way, I nd a value of κ = 0.67.
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Table 1.2
Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target/Source
Disutility from work µ = αn Normalization
Inverse Frisch elasticity ω = 1 Bianchi and Mendoza (2013)
Substitutability consumption/housing ξ = 0.76 Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011)
Risk aversion δ = 2 Standard value
Time discount β = 0.99 Standard value
Share labor αn = 0.64 Standard value
Share housing αh = 0.11 Ratio real estate value over GDP=2.24
Gross real interest rate R = 1.0065 Average return Treasury Bills
Working capital parameter ν = 0.68 Ratio M1 over GDP held by rms
Mismatch shock ψ = 0.0278 Ngai and Tenreyro (2014)
Sellers’ matching function parameter γ = 0.21 Genesove and Han (2012)
Sellers’ bargaining power ζ = γ Hosios’ condition
Cost searching eort κ = 0.67 Average TOM house on sale
Note: The table report the calibrated value of all the parameters of the model, except for the DGP of the
technology shock. TOM refers to the expected time on the market.
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1.4.4 Quantitative Results
Real Eects of Volatility Shocks
How do volatility shocks aect the real economy? Figure 1.6 plots the policy function
of housing investment (i.e., searching eort in the housing market) as a function of the
volatility of TFP - at dierent levels of households’ leverage. I report the values of both
housing investment and TFP volatility as percentage deviations from their ergodic steady-
state.
Figure 1.6
Policy Function of Housing Investment
The gure plots the policy function of housing investment (i.e., searching eort in the
housing market) as a function of the volatility of TFP - for two dierent levels of house-
holds leverage, low and high. Housing investment and TFP volatility are dened as per-
centage deviations from the ergodic steady state.
Figure 1.6 shows that housing investment is decreasing in the level of TFP volatil-
ity. The higher the volatility, the more household members are discouraged to search for
a house, the lower overall housing investment. Interestingly, the relationship between
housing investment and TFP volatility does depend on households’ leverage. When lever-
age is low, a 10% increase in the volatility of TFP reduces housing investment by around
-3.5%. Instead, when households’ leverage is high, the same change in volatility implies
a fall in housing investment by around -7.5%. These dierences are due to the fact that
households’ borrowing constraint is more likely to bind at high levels of leverage. When
the constraint becomes binding, a small shock to productivity propagate much more into
the real economy, because households have no additional borrowing capacity to smooth
out the eects of shocks.
In addition, the relationship between housing investment and volatility becomes highly
non-linear at high levels of leverage. Indeed, when leverage is high and volatility peaks,
then the borrowing constraint becomes binding, which forces households to sharply re-
duce their debt and re sell their housing stock.
1.4 Quantitative Analysis 25
Frequency and Severity of Financial Crises.
I compare the quantitative performance of ve dierent economies with the data. In the
rst economy, which I refer to as the “RBC” case, I consider a standard model in which
there are only level shocks to TFP and the housing market is perfectly liquid. In the second
alternative, which I refer to as the “Search Frictions” economy, I add search frictions in the
housing market in the “RBC” economy. This second case disentangles the role of search
frictions alone in capturing the dynamics of nancial crises. In the third case, which I
refer to as the “Stochastic Volatility” economy, I add the volatility shocks to TFP to the
“RBC” economy. Hence, this case disentangles the role of stochastic volatility once it is
introduced in a standard framework with a perfectly liquid housing market. In the fourth
and fth economies I consider a “RBC” economy with both search frictions in the housing
market and volatility shocks to TFP. The only dierence between these two economies
is that in the “Fixed LTV” economy I consider a constant LTV ratio at 100%, while in
the “Stochastic LTV” economy I consider a LTV ratio which is endogenous and moves
over time as a function of housing liquidity. These two economies disentangle the role of
changes in the collateral liquidity as a propagation mechanism for the volatility shocks.
The addition of stochastic volatility - throughout the ve economies - does not alter
the unconditional mean of volatility. The presence of a stochastic volatility implies only
a time varying pattern around the unconditional mean. The quantity of aggregate risk is
the same in all the scenarios I compare.
Table 1.3 reports the results of the model on the frequency and the severity of nancial
crises, on a sample of simulated data over 10,000 periods. I compare the frequency and
severity of nancial crises implied by the ve economies with the actual moments recov-
ered from U.S. data. I dene a nancial crisis in the model as the state in which aggregate
credit growth falls down by more than one standard deviation. According to this deni-
tion, over the last century there have been two nancial crises: in 1929 and in 2007. As
measures of severity, I consider the cumulative drop of output growth, employment drop
and credit growth during the two years following a nancial crisis (i.e, on the year upon
the occurrence of the crisis and the following one).
The second column of Table 1.3 shows that a standard RBC model generates too few
and mild crises. This economy accounts for around 39% of the frequency of crises and
52% of the output drop. Introducing search frictions raises the probability of experienc-
ing a nancial crisis by 15% and the associated drop in output, employment and credit by
12%, 18% and 11%, respectively. Hence, changes in the liquidity of the collateral improve
the performance of the model to a limited extent, when the ultimate source of exogenous
variation is given by shocks to the level of TFP. Instead, if I consider the role of stochastic
volatility of TFP into a standard RBC economy, the “Stochastic Volatility” case, I nd that
volatility shocks barely improves the predictions of the model. A time varying volatility
amplies the severity of crises just by 8%, while the drops in output, employment and
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credit hardly change. These results point out that volatility shocks need a propagation
mechanism in order to have a relevant role in capturing the dynamics of credit crunches.
Table 1.3
Results
Data RBC Search Stochastic Search Frictions &
Frictions Volatility Stochastic Volatility
Fixed Stochastic
LTV LTV
Frequency Crises 2.00% 0.78% 0.90% 0.84% 0.95% 1.21%
Output Drop –9.78% –5.07% –5.68% –5.11% –6.03% –7.99%
Employment Drop –10.29% –4.20% –4.96% –4.37% –5.14% –6.03%
Credit Drop –12.07% –7.06% –7.81% –7.52% –8.40% –9.25%
Note: The output drop, employment drop and credit drop refer to the fall in output growth, employment growth and credit
growth over the two years following a nancial crisis (i.e., upon the year of occurence and the following one). In the model,
a nancial crisis correspond to the state in which aggregate credit falls down by more than one standard deviation. The
“RBC” refers to an economy with only level shocks to TFP and a perfectly liquid housing market. The “Search Frictions”
refers to a RBC economy with a frictional housing market. The “Stochastic Volatility” refers to a RBC economy with
stochastic volatility. The “Search Frictions & Stochastic Volatility” refers to a RBC economy with stochastic volatility and
a frictional housing market. This economy is studied in two dierent cases. In the rst one, “Fixed LTV”, the LTV ratio
is xed at 100%. In the second one, “Stochastic LTV”, the LTV ratio is endogenous and moves over time as a function of
housing liquidity.
When I consider the benchmark economy with both search frictions and stochastic
volatility of TFP, in which the LTV ratio is endogenous and moves over time as a function
of liquidity (the “Search Frictions & Stochastic Volatility - Stochastic LTV” case), then the
frequency of crises implied by the model raises to 1.21%, with an associated drop in output,
employment and credit of -7.99%, -6.03% and -9.25%. Thus, the interaction of volatility
shocks and search frictions in the housing market raises the probability of experiencing a
crisis by around 55% with respect the basic RBC economy and accounts for around 60% of
the observed frequency of crises. As far as the severity of the crisis is concerned, volatility
shocks and search frictions boost the drops of output in employment by around 58% and
44%, and the fall in credit by 31%.
The results of the “Search Frictions & Stochastic Volatility - Fixed LTV” disentangle
the contribution of the changes in the collateral liquidity on the performance of the model.
When the LTV ratio is kept constant at 100%, then the predictions of the model worsens,
both in terms of frequency and severity of crises. The comparison between the “Fixed
1.4 Quantitative Analysis 27
LTV” and “Stochastic LTV” economies shows that changes in the liquidity of the collateral
accounts for most of the increase in the frequency of nancial crises of the benchmark
economy.
These results point out that either search frictions or volatility shocks can improve
the performance of the model, although falling short in capturing the characteristics of
crises as in the data. The interaction of a frictional housing market and volatility shocks
accounts for half of the probability of experiencing a crisis, and its corresponding drop in
output and credit. The changes in the liquidity of the collateral, that eventually modies
the LTV ratio, represent the key mechanism through which volatility shocks propagate
into the real economy. This nding adds to the literature on the real eects of volatility
shocks, such as Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), Bloom (2009) and Fernandez-Villaverde et
al. (2011), by pointing out that search frictions in the housing market amplies the eects
of the changes in volatility.
Dynamics of Aggregate Productivity around Financial Crises.
Table 1.3 shows that the volatility shocks to aggregate productivity raises the occurrence
of nancial crises by around 55%. What is then the dynamics of these shocks around -
nancial crises? Figure 1.7 plots the behavior of the level and volatility of TFP around a
crisis, as implied by the model.
The graphs show that the period preceding a crisis is characterized by a high level and
a low volatility of productivity. In the model, a nancial crisis bursts after a long period
of expansion in the economic activity. For example, the level of productivity is 3% above
its long-run mean three years before a crisis, while the volatility of productivity is around
15% below mean. This long period of high level of productivity with low volatility gen-
erates a credit and investment boom which reinforce each other, raising the equilibrium
LTV ratio and ultimately boosting households’ leverage. In this way, these realizations
of high productivity and low volatility builds up systemic risk. Indeed, a joint 2.5% drop
in the level of productivity and a rise in volatility of around 27% turn the borrowing con-
straint into binding and trigger a crisis. Hence, a crisis coincides with both a slump in the
level of productivity and a sudden spike in volatility which follow a long period of high
productivity with low volatility.
To understand the role of the changes in households’ collateral values, I plot the dy-
namics of house price and the LTV ratio around nancial crises in Figure 1.8. It shows
that nancial crises are preceded by an inationary spiral in both the house prices and
the LTV ratio which relaxes households’ credit limit and raises the level of leverage and
therefore systemic risk in the economy. Afterwards, the inationary spirals are abruptly
reversed into deationary spirals amidst the burst of the nancial crisis.
In the model a nancial crisis is preceded by a boom in house price of around 8% above
mean, which is then turned into a house price bust at 8% below trend. A similar dynamics
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Figure 1.7
Dynamics of Aggregate Volatility around Financial Crises.
(a) Level of Aggregate Productivity
(b) Volatility of Aggregate Productivity
Note: The gure plots the average values of the deviations from the long-run mean of
the level zt (Panel a) and the volatility σt (Panel b) of total factor productivity in a 9 year
window around nancial crises. The solid line denotes the dynamics implied by the bench-
mark model, whereas the dashed line denotes the dynamics in the data. A nancial crisis
is dened as the state in which aggregate credit growth drops down by more than one
standard deviation.
characterizes the LTV ratio. The ratio ranges around is 8% above mean before a nancial
crisis and it then turned into a very large drop, down to 13% below mean. So, amidst the
nancial crisis house price collapses by around 16% while the LTV ratio drops down by
a larger extent, around 21%. This result underlies the key role of the novel mechanism
of this paper - the endogenous boom and bust in the LTV ratio - in accounting for the
frequency and the severity of nancial crises.
In addition, the behavior of aggregate credit around crises can be used to compare the
prediction of my theory with competitive explanations. Indeed, a rare disaster shock as in
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Figure 1.8
House Price and Loan-to-Value Ratio around Financial Crises.
(a) House Price
(b) Loan-to-Value Ratio
Note: The gure plots the average values of the deviations from the long-run mean of the
house price qmktt (Panel a) and the loan-to-value ratio
qmktt
qoptt
(Panel b) in a 9 year window
around nancial crises. The solid line denotes the dynamics implied by the benchmark
model, whereas the dashed line denotes the dynamics in the data. A nancial crisis is de-
ned as the state in which aggregate credit growth drops down by more than one standard
deviation.
Barro (2006) and Gourio (2012) is able to generate a nancial crises in which both output
and credit signicantly drop. Yet, such a theory could not explain the period of credit
and output boom which precedes a nancial crisis. From this perspective, a model with
volatility shocks can generate both the upside risk and the downside risk that is necessary
to account for the very nature of nancial crises: credit booms which turn into bust.
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Time Variation in the Loan-to-Value Ratio.
In this Section I study the time variation in the LTV ratio q
opt
t
qmktt
implied by the model. Table
1.4 reports the standard deviation of the LTV ratio in the data and in the four economies
I consider. I report the average standard deviation of the LTV ratio together with the
standard deviations conditional on whether the economies is in normal times or in crisis
times. To derive the data counterpart of the LTV ratio of my model, I follow Jermann and
Quadrini (2012). First, I log-linearize the collateral constraint dened in Equation (1.12).
I assume that the collateral constraint is always binding and derive the series of the LTV
ratio as the residual once I substitute each variable with its observable counterpart in the
data. I take data on employment, wage, total liabilities and the market value of real estate.
In this way, I obtain the value of the LTV ratio over time, a series which Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) refer to as an exogenous nancial shock.11
Table 1.4
Standard Deviation LTV Ratio
Data RBC Search Stochastic Search Frictions &
Frictions Volatility Stochastic Volatility
Fixed Stochastic
LTV LTV
Average 3.48% 0% 1.22% 0% 0% 1.95%
Normal Times 3.41% 0% 1.01% 0% 0% 1.50%
Crisis Times 5.52% 0% 3.23% 0% 0% 4.25%
Note: The LTV ratio is the ratio between the option value and the actual price of housing, q
opt
t
qmktt
. In the
model, “Crisis Times” correspond to the states in which aggregate credit falls growth drops by more than
one standard deviation. The “RBC” refers to an economy with only level shocks to TFP and a perfectly
liquid housing market. The “Search Frictions” refers to a RBC economy with a frictional housing market.
The “Stochastic Volatility” refers to a RBC economy with stochastic volatility. The “Search Frictions &
Stochastic Volatility” refers to a RBC economy with stochastic volatility and a frictional housing market. This
economy is studied in two dierent cases. In the rst one, “Fixed LTV”, the LTV ratio is xed at 100%. In the
second one, “Stochastic LTV”, the LTV ratio is endogenous and moves over time as a function of housing liquidity.
Table 1.4 shows that as long as in the model the housing market is perfectly liquid and
qoptt equals qmktt , the LTV ratio is constant and equals 1. This is case in all the economies
11The standard deviation of the series does not change if either I consider only the data on real estate
and liabilities of the household sector or I consolidate it with with the non-nancial business sector.
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without search frictions. Also in the economy with a xed LTV ratio the standard devi-
ation is zero by construction. Instead, the LTV ratio changes over time once I allow for
a frictional housing market. In the “Search Frictions” economy, the standard deviation of
the ratio is 1.22%. It equals 1.01% in normal times and it peaks up to 3.23% in crisis times.
When I add volatility shocks, the standard deviation becomes 1.91%, with a value of 1.50%
in normal times and 4.25% in crisis times. These results show that volatility shocks amplify
the variation in the borrowing margin by around 60% on average, and account for 56% of
the observed standard deviation of the borrowing margin. Moreover, Table 1.4 shows that
although the model falls short in accounting for the volatility of LTV ratios in normal
times, it provides a much better approximations in crisis times. The benchmark model
accounts for around 77% of the standard deviation of LTV ratios amidst a nancial crisis.
Indeed, volatility shocks do not generate much variation in LTV ratios in good times. In-
stead, when the households’ borrowing constraint becomes binding, changes in the level
and volatility of TFP trigger a Fisherian deation spiral in the house price and housing
liquidity which amplies the uctuations in the LTV ratio.
Overall Table 1.4 shows that volatility shocks can be accounted for as a possible foun-
dation of the nancial shocks à la Jermann and Quadrini (2012), especially in crisis times.
Hence, this model provides a quantitative theory of time varying LTV ratios which can be
tested using data on housing market liquidity.
Moreover, in the model the changes in LTV ratios are driven by credit demand motives,
because is no role for credit supply in the form of banks. The implications of this result
are twofold. First, this evidence suggests that nancial shocks should not necessarily be
interpreted as if they were originated in the nancial sector. Second, the ndings of this
paper can help reconciling dierent views on the cause of the last recession. Through
the lenses of this paper, the fact the drop in investment, credit and employment amidst
the Great Recession can be accounted for by a large negative nancial shock - as shown
in Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) - is not necessarily
counterfactual with the possibility that the credit crunch was triggered by a fall in credit
demand due to the deterioration of households’ balance sheets, as shown by Mian and Su
(2009, 2011).
Asset Pricing Implications
What are the characteristics of asset prices implied by the model? Table 1.5 reports the eq-
uity premium, the market price of risk and the Sharpe ratio associated with the investment
in housing in the ve dierent economies.
Table 1.5 shows that overall the behavior of asset prices starkly diers across normal
times and nancial crises. The unconditional equity premium is very low in all the dier-
ent economies, ranging from the 0.65% of the “RBC” model up to the 1.14% of the bench-
mark model. Instead, upon the realization of a nancial crises, the premium skyrockets up
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Table 1.5
Asset Prices
RBC Search Stochastic Search Frictions &
Frictions Volatility Stochastic Volatility
Fixed Stochastic
LTV LTV
a. Unconditional
Equity Premium 0.65% 0.72% 0.67% 0.88% 1.14%
Market Price of Risk 1.65% 1.93% 1.73% 2.31% 2.50%
Sharpe Ratio 0.15 0.21 0.16 0.23 0.28
b. Crisis Times
Equity Premium 10.59% 10.96% 10.79% 11.63% 12.51%
Market Price of Risk 3.97% 4.17% 4.02% 4.60% 4.93%
Sharpe Ratio 0.34 0.46 0.38 0.50 0.57
Note: The “Equity Premium” refers to the dierence between the return on housing and the xed risk-
free interest rate. The “Market Price of Risk” is the ratio between the unconditional standard deviation
and the unconditional average of the stochastic discount factor of the family. The “Sharpe Ratio” denotes
the ratio between unconditional average and the unconditional standard deviation of the excess return.
“Unconditional” denotes the moments of the model average over all the states of nature. “Crisis Timesńń
refer to the states in which aggregate credit growth drops by more than one standard deviation. The “RBC”
refers to an economy with only level shocks to TFP and a perfectly liquid housing market. The “Search
Frictions” refers to a RBC economy with a frictional housing market. The “Stochastic Volatility” refers to
a RBC economy with stochastic volatility. The “Search Frictions & Stochastic Volatility” refers to a RBC
economy with stochastic volatility and a frictional housing market. This economy is studied in two dierent
cases. In the rst one, “Fixed LTV”, the LTV ratio is xed at 100%. In the second one, “Stochastic LTV”, the
LTV ratio is endogenous and moves over time as a function of housing liquidity.
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to 10.59% in the “RBC” economy and an even higher 12.51% under the benchmark econ-
omy. The same applies for the market prices of risk and the Sharpe ratio. For instance,
the Sharpe ratio of the economy with search frictions in the housing market, stochastic
volatility and stochastic LTV ratio is 0.28 unconditionally, and gets up to 0.57 amidst the
occurrence of a nancial crisis.
The asset pricing implications of the mode are then twofold. First, as in Bianchi
and Mendoza (2013) and He and Krishnamurthy (2010), the non-linearities implied by
the occasionally-binding borrowing constraint generate asymmetric movements in asset
prices, which depend on whether the economy is experiencing a nancial crisis. Second,
the rare events in which the economy experiences a major drop in aggregate credit and
a sharp rise in the excess returns help increasing the overall unconditional predictions of
the model in terms of asset prices. Although the model still falls short in accounting for
asset prices unconditionally, it is able to generate an excess return as high as 1.14% in the
benchmark version.
Finally, Table 1.5 conrms that the search frictions in the housing market and espe-
cially the stochastic LTV ratio which depends on housing liquidity are important prop-
agation channels of the TFP shocks. Indeed, the search frictions in the housing mar-
ket increase the excess return by around 11%, while the interactions of search frictions
and stochastic volatility further raises the excess return by around 58%. Importantly, the
stochastic LTV ratio accounts for almost 23% of the overall unconditional equity premium.
I deem the results to be an important contribution in and of itself: the interaction between
funding liquidity and market liquidity is an important channel that could help standard
production economies in accounting for the characteristics of asset prices.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I show that nancial crises - i.e., major credit crunches - can be triggered
by real shocks. I consider a model where the exogenous source of variation is given by
shocks to both the level and the volatility of TFP. In particular, I emphasize the role of
shocks to the volatility of TFP as a source of nancial instability, which generates periods
of credit booms followed by deep busts.
The main propagation mechanism I propose is the presence of search frictions in the
housing market. I show that in this environment the volatility shocks are propagated into
the real economy by the liquidity of housing, which in the model is captured by search
frictions. Moreover, as long as houses serve as collateral assets, the liquidity of the housing
market determines households’ maximum LTV ratio. LTV ratio can then be interpreted as
liquidity discounts: households can access to a higher LTV ratio when the housing market
is more liquid.
Search frictions in the housing market are crucial to let volatility shocks directly aect
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households’ investment propensity in housing. In my model, the search frictions deter-
mine both partial irreversibilities (i.e., there is an endogenous bid-ask spread between the
relevant house price of sellers and buyers) and adjustment costs in housing investment.
Since housing investment is expensive to reverse, agents prefer a wait-and-see behavior in
times of high uncertainty, which is eventually reected in a lower investment. Therefore,
changes in volatility drive the level of investment, and the higher the volatility, the lower
the housing investment, the lower both the housing liquidity and households’ LTV ratio.
Interestingly, in the model nancial crises are characterized by deationary spirals in
both the house price and the LTV ratio, a novel mechanism which amplies the magnitude
of the credit crunch. These dynamics do not hinge on the presence of a nancial sector:
both the credit boom and the credit bust are entirely driven by changes in households’
credit demand. Yet, the model generates dynamics in the LTV ratios which are observa-
tionally equivalent to a nancial shock à la Jermann and Quadrini (2012). This evidence
supports the ndings of Mian and Su (2009, 2011), who point out that the deterioration
of the balance sheet of the households, rather than the one of the nancial intermediaries,
has triggered the Great Recession.
The policy implications of this paper are twofold. First, these results warn policy-
makers in interpreting shifts in LTV ratios as entirely driven by changes in credit supply.
Hence, a nancial shock is not a smoking gun supporting the government intervention in
the nancial sector. Second, the liquidity of housing - rather than the house price - is the
relevant variable that captures the condition of the housing cycle. In a companion paper,
Rachedi (2014), I provide evidence showing that the liquidity crunch in 2005 predicts the
fall in house prices and households’ leverage during the Great Recession.
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1.A Appendix: Data
1.A.1 Aggregate Volatility and Financial Crises
I build a panel of 20 developed countries from 1980 until 2013. Extending the panel back
to the 60’s or 70’s does not alter the results because in those years the 20 developed coun-
tries under investigation experienced almost no nancial crisis. The countries covered
are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
Financial Crises: I take the dates of nancial crises from multiple sources, that is, Bordo
et al. (2001), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Reinhart and Rogo (2009), Laeven and Valencia
(2012), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Jorda et al. (2015). Financial crises are dened as
credit crunches in which the nancial sector experiences large losses and bank runs, that
eventually lead to a spike in bankruptcies, forced merged and government intervention.
Recessions: The dates of recessions are instead given by the OECD recession indica-
tors. For the United States, I follow the dates provided by NBER. The dates of crises and
recessions by country are reported in Table 1.A.1.
Total Factor Productivity: I take the series of TFP from the Penn World Tables 8.0. TFP
is computed as the residual of real GDP minus the capital stock times the complement
to one of the share of labour compensation on GDP minus the total level of labor force
(employment times average annual hours worked by persons engaged) multiplied by the
share of labour compensation. The nominal variables are normalised at constant 2005
national prices.
Stock Market Volatility: The measure of aggregate volatility is based on stock market
returns. For each of the 20 countries of the panel, I consider the representative stock mar-
ket index, I take daily returns and compute a measure of dispersion (either the variance
or the interquantile range) within a period (either a year or a quarter). The stock market
indexes are the following: MSCI for Australia, MSCI for Austria, MSCI for Belgium, TSX
for Canada, MSCI for Denmark, MSCI for Finland, MSCI for France, DAX for Germany,
ATHEX for Greece, MSCI for Ireland, MSCI for Italy, NIKKEI for Japan, MSCI for Nether-
lands, MSCI for Norway, MSCI for Portugal, MSCI for Spain, MSCI for Sweden, MSCI for
Switzerland, FTSE for the UK, DJIA for the US. The source of the data is Datastream.
Credit to the Private Nonnancial Sector: I take the series on private credit from the
“Long Series on Total Credit and Domestic Bank Credit to the Private Nonnancial Sector”
of the Bank for International Settlements. For each country, I take the adjusted for breaks
nominal quarterly series. I take the series in which the lending sector is any sector and the
borrowing sector is the private nonnancial sector. Real values are derived by dividing
the credit series by the CPI. Annual observations are computed by averaging the quarterly
values within a year.
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Table 1.A.1
The Dates of Financial Crises and Recessions
Financial Crises Recessions
Australia 1989 1982, 1986, 1994, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2012
Austria 2008 1980, 1984, 1986, 1992, 1995, 2001, 2011
Belgium 2008 1980, 1984, 1991, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2011
Canada 2008 1980, 1986, 1989, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2012
Denmark 1987, 2008 1980, 1989, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2011
Finland 1991 1980, 1982, 1990, 1992, 1995, 2001, 2012
France 2008 1981, 1983, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2012
Germany 2008 1980, 1986, 1991, 1995, 2001, 2011
Greece 1991, 2009 1997, 2000, 2004
Ireland 2008 1982, 1985, 1991, 1997, 2001
Italy 1990, 2008, 2011 1980, 1986, 1996, 2001
Japan 1992 1982, 1986, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2012
Netherlands 2008 1980, 1986, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2011
Norway 1988 1980, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2008, 2012
Portugal 2008, 2011 1980, 1983, 1991, 1995, 2001
Spain 2008, 2011 1980, 1984, 1991, 1995, 2000
Sweden 1991, 2008 1980, 1984, 1996, 2000, 2011
Switzerland 2008 1982, 1986, 1994, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2012
United Kingdom 1984, 1991, 2007 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2011
United States 2007 1980, 1981, 990, 2000
Note: The dates of nancial crises come from Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Reinhart and Rogo
(2009), Laeven and Valencia (2012), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Jorda et al. (2015). Financial crises are dened as
credit crunches in which the nancial sector experiences large losses and bank runs, that eventually lead to a spike
in bankruptcies, forced merged and government intervention. The dates of recessions come from OECD recession
indicators.
Gross Domestic Product: I take the series of real GDP for the United States from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, series IDGDPC1. For all the other countries, I take the series
of nominal GDP from the “Main Economic Indicators” database of the OECD. I compute
the real series by dividing the nominal GDP series by the CPI.
House Prices: Real house prices are mostly taken from the International House Price
database of FED Dallas, which is borrowed from Mack and Martinez-Garcia (2011). For
Austria, Greece and Portugal, I have taken the quarterly series of house prices from the
Property Price Statistics of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). For Austria, I
consider the series of “Residential Property Prices, All Flats (Vienna), per square meter”,
for Greece I consider the series of “Residential Property Prices, All Flats (Other Cities),
per dwelling”, and for Portugal I consider the series. The real annual prices are taken by
deating with the according CPI series the nominal series, which has been aggregated at
the annual level by taking the average over the four quarterly observations per year. For
Portugal, I take the monthly series from the Property Price Statistics of the BIS, considering
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the series of “Residential Property Prices, All Dwellings, per square meter”. The annual
series is computed by taking the average over the twelve observations per year.
1.A.2 SVAR: Volatility Shocks and the Housing Market
The VAR is estimated using with monthly data from January 1963 until December 2013
on the level of S&P 500 returns, an indicator of volatility, the Federal Funds Rate, the
consumer price index, industrial production and three variables on the housing markets
related to price, quantity and liquidity. Each series but the volatility indicator is taken
in logarithm and detrended with a band-pass lter that removed frequencies below 18
months and above 96 months. The VAR includes a set of 12 lags.
S&P 500 returns: I take the logarithmic returns of the series of S&P 500 Stock Price Index
provided by S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC.
Indicator of Volatility: The indicator of volatility is borrowed by Bloom (2009). The
measure of volatility is an indicator function which equals one in the events in which the
VIX index (or the volatility of daily returns within a month in case the VIX data is not
available) is at least 1.65 standard deviations above its long run trend, as proxied by the
HP-ltered trend.
Federal Funds Rate: The series is the Eective Federal Funds Rate provided by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The FED-FRED indicator code is FEDFUNDS.
Consumer Price Index: The series is the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Con-
sumers: All Items provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The FED-FRED indicator
code is CPIAUCSL.
Industrial Production: The series is the Industrial Production Index provided by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The FED-FRED indicator code is IND-
PRO.
House Price: The series is the Median and Average Sales Prices of New Homes Sold
provided by the Census Bureau. The series refers to new, single-family houses only. The
FED-FRED indicator code is MSPNHSUS. In the robustness checks, I also use the series of
the Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index provided by Freddie Mac, which starts in
January 1975.
Quantity of Houses Sold: The series is the Number of Houses Sold provided by the Cen-
sus Bureau. The series refers to new, single-family houses only. The FED-FRED indicator
code is HSN1F.
Liquidity of the Housing Market: The series is the Monthly Supply of Home provided
by the Census Bureau. The series refers to new, single-family houses only. The series in-
dicates the expected time of the market of houses put up on sale. The FED-FRED indicator
code is MSACSR.
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1.B Appendix: Dynamics aroundCrises andRecessions
Figure 1.B.1 plots the dynamics around nancial crises and recessions of credit growth,
GDP growth, the house price growth and the level of the Solow residual. Panel (a) of Fig-
ure 1.B.1 shows that credit growth is much more volatility around nancial crises than
around recessions. Moreover, nancial crises are preceded by a credit boom in which
credit grows around 2% above trend. The trend is reversed upon the burst of the crisis,
after which credit growth becomes highly negative. Instead, the dynamics around reces-
sions do not present sizeable deviations from the long-run mean of credit growth. An
analogous dynamics characterize also the GDP, the house price growth and the level of
the Solow residual, as depicted in Panel (b), (c) and (d). This evidence supports the view of
Reinhart and Rogo (2009), Mendoza and Terrones (2012), Schularick and Taylor (2012),
and Jorda et al. (2013, 2015) that nancial crises are booms gone bust.
Figure 1.B.1
Dynamics around Crises and Recessions.
(a) Real Credit Growth (b) Real GDP Growth
(c) Real House Price Growth (d) Solow Residual
Note: The gure plots the median values of cross-country annual growth rates of real credit to the private non-nancial
sector (Panel a), real GDP growth rates (Panel b), real house price growth (Panel c) and the level of the Solow residual
(Panel d) measured in log dierences from the long-run mean - around recessions and nancial crises (9 year window).
The continuous line indicates the dynamics around nancial crises, while the dashed line refers to recessions. The
dates of nancial crises are taken from Reinhart and Rogo (2009). Recessions are derived from the OECD recession
indicators.
Figure 1.B.2 shows that the dynamics of volatility around nancial crises and reces-
sions are not altered when either computing volatility as the median values of the devia-
tions of the Solow residual from the trend (instead of the mean as in Figure 1.1), or when
excluding the recent nancial crises episodes. Figure 1.B.3 shows that the VIX was well
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below average over the three years preceding the nancial crisis, and experience a surge
raise at the beginning of 2007, well before the burst of the Great Recession. Over the three
quarters preceding the nancial crisis, the VIX has experienced a cumulative increase of
around 50% from its beginning of 2007 level. This evidence suggests that a sudden volatil-
ity spike after a prolonged period of low volatility tends to lead to a nancial crisis.
Figure 1.B.2
Different Measures of Aggregate Volatility.
(a) Volatility of Solow Residual - Median (b) Volatility of Solow Residual - 1980 - 2006
Note: The gure plots the dynamics of aggregate volatility around nancial crises and recessions (9 year win-
dow). The continuous line indicates the dynamics around nancial crises, while the dashed line presents the
dynamics around recession. In Panel (a) aggregate volatility is measured as the median values of the deviations
from the trend of the stochastic volatility of countries’ total factor productivity. In Panel (b) aggregate volatility
is measured as the median values of the deviations from the trend of the stochastic volatility of countries’ total
factor productivity over the period 1980-2006, therefore excluding the recent nancial crisis. The dates of nan-
cial crises are taken from Reinhart and Rogo (2009). Normal recessions are derived from the OECD recession
indicators.
Figure 1.B.3
The VIX and the Great Recession.
Note: The gure plots the changes in the quarterly VIX index, from January 1999 until December
2011. The series is dened as the percentage deviation from the long-run mean. The shadow area
denotes the last nancial crisis.
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1.B.1 SVAR and the House Price
Figure 1.B.4 shows that the impulse response functions of the housing market variables
does not change even when considering a dierent measure of the house price, that is, the
CMHPI series from Freddie Mac.
Figure 1.B.4
Volatility Shocks and the Housing Market.
(a) Volatility (b) House Price
(c) House Sales (d) Time on the Market
Note: VAR estimated from January 1975 to December 2013. The dashed lines are 1
standard-error bands around the response to a volatility shock. The coordinates indi-
cate percent deviations from the baseline.
1.C Appendix: Characterization of the Equilibrium
1.C.1 Denition of Decentralized Equilibrium
In this environment, a recursive decentralized equilibrium is dened by the individual
value functionV (h, d;H ,D, z,σ) and optimal policy functions
{
cˆ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ) , nˆ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ) ,
sˆ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ) , dˆ′ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ)
}
, pricing functions for occupied housing qmkt (H ,D, z,σ),
vacant housing qopt (H ,D, z,σ) and labor w (H ,D, z,σ), probabilities of selling and buying
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a house Psell (H ,D, z,σ) and Pbuy (H ,D, z,σ), and a perceived law of motion for aggregate
bond holdings ΓD (H ,D, z,σ) and occupied housing ΓH (H ,D, z,σ) such that:
1. Given the pricing functions qmkt (H ,D, z,σ), qopt (H ,D, z,σ) and w (H ,D, z,σ), the prob-
ability of selling and buying a house, Psell (H ,D, z,σ) and Pbuy (H ,D, z,σ), and the law
of motions of aggregate bond holdings ΓD (H ,D, z,σ) and aggregate occupied housing
ΓH (H ,D, z,σ), the families’ problem is solved byV (h, d;H ,D, z,σ) and
{
cˆ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ) ,
nˆ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ) , sˆ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ) , dˆ′ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ)
}
.
2. The housing markets clear, the probability of buying a house is
Pbuy (H ,D, z,σ) = sˆ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ) [(1 – h)ˆs (h, d;H ,D, z,σ)]
1–γ (1 – h)γ
(1 – h) sˆ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ)
,
the probability of selling a home is
Psell (H ,D, z,σ) = [(1 – h)ˆs (h, d;H ,D, z,σ)]
1–γ (1 – h)γ
1 – h ,
where the prices of occupied and vacant housing are determined by Equation (1.24) and
(1.8), respectively.
3. The labor market clears at the equilibrium wage w (H ,D, z,σ).
5. The perceived law of motion of aggregate bond holdings coincide with the actual one,
that is, ΓD (H ,D, z,σ) = dˆ′ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ).
6. The perceived law of motion of the aggregate stock of occupied houses coincide with
the actual one: ΓH (H ,D, z,σ) = (1 – ψ)
(
h + Pbuy (H ,D, z,σ) sˆ (h, d;H ,D, z,σ) (1 – h)
)
.
1.C.2 First Order Conditions
The rst order conditions of the problem yield the optimal choices on the supply of work-
ing hours, the number of workers to hire, housing investment and borrowing:
wt =
Ult
Uct
(1.C.1)
ztFnt = wt
[
1 + φtν
Uct
]
(1.C.2)
qmktt +
2κst
Pbuyt (1 – ht)
= ψEt
[
Λt+1
(
Psellt+1q
mkt
t+1 +
(
1 – Psellt+1
)
qoptt+1
)]
+ . . .
· · · + (1 – ψ)Et
[
Λt+1
(
VHt+1 +
Uht+1
Uct+1
+ ezt+1Fht+1 +
φt+1
Uct+1
qopt,t+1
)]
(1.C.3)
Uct = βREt
[
Uct+1
]
+ φt (1.C.4)
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where Yxt denotes the derivatives of the function Y (·) with respect the term xt , and φt is
the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint of the families.
The Equation (1.C.1) is the standard condition for the optimal labor supply. Instead,
the optimal labor demand (1.C.2) is distorted by the presence of the Lagrange multiplier
associated to the borrowing constraint φt . In the states in which the borrowing constraint
binds, the multiplier φt is positive, and the shadow price of the borrowing constraint
denes a wedge above the marginal cost. Hence, when a family is borrowing constrained,
the cost of hiring labor force de-facto increases, forcing the families to reduce the number
of workers hired and the overall level of production.
The Equation (1.C.3) represents the equilibrium conditions for the search eort on the
frictional market. It stipulates that in equilibrium the overall cost of searching for a house
equal its marginal gain. The cost is the sum of the searching cost and the house price. The
gain is the sum of the production dividends, the utility services received from occupying
the house, the extra amounts of resources obtained by relaxing the borrowing constraint
with an additional unit of collateral and the continuation value of owning a house. This
term also considers the event in which the member is hit by a mismatch shock and forced
to sell the house.
Finally, the Equation (1.C.4) characterizes the optimal choices of bonds. Again, the
borrowing constraint adds an extra-nancing cost φt which increases the actual repay-
ment cost. Therefore, in the states in which the borrowing constraint binds, households
de-facto incur in an interest rate that is above the one charged by foreign investors.
1.D Appendix: Proofs
1.D.1 Equilibrium Borrowing Constraint
The derivation of the equilibrium borrowing constraint closely follows Bianchi and Men-
doza (2013). The borrowing constraint arises in equilibrium as an incentive compatibility
constraint which grounds on a limited enforceability of debt, that is, families lack of com-
mitment to repay their debt. I consider the incentive compatibility constraint which yields
zero expected prots for the lenders in case they seize families’ collateral, and ensures that
families do not default. I consider the following environment:
1. Loans are signed with lenders in a competitive environment;
2. Financial contracts are not exclusive;
3. There is no informational friction between lenders and families;
4. Families borrow during the second stage of each period of the model, that is, just
after the realization of the shocks, and before production takes place;
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5. Families lack of commitment in repaying the debt only during the rst stage of the
problem;
6. If families renege on their debt, the stock of occupied housing hi,t is seized by the
lenders during the third stage, that is, defaulting families can still use their stock of
occupied housing for production and enjoy its utility services;
7. Lenders immediately sell the liquidated housing to a real estate sector in the third
stage;
8. The real estate sector consists of a continuum of real estate agencies;
9. Each family owns a diversied stake in the real estate sector;
10. There is free entry in the real estate sector, which is further perfectly competitive;
11. The real estate sector buys the liquidated houses from the lenders and puts them up
on sale on the frictional market;
12. The real estate sector do not use the stock of liquidated houses either as a production
input or as a collateral asset, and does not enjoy any utility service of housing;
13. After reneging on debt, families can immediately access again nancial market at
no penalty, and can purchase again its housing stock at competitive prices.
In this environment, in case a family defaults on its current level of debt, the lenders
lose an amount of resources that equals di,t+1R + νwtni,t , and gain q
opt
t hi,t from selling the
liquidated housing to the real estate sector. Hence, in equilibrium lenders will not require
a collateral value larger than qoptt hi,t .
On the other hand, from a family perspective, the gain of defaulting equals di,t+1R +
νwtni,t while its cost is VHi,thi,t , that is, the value that families attribute to the stock of
housing seized by the lenders. Since VHi,thi,t ≥ qoptt hi,t , families will always decide to
repay back their debt. Thus, the borrowing constraint
di,t+1
R
+ νwtni,t ≤ qoptt hi,t
ensures that lenders do not make ex-ante prots on a defaulting family and that families
do not default in equilibrium. In this way, the real estate sector does not operate on an
equilibrium path.
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1.D.2 Proof of Proposition 1.
The loan-to-value ratio q
opt
t
qh,t
equals
qoptt
qmktt
= Psellt +
(
1 – Psellt
)
Et
[
Λt+1q
opt
t+1
]
In a steady-state equilibrium, the loan-to-value ratio equals
qopt
qmkt
= Psell +
(
1 – Psell
)
β
qopt
qmkt
= P
sell
1 –
(
1 – Psell
)
β
since Λt+1 = β
Uct+1
Uct
, and Uct+1 = Uct = Uc along the steady-state. Thus, the derivative of
the loan-to-value ratio with respect to a change in the current level of the liquidity of the
frictional housing market, measured in terms of probability of selling a house is
∂
qopt
qmkt
∂Psell
= 1 – β[
1 –
(
1 – Psell
)
β
]2 > 0 ∀β ∈ (0, 1), Psell ∈ (0, 1)
1.D.3 Proof of Proposition 2.
I use the equation of house price qw,t given by the condition (1.24) to characterize the
expected equity premium associated to the investment in housing
Et
[
Rept+1
]
= Et
[
Rht+1 – R
]
where Rht+1 =
ezt+1Fht+1+q
mkt
t+1
qmktt
denotes the cum-dividend return on housing investment. The
equity premium reads
Et
[
Rept+1
]
= 1
Et [Λt+1]
{
φt
Uct︸︷︷︸
Collateral
+Et
[
Λt+1∆qmktt+1
(
1 –
qoptt+1
qmktt+1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Search Frictions
+ Et [Λt+1Ωt+1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mismatch & Bargaining
– Et
[
Λt+1∆qmktt+1
VHt+1
qmktt+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Continuation Value Match
–Et
[
Λt+1∆qmktt+1
φt+1
Uct+1
qoptt+1
qmktt+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collateral × Search Frictions
–Ct
[
Rept+1, Λt+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk
}
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where
Ωt+1 = ζψEt
[
Λt+1∆qmktt+1
(
1 – Psellt+1
)(
1 –
qoptt+1
qmktt+1
)]
+ ζEt
[
Λt+1∆qmktt+1
(
1 –
qoptt+1
qmktt+1
)]
+
+ (1 – (1 – ψ) ζ)Et
[
Λt+1∆qmktt+1
VHt+1
qmktt+1
]
+ (1 – (1 – ψ) ζ)Et
[
Λt+1∆qmktt+1
φt+1
Uct+1
qoptt+1
qmktt+1
]
+
+ (1 – (1 – ψ) ζ)Et
[
Λt+1∆qmktt+1
zt+1Fht+1
qmktt+1
]
– ζψEt
[
Λt+1∆qmktt+1
]
The formula above highlights that the premium, and therefore the house price, depends
on collateral values and search frictions. Indeed, in standard asset pricing conditions,
the equity return depends only the level of risk, that is, the covariance between families’
stochastic discount factor and the equity premium. Here, the equity premium is also in-
creasing in the current Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint φt and
the search frictions as measured by the margin of the borrowing constraint. On one hand,
when the borrowing constraint binds, the equity premium rises, and the house price qmktt
declines. Thus, borrowing constrained families that are forced to re sales depress the cur-
rent house price. On the other hand, when the future probability of selling houses in the
frictional market decreases, tightening the borrowing margin, the equity premium rises
and therefore the house price declines. So, a liquidity freeze lowers the house price. In ei-
ther case, there is also an indirect eect. The high equity return in the states in which the
borrowing constraint binds and the liquidity of the housing market is low tends to be as-
sociated by disproportionately higher levels of families’ marginal utility of consumption.
This comovement further depresses the house price.

chapter 2
Asset Pricing With
Heterogeneous Inattention
2.1 Introduction
Does the observed households’ limited attention to the stock market quantitatively ac-
count for the bulk of asset prices? I address this question introducing an observation
cost in a production economy with heterogeneous agents, incomplete markets and id-
iosyncratic labor income risk. In this environment inattention changes endogenously over
time and across agents. I discipline the quantitative analysis by calibrating the observa-
tion cost to match the observed duration of inattention of the median household. I nd
that the presence of the observation cost improves the performance of the model, generat-
ing limited equity market participation, a realistic dynamics of consumption growth and
countercyclical patters for both the stock returns volatility and the equity premium. Yet,
inattention cannot account for the bulk of stock prices.
This paper studies the role of households’ inattention by relaxing the assumption that
agents are always aware of the state of the economy. Despite standard models postulate
that households continuously collect information on the stock market and derive opti-
mal consumption/savings plans, in the data we observe a dierent pattern. For exam-
ple, Ameriks et al. (2003) show that households plan infrequently, and wealthy agents
plan more often than poor ones. Alvarez et al. (2012) use data from two Italian surveys
and nd that the median household pays attention to the stock market every 3 months.
Furthermore, there is a sizeable heterogeneity in inattention across households: 24% of
agents observe the nancial portfolios less than twice per year, whereas 20% of them do
it more often than once per week. Finally, Rossi (2010), Da et al. (2011), Sichermann et al.
(2012), and Andrei and Hasler (2015) nd that the allocation of attention is time-varying,
although the sign of the relation between inattention and nancial returns is ambiguous.1
This evidence has motivated a new strand of literature, which concentrates on infrequent
planning and limited attention as potential solutions to the equity premium puzzle. A
priori, these factors could improve the performance of standard models by increasing the
1Few other papers show that investors’ allocation of attention aects stock prices and portfolio choices,
e.g. Barber and Odean (2008), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), Della Vigna and Pollet (2009), Hirshleifer et
al. (2009) and Mondria et al. (2010).
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risk of holding stocks and implying a low correlation between consumption and equity
returns. Nonetheless, the literature nds inconclusive results. Lynch (1996), Gabaix and
Laibson (2002), Rossi (2010) and Chien et al. (2011, 2012) show that models embodying
inattention or infrequent planning can account for the level and the dynamics of asset
prices. Conversely, Chen (2006) and Finocchiaro (2011) nd that although these features
do increase the volatility of stock returns, they have no eects on the equity premium.
In this paper I evaluate whether the observed duration of households’ inattention can
account for the equity premium and the dynamics of asset prices. I develop a model that
plugs the inattention of Reis (2006) in the environment of Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998). I
consider a production economy with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents, who
incur in an observation cost whenever they collect information on the state of the econ-
omy and formulate a new plan for consumption and nancial investment. This feature
creates a trade-o: attentive households take better decisions, but also bear higher costs.
As a result, households decide to plan at infrequent dates and stay inattentive meanwhile.
Inattentive agents do not gather new information and follow by inertia pre-determined
paths of consumption and nancial investment. To discipline the role of infrequent plan-
ning, I calibrate the observation cost to match the actual duration of inattention for the
median household, as estimated by Alvarez et al. (2012). This choice implies that the aim
of the paper is not to use inattention to match asset prices, but rather to study its quan-
titative implications once observation costs are calibrated to the inattention observed in
the data.
Looking at the results of the model, I nd that inattention diers across agents and
co-moves with nancial returns. The level of inattention depends negatively on house-
holds’ wealth - in line with the evidence of Ameriks et al. (2003) - because poor agents
face disproportionately higher observation costs. The cyclicality of inattention depends
on the marginal gain and the marginal cost of being attentive and actively investing in
the stock market. Both forces are countercyclical, but they asymmetrically aect dierent
agents. Poor households plan in expansions because they cannot aord the observation
cost in bad times. Instead, wealthy agents plan in recession to benet of the higher ex-
pected return to equity. Overall the level of inattention is countercyclical. Second, the
participation to the equity market is limited because the observation cost is de facto a
barrier to an optimal investment in stocks. In turn, limited participation implies a more
realistic wealth distribution since only wealthy stockholders can benet of the returns to
equity. In the benchmark model, inattention impedes 27% of households to participate in
the stock market and raises the Gini index of wealth by 56%. Third, the volatility of stock
returns is high and countercyclical. The observation cost boosts the level of volatility be-
cause it acts as a capital adjustment cost. Indeed, inattentive agents cannot immediately
adjust their nancial positions to the realizations of the aggregate productivity shock. Fur-
thermore, the limited participation in the equity market intensies the inelasticity in the
supply of capital. More interestingly, the countercyclical dynamics of inattention implies
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time-varying adjustment costs which are more stringent in bad times. As a result, the
volatility of stock returns peaks in recessions. Inattention has two further eects on stock
prices. On one hand, it generates a weak correlation between equity returns and con-
sumption growth, through the slow dissemination of information across agents. On the
other hand, it induces large variations in the excess returns. This second result is usually
obtained through consumption habits or heteroskedastic consumption growth. Instead,
here it is just the by-product of the observation cost, that concentrates the aggregate risk
on a small measure of agents. At each point of time there are few attentive investors that
trade stocks and bear the whole aggregate risk of the economy, commanding a higher re-
turn rate on equity. As long as the number of active investors shrinks down in recessions,
stockholders require a higher compensation in bad times. This mechanism is amplied by
the presence of inattentive agents, who create a residual aggregate risk by consuming too
much in bad times and too little in good times. Such behavior forces attentive stockhold-
ers to switch their consumption away from times in which their marginal utility is high.
In this respect, the model endogenizes the limited stock market participation and hetero-
geneity in trading technologies that Guvenen (2009) and Chien et al. (2011, 2012) take as
exogenous to replicate the dynamics of asset prices. Fourth, in the benchmark model the
equity premium is still around 1%. The price of risk is low because households react to the
observation cost by becoming inattentive, accumulating savings and deleveraging out of
stocks. These mechanisms explain why increasing the magnitude of the observation cost
barely alters the Sharpe ratio. Finally, I nd that the eects of inattention on asset prices
crucially depend on the specication of the borrowing constraints. When they are loose
enough, all households participate in the stock market following buy-and-hold positions,
as pointed out in Chen (2006). Since there is no risk of hitting the borrowing constraint,
agents can dilute the observation cost by trading more infrequently, and inattention does
not aect asset prices.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper adds to the literature on the equity premium puzzle. Since the seminal paper
of Mehra and Prescott (1985), many solutions have been proposed: long-run risk (Bansal
and Yaron, 2004), consumption habits (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), and limited stock
market participation (Guvenen, 2009), among others. The emphasis of this paper is on
households’ inattention to the stock market. In the literature, households’ inattention is
usually achieved either by making agents gathering information and planning nancial
investment at discrete dates (e.g., Due and Sun, 1990; Lynch, 1996; Gabaix and Laibson,
2002; Chen, 2006; Reis, 2006 and Finocchiaro, 2011), or through learning with capacity
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constraints (as in Sims, 2003; Peng, 2005; Huan and Liu, 2007).2 I follow the rst strand
of the literature because of my emphasis on the eects of inattention on agents’ portfolio
decisions. Indeed, I study a heterogeneous agent economy, where any household can
react to the risk of inattention by modifying its portfolio. This feature avoids having a
representative agent which in equilibrium holds anyway the market portfolio. Models
featuring learning with capacity constraint can be extended to the case of heterogeneous
agents and idiosyncratic shocks only by neglecting the existence of higher-order beliefs,
as discussed in Porapakkarm and Young (2008).3 Yet, Angeletos and La’O (2009) show
that higher-order beliefs do play a crucial role in the dissemination of information across
agents. Instead, models in which inattention is modeled as agents gathering information
at infrequent times do not suer of this problem and are therefore more tractable.
My paper diers from the literature on inattention on two main dimensions. First,
I discipline the role of infrequent planning by calibrating the observation cost to match
the actual duration of inattention for the median household. In this way, I can evaluate
whether the observed level of inattention can quantitatively account for the dynamics of
asset prices. Second, I identify the mechanisms tempering or amplifying the eects of
the observation cost on stock prices. In this respect, this paper mirrors the analyses that
Pijoan-Mas (2007) and Gomes and Michaelides (2008) carried out for habits and agents
heterogeneity.
2.3 The Model
In the discrete-time economy there is a representative rm that uses capital and labor to
produce a consumption good. On the other side, there is unit measure of ex-ante iden-
tical agents. Households are ex-post heterogeneous because they bear an uninsurable
idiosyncratic labor income risk. Moreover, they face a monetary observation cost when-
ever collecting information on the states of the economy and choosing consumption and
savings.
2.3.1 The Firm
The production sector of the economy constitutes of a representative rm, which pro-
duces a homogeneous consumption good Yt ∈ Y ⊂ R+ using a Cobb-Douglas production
2The notion of inattention is also closely tied to the concept of information acquisition, e.g. Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) and Peress (2004), and the one of uncertainty, see Veronesi (1999) and Andrei and Hasler
(2015).
3When agents have imperfect common knowledge and dier in their information set, they need to
forecast other agents’ forecast, and so on so forth. In this case, equilibrium prices do not depend only on the
innite-dimensional distribution of agents across wealth, but also on the innite-dimensional distribution
of beliefs.
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function
Yt = ztN 1–ηt K
η
t (2.3.1)
where η ∈ (0, 1) denotes the capital income share. The variable zt ∈ Z ⊂ R+ follows
a stationary Markov process with transition probabilities Γz(z′, z) = Pr
(
zt+1 = z′|zt = z
)
.
The rm hires Nt ∈ N ⊂ R+ workers at the wage wt , and rents from households the stock
of physical capital Kt ∈ K ⊂ R+ at the interest rate rat . Physical capital depreciates at a
rate δ ∈ (0, 1) after production. At every point of time, after the realization of the shock
z, the rm chooses capital and labor to equate their marginal productivity to their prices,
as follows
rat = ηztN
1–η
t K
η–1
t – δ (2.3.2)
wt = (1 – η)ztN–ηt K
η
t . (2.3.3)
Both prices depend on the realization of the aggregate productivity shock zt . I inten-
tionally abstract from any adjustment cost to focus on inattention as the only source of
slowly-moving capital, as in Due (2010).
2.3.2 Households
The economy is populated by a measure one of ex-ante identical households. They are
innitely lived, discount the future at the positive rate β ∈ (0, 1) and maximize lifetime
utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (ct) dt (2.3.4)
where ct ∈ C ⊂ R+ denotes consumption at time t. The utility function is a CRRA,
U (c) = c
1–θ
1–θ , where θ denotes the risk aversion of households.
Idiosyncratic Shocks
As in Pijoan-Mas (2007), households bear an idiosyncratic labor income risk which consists
of two components. First, agents are hit by a shock et ∈ E ⊂ {0, 1}, which determines
their employment status.4 A household has a job when et = 1 and is unemployed when
et = 0. I assume that et follows a stationary continuous Markov process with transition
probabilities
Γe(z, z′, e, e′) = Pr
(
et+1 = e′|et = e, zt = z, zt+1 = z′
)
. (2.3.5)
The shock is idiosyncratic and washes out in the aggregate. Yet, its transition probabilities
depend on the aggregate productivity shock. As a consequence, both the idiosyncratic
4The only purpose of the presence of an employment status shock is to relax the conditions governing
the modeling of households’ inattention.
52 Asset Pricing With Heterogeneous Inattention
uncertainty and the unemployment rate of the economy rise in recessions.5 Second, when
a household is given a job, it faces a further shock ξt ∈ ¨ ⊂ R+, which determines the
eciency units of hours worked. This shock is orthogonal to the aggregate productivity
shock and follows a stationary continuous Markov process with transitional probabilities
Γξ(ξ, ξ′) = Pr(ξt+1 = ξ′|ξt = ξ). (2.3.6)
When a household is unemployed, it receives a constant unemployment benet w¯ > 0.
Households’ labor income lt is then
lt = wtξtet + w¯ (1 – et) . (2.3.7)
Market Arrangements
Households own the capital of the economy. Each agent holds at ∈ A ≡ [a,∞] units
of capital, which are either rented to the rm or traded among households. Capital is
risky and yields the rate rat , as dened in (2). Agents can also invest in a one-period non-
contingent bond bt ∈ B ≡ [b,∞], which is in zero net supply. The bond yields a risk-free
rate rbt . Households face exogenous borrowing constraints for both assets and cannot go
shorter than b in the risk-free bond and a for the risky equity. When these values equal
zero, no short position is allowed at all. I also consider a borrowing constraint f on the
total nancial portfolio at+1 + bt+1.
In this framework, markets are incomplete because agents cannot trade claims which
are contingent on the realizations of the idiosyncratic shock. As long as the labor income
risk cannot be fully insured, agents are ex post heterogeneous in wealth, consumption and
portfolio choices.
Observation Cost
Agents incur in a monetary observation cost proportional to their labor income χlt when-
ever acquiring information on the state of the economy and dening the optimal choices
on consumption and savings. This cost is a reduced form for the nancial and time op-
portunity expenditures bore by households to gure out the optimal composition of the
nancial portfolio. The observation cost induces the agents to plan infrequently and stay
inattentive meanwhile. Planning dates are dened as dates di ∈ D ⊂ N such that di+1 ≥ di
for any i. At a planning date di, households pay the cost χldi , collect the information on
the states of the economy and decide the next planning date di+1. Moreover, at planning
dates, households decide the stream of consumption throughout the period of inattention[
cdi , cdi+1–1
]
, and the investment in risky capital adi+1 and risk-free bonds bdi+1. Instead,
5I dene such a structure for the employment shock following Mankiw (1986), who shows that a coun-
tercyclical idiosyncratic uncertainty accommodates a higher price of risk. Without such feature, incomplete
markets would not aect the equity premium, as discussed in Krueger and Lustig (2010). Anyway, Storeslet-
ten et al. (2007) nd that in the data labor income risk does peak in recessions.
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at non planning dates, households are inattentive and follow the pre-determined plan for
consumption set in the previous planning date. I assume that the nancial portfolio of
inattentive households is re-balanced every period to match the initial share of risky as-
sets adiadi+bdi
.6
In the model, attentive households observe the states of the economy, while inattentive
ones do not. These states include the realizations of the aggregate productivity and the id-
iosyncratic labor income shock. On one hand, it is reasonable to assume that agents are not
fully aware of the actual realization of the aggregate shock.7 On the other hand, inatten-
tive agents cannot observe even their labor income. This condition is required to preserve
the computational tractability of the model. Indeed, if households could also observe their
stream of labor income, then they would always gather some new information. Hence,
agents would make their decision on whether to be inattentive on a continuous basis. Fur-
thermore, agents could infer the dynamics of the aggregate states by exploiting the corre-
lation between aggregate productivity and labor earnings, implying an additional learning
dynamics within the model. These features would inate the states and the mechanisms of
the model making it computationally infeasible. Nevertheless, to mitigate the assumption
that households do not observe their labor income, I postulate that inattention breaks out
exogenously when the employment status changes, from worker to unemployed or vice
versa. Changes in employment status are interpreted as major events which capture the
attention of agents and require them to change previous plans on consumption and sav-
ings. In such a case, households are forced to become attentive and pay the observation
cost. This assumption implies that each household is always aware of its employment sta-
tus. As a result, labor income is only partially unknown to inattentive agents.8,9 I dene
one further condition on the behavior of inattention. To maintain the existence of credit
imperfections, I postulate that inattention breaks out exogenously when agents are about
to hit the borrowing constraints. In such a case, an unmodeled nancial intermediary
calls the attention of the agents which are forced to become attentive and pay the obser-
6This assumption, which is also made in Gabaix and Laibson (2002), Abel et al. (2007) and Alvarez et
al. (2012), is consistent with the empirical evidence on weak portfolio re-balancing across households. For
example, Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) study a ten-year panel of households and document that around 60%
of them changed the composition of the portfolio at most once.
7For example, the statistics on the gross domestic product are released with a lag of a quarter.
8Unemployed inattentive agents are aware of their earnings while employed inattentive agents have
an unbiased expectation about their labor income. Employed agents in the model are akin to workers who
receive stochastic bonuses at infrequent dates during the year. Note that the observation cost is calibrated
to imply a length of inattention for the median agent which equals a quarter. Therefore, the median agent
does not gather full information about her labor income just for three months.
9Even if the correlation between labor income and the aggregate shock is set to zero, agents that observe
their labor income every period will always have new ow of information upon which to update their
optimal policies on consumption and investment. Accordingly, the problem of inattentive agents would
depend on both the actual states of the economy and the beliefs on the states they cannot directly observe.
As a result, the number of relevant states for the maximization problem would increase from six up to eleven.
Under the calibration choices of this paper, the grid points of the value function iteration would go from the
current 5 millions up to around 450 billions, making infeasible any computation algorithm.
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vation cost. These two assumptions aect the outs from inattention. Indeed, a household
that at time di decides not to observe the states of the economy until di+1 will cease to be
inattentive at the realized new planning date λ (di+1), which is the minimum between the
desired new planning date di+1 and the periods in which either the employment status of
the household changes,
{
j ∈ [di, di+1) : ej 6= ej–1
}
, or the household is about to hit the
borrowing constraint,
{
j ∈ [di, di+1) : bj+1 < b or aj+1 < a or
(
aj+1 + bj+1
)
< f
}
.
Value Function
To dene the aggregate states of the households’ problem, I introduce the distribution
of the agents γ - dened over households’ idiosyncratic states, the decisions of inat-
tention, the portfolio choices, and the consumption path {ωt , et , ξt , dt , at , bt , ct } - which
characterizes the probability measure on the σ-algebra generated by the Borel set J ≡
˙ × E × ¨ × D × A × B × C. Roughly speaking, γt keeps track of all the heterogeneity
among agents. In this environment, γt is an aggregate state because prices depend on
it. Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) discuss how prices depends on the entire distribution of
agents across their idiosyncratic states. The further addition of the duration of inattention
across agents makes the prices to depend also on further objects, which are required to de-
ne the optimal behavior of inattentive agents at each point of time. Indeed, these objects
signal active investors about the degree of the informational frictions in the economy. The
distribution γt evolves over time following a law of motion
γt+1 = H
(
γt , zt , zt+1
)
(2.3.8)
The operator H (·) pins down the changes in the measure γt taking as given the initial
value of γt itself, and the realizations of the aggregate shock zt .
The structure of the problem should also take into account how the information is re-
vealed to the agents. The state variables of this economy xt ≡ {ωt , et , ξt ; zt , γt } are random
variable dened on a ltered probability space (X , F , P). X denotes the set including all
the possible realizations of xt , F is the ltration {Ft , t ≥ 0} consisting of the σ-algebra that
controls how the information on the states of the economy is disclosed to the agents, and
P is the probability measure dened on F . Hereafter, I dene the expectation of a variable
vt conditional on the information set at time k as Ek [vt] =
∫
vtdP (Fk) =
∫
v (xt) dP (Fk).
The state vector P
(
vt
∣∣Fk) = P (vt∣∣xk) is a sucient statistics for the probability of any
variable vt because of the Markov structure of xt . The presence of observation costs and
inattentive agents implies some measurability constraints on the expectations of house-
holds. Namely, a planning date di denes a new ltration Fs such that Fs = Fdi for
s ∈ [di, λ (di+1)). Hence, any decision made throughout the duration of inattention is
conditional on the information at time di, because the household does not update its in-
formation set until the new planning date λ (di+1). Taking into account this measurability
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constraint, I write the agents’ recursive problem as
V (ωt , et , ξt ; zt , γt) = max
d,
[
ct ,cλ(d)–1
]
, at+1, bt+1
Et
[ λ(d)∑
j=t
βj–t U
(
cj
)
+ . . .
· · · + βλ(d)–t V
(
ωλ(d), eλ(d), ξλ(d); zλ(d), γλ(d)
)]
(2.3.9)
s.t. ωt + lt (zt , γt) = ct + at+1 + bt+1 (2.3.10)
ωλ(d) =
(
at+1 + bt+1
) λ(d)∏
k=t+1
rpk (zk , γk;αt+1) + . . .
· · · +
λ(d)–1∑
j=t+1
[(
lj – cj
) λ(d)∏
k=j+1
rpk (zk , γk;αt+1)
]
– χlλ(d) (2.3.11)
γλ(d) = H
(
γt , zλ(d)
)
(2.3.12)
aj+1 ≥ a, bj+1 ≥ b, ωj+1 ≥ ω, ∀j ∈ [t,λ(d) – 1) (2.3.13)
λ(d) = min
j∈[t,d]
{
d, ej 6= ej–1, bj+1 < b, aj+1 < a,
(
aj+1 + bj+1
)
< f
}
(2.3.14)
where rp (z, γ;α) = α
(
ra (z, γ) – rb (z, γ)
)
+ (1 + rb (z, γ)) denotes the total returns of
the nancial portfolio and αt = at+1at+1+bt+1 is the share of the nancial portfolio invested
in the risky asset at the planning date t. Equation (11) denotes the budget constraint of
the agents, who use their wealth and labor income to consume and invest in the two
assets. Equation (12) shows the evolution over time of total wealth, which depends on
the consumption stream and the returns to investment throughout inattention. Note that
the share of risky capital in the nancial portfolio is kept constant at αt+1 = at+1at+1+bt+1 .
Moreover, at the realised new planning date λ(d) agents incur in the observation cost
χlλ(d). Equation (13) denes the law of motion of the distribution of agents γt conditional
on the history of aggregate shocks zλ(d). Finally, Equation (14) denotes the borrowing
constraints faced by the households, whereas Equation (16) describes the new realised
planning date λ(d), which depends not only on the decision of the next planning date d,
but also on the dynamics of the employment status, and the value of stock and bonds. In
this environment, Reis (2006) shows that the measurability constraint holds as long as the
optimal choices
{
d,
[
ct , cλ(d)–1
]
, at+1, bt+1
}
are made only upon the information given
by
{
ωt , et , ξt ; zt , γt
}
.
56 Asset Pricing With Heterogeneous Inattention
2.3.3 Equilibrium
Denition of Equilibrium.
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a value function V and a set of policy func-
tions
{
gc , gh, gb, ga, gd
}
, a set of prices
{
rb, ra,w
}
, and a law of motion H (·) for the
measure of agents γ such that10:
• Given the prices
{
rb, ra,w
}
, the law of motion H (·), and the exogenous transi-
tion matrices
{
Γz , Γe, Γξ
}
, the value function V and the set of policy functions{
gc , gh, gb, ga, gd
}
solve the household’s problem;
• The bonds market clears,
∫
gbdγ = 0;
• The capital market clears,
∫
gadγ = K ′;
• The labor market clears,
∫
eξdγ = N ;
• The law of motion H (·) is generated by the optimal decisions
{
gc , gh, gb, ga, gd
}
,
the transition matrices
{
Γz , Γe, Γξ
}
and the history of aggregate shocks z.
First-Order Conditions.
Gabaix and Laibson (2002) consider an environment where agents are exogenously inat-
tentive for a given number of periods. In their model, the Euler equation for consumption
holds just for the mass of attentive agents because inattentive households are o their
equilibrium condition. Instead, here the Euler equations of both attentive and inattentive
agents hold in equilibrium. Indeed, the Euler equation of an agent at a planning date t is
a standard stochastic inter-temporal condition that reads
Et
[
Mλ(d),t
λ(d)∏
k=t+1
(
αt+1
(
rak (zk , γk) – r
b
k (zk , γk)
)
+ (1 + rbk (zk , γk))
)]
= 0 (2.3.15)
where λ(d) denotes the next date in which the household will gather new information and
dene a new consumption/savings plan, and Mλ(d),t = βλ(d)–t
U ′
(
cλ(d)
)
U ′(ct ) is the households’
stochastic discount factor. This condition posits that the optimal share of stocks in the
portfolio is the one which equalizes the expected discounted ow of returns from stocks
and bonds throughout the period of inattention. The Euler equation is not satised with
10With an abuse of notation, I neglect the dependence of the value function, the policy functions, the set
of prices and the law of motion of the measure of agents on the states of the households’ problem.
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equality for borrowing constrained agents. Instead, the Euler equation of an inattentive
agent between time s and q, with t < s < q < λ is deterministic and equals
Mq,s
q∏
k=s+1
(
αs+1
(
rak (zk , γk) – r
b
k (zk , γk)
)
+ (1 + rbk (zk , γk))
)
= 0 (2.3.16)
Inattentive agents do not gather any new information on the states of the economy and
therefore they behave as if there were no uncertainty. Agents get back to the stochastic
inter-temporal conditions as soon they reach a new planning date, and update their infor-
mation set. Therefore, as agents alternate between periods of attention and inattention,
they also shift from stochastic to deterministic Euler equations.
2.4 Calibration
The calibration strategy follows Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) and Pijoan-Mas (2007).
Some parameters (e.g., the risk aversion of the household) are set to values estimated in
the literature, while others are calibrated to match salient facts of the U.S. economy. The
idiosyncratic labor income risk is dened to target the cross-sectional distribution of labor
income. It is important to have a realistic variation in labor income because the choice
of inattention, and consequently all the eects of the observation cost on asset prices,
depends on the budget of households. Then, the aggregate shock is calibrated to match
the volatility of aggregate output growth, while the observation cost is dened to replicate
the duration of inattention of the median household. Finally, despite I set one period of
the model to correspond to one month, I report the asset pricing statistics aggregated at
the annual frequency to be consistent with the literature.
The parameters set to values estimated in the literature are the capital share of the pro-
duction function η, the capital depreciation rate δ, and the risk aversion of the household
θ. I choose a capital share η = 0.40, as suggested by Cooley and Prescott (1995). The de-
preciation rate equals δ = 0.0066 to match a 2% quarterly depreciation. The risk aversion
of the household is θ = 5, which gives an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.2, at
the lower end of the empirical evidence. Then, I set the constraint on nancial wealth f
to be minus two times the average monthly income of the economy, and households can
reach this limit by short selling either bond or capital, that is, b = f and a = f .11 Finally,
I calibrate the rst parameter, the time discount rate of the household, to match the U.S.
annual capital to output ratio of 2.5, and nd β = 0.9951.
11In Guvenen (2009) the borrowing constraints equal 6 months of labor income. Instead, Gomes and
Michaelides (2008) rule out any short sale. In Section 2.5.6, I evaluate how dierent values for the borrowing
constraints might change the results of the model.
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2.4.1 Aggregate Productivity Shock
I assume that the aggregate productivity shock follows a two-state rst-order Markov
chain, with values zg and zb denoting the realizations in good and bad times, respectively.
The two parameters of the transition function are calibrated targeting a duration of 2.5
quarters for both states. The values zg and zb are instead dened to match the standard
deviation of the Hodrick-Prescott ltered quarterly aggregate output, which is 1.89% in
the data. These values are therefore model dependent, and vary with the specication of
the environment.
2.4.2 Idiosyncratic Labor Income Shock
Employment Status. The employment shock e follows a two-state rst-order Markov
chain, which requires the calibration of ten parameters that dene four transition matrices
two by two. I consider the ten targets of Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998). I rst dene four
conditions that create a one-to-one mapping between the state of the aggregate shock and
the level of unemployment. That is, the good productivity shock zg comes always with
an unemployment rate ug , and the bad one zb with an unemployment rate ub, regardless
of the previous realizations of the shock. In this way, the realization of the productivity
shock pins down the unemployment rate of the economy. The four conditions are
1 – ug = ugΓe
(
zg , zg , 0, 1
)
+
(
1 – ug
)
Γe
(
zg , zg , 1, 1
)
(2.4.17)
1 – ug = ubΓe
(
zb, zg , 0, 1
)
+ (1 – ub) Γe
(
zb, zg , 1, 1
)
(2.4.18)
1 – ub = ugΓe
(
zg , zb, 0, 1
)
+
(
1 – ug
)
Γe
(
zg , zb, 1, 1
)
(2.4.19)
1 – ub = ubΓe (zb, zb, 0, 1) + (1 – ub) Γe (zb, zb, 1, 1) (2.4.20)
The level of the unemployment rate in good time and bad time are dened to match the
actual average and standard deviation of the unemployment rate. I compute the two mo-
ments using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1948 to 2012, and obtain 5.67%
and 1.68%, respectively. Under the assumption that the unemployment rate uctuates
symmetrically around its mean, I nd ug = 0.0406 and ub = 0.0728. Two further condi-
tions come by matching the expected duration of unemployment, which equals 6 months
in good times and 10 months in bad times. Finally, I set the job nding probability when
moving from the good state to the bad one as zero. Analogously, the probability of losing
the job in the transition from the bad state to the good one is zero.
Unemployment Benet. I set the unemployment benet w¯ to be 5% of the average
monthly labor earning. Although dierent values of the benet aect the lower end of
the wealth distribution, they have no sizable eect on the asset pricing moments of the
model.
Eciency Units of Hour. The eciency units of hour ξ follows a three-state rst-order
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Markov chain. The values of the shock and the transition function are calibrated to match
three facts on the cross-sectional dispersion of labor earnings across households: the share
of labor earnings held by the top 20% and the bottom 40% of households, and the Gini co-
ecient of labor earnings. The data, taken from Díaz-Gímenez et al. (2011), characterize
the distribution of earnings, income and wealth in the United States in 2007. Table 2.4.1
reports the calibrated values and the transition function of the shock ξ, while Table 2.4.2
compares the three statistics on the distribution of labor earnings in the data and in the
model.
Table 2.4.1
Parameters shock efficiency units of hour
ξ1 = 15 ξ2 = 4 ξ3 = 1
Γξ (ξ1, ·) Γξ (ξ2, ·) Γξ (ξ3, ·)
Γξ (·, ξ1) 0.9850 0.0025 0.0050
Γξ (·, ξ2) 0.0100 0.9850 0.0100
Γξ (·, ξ3) 0.0050 0.0125 0.9850
Note: The eciency unit of hours ξ follows a rst-
order Markov chain with transition function Γξ .
Table 2.4.2
The distribution of labor earnings
Target Model Data
Share earnings top 20% 62.1% 63.5%
Share earnings bottom 40% 4.4% 4.2%
Gini index 0.57 0.64
Note: the data is from Díaz-Gímenez et al. (2011).
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2.4.3 Observation Cost
The observation cost is calibrated to match the duration of inattention of the median
household in a year, which Alvarez et al. (2012) estimate to be around 3 months. Ac-
cordingly, I set the xed cost to χ = 0.029. It amounts to 2.9% of households’ monthly
labor earnings. For example, if the average household earns an income of around $3, 000
per month, the cost equals $87.
2.4.4 Computation of the Model
The computation of heterogeneous agent models with aggregate uncertainty are known to
be cumbersome because the distribution γ, a state of the problem, is an innite-dimensional
object. I approximate γ using a nite set of moments of the distribution of aggregate capi-
tal K , as in Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998), Pijoan-Mas (2007) and Gomes and Michaelides
(2008), and the number of inattentive agents in the economy in every period ζ . On one
hand, the approximation using a nite set of moments of aggregate capital K can be in-
terpreted as if the agents of the economy were bounded rational, ignoring higher-order
moments of γ. Nevertheless, this class of models generates almost linear economies, in
which it is sucient to consider just the rst moment of the distribution of capital to have
almost a perfect t for the approximation. On the other hand, inattention adds a further
term ζ , which signals active investors about the degree of the informational frictions in the
economy. This condition adds a further law of motion upon which to nd convergence.
The presence of inattention implies one further complication. The decision of the agents
on how long to stay inattentive requires the evaluation of their value function over a wide
range of dierent time horizons. I report the details of the algorithm in the Appendix 2.A.
2.5 Results
I compare the results of the benchmark model with three alternative calibrations. In the
rst, the observation cost is zero and there is no inattention. In the second one, the ob-
servation cost is more severe and amounts to χ = 0.058. Finally, I consider an economy
in which agents are more risk averse, with θ = 8. I calibrate each version of the model to
match both the level of aggregate wealth and the volatility of aggregate output growth.
Results are computed from a simulated path of 3, 000 agents over 10, 000 periods.
2.5.1 Inattention
The observation cost is calibrated to a 3 months duration of inattention for the median
household. It turns out that such a cost prevents a third of agents from gathering infor-
mation on the stock market. Table 2.5.3 shows that in the model, in any given month, the
average fraction of inattentive agents in the economy equals 39%.
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Table 2.5.3
Inattention
Inattention χ = 0.024 χ = 0 χ = 0.048 θ = 8 Data
A. Duration of inattention (months)
Median 3.0 0 3.3 3.7 3.0
Median - good times 2.8 0 3.0 3.3 -
Median - bad times 3.2 0 3.5 4.0 -
75th percentile - good times 1.0 0 1.1 1.2 -
75th percentile - bad times 0.7 0 0.8 0.7 -
25th percentile - good times 5.5 0 5.8 6.2 -
25th percentile - bad times 6.0 0 6.2 6.6 -
B. Fraction of inattentive agents
Median 0.39 0 0.41 0.45 -
Median - good times 0.36 0 0.38 0.41 -
Median - bad times 0.42 0 0.44 0.49 -
Note: the variable χ denes the observation cost and θ is the risk aversion of agents, which
equals 5 in the benchmark model. Good times denote the periods in which the aggregate
productivity shock is z = zg and bad times denote the periods in which the aggregate pro-
ductivity shock is z = zb. The fraction of inattentive agents are reported in percentage values.
Data is from Alvarez et al. (2012).
Furthermore, Figure 2.5.1 shows that there is a negative correlation between wealth
and inattention, in line with the empirical evidence of Ameriks et al. (2003) and Alvarez
et al. (2012). There is also a sizable dispersion of inattention across agents, because poor
agents cannot aord the observation cost and end up being more inattentive. For example,
the wealthiest 20% of households observe the states of the economy every period, while
the poorest 20% stay inattentive for 8 months on average. Such behavior implies that
in the model inattention behaves as both a time-dependent and a state-dependent rule.
Indeed, at each point of time households set a time-dependent rule, deciding how long to
stay inattentive. Yet, when a household becomes wealthier, it opts for shorter periods of
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inattention. Thus, inattention looks as if it were conditional on wealth.12
Figure 2.5.1
Optimal Choice of Inattention
Note: the gure plots the policy function of inattention gd as a function of
wealth ω. The idiosyncratic shocks are set to e = 1 and ξ = 4. The aggregate
shock is z = zg and the aggregate capital equals its mean.
When studying the dynamics of inattention over the cycle, I nd that it depends on
two forces. On one hand, the countercyclical equity premium induces agents to plan in
recessions because the cost of inattention in terms of foregone nancial returns is lower
in good times. On the other hand, the severity of the observation cost uctuates as a
function of households’ wealth. In recessions, agents are poorer and cannot aord the
observation cost. The results point out that the former channel dominates in wealthy
agents, whose inattention is pro-cyclical. For example, in the model the agents at the 75-th
percentile of the wealth distribution are on average inattentive for 1 month in good times
and 0.7 months in bad times. Instead, the direct cost of inattention aects relatively more
poor agents, which prefer to plan in expansions. The agents at the 25-th percentile of the
wealth distribution are on average inattentive for 5.5 months in good times and 6 months
in bad times. Overall, inattention is countercyclical: both the duration of inattention for
the median agent and the fraction of inattentive agents in the economy rise in recession.
Such a result can also be interpreted as a foundation to the countercyclical dynamics of
uncertainty. Indeed, the two concepts are intimately tied: when agents pay less attention
to the states of the economy, the dispersion of their forecasts over future returns rises,
boosting the level of uncertainty in the economy.
Increasing the size of the observation cost to χ = 0.048 extends the duration of inat-
tention for the median agent up to 3.3 months. Also a risk aversion of θ = 8 does increase
12Reis (2006) labels this property of inattention as “recursive time-contingency”. See Alvarez et al. (2012)
and Abel et al. (2007, 2013) for further characterizations of the dynamics of inattention over time.
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the duration of inattention, which goes up to 3.7 months. This last result is in line with
the evidence provided by Alvarez et al. (2012), who show that more risk averse investors
observe their portfolio less frequently. This outcome is the net result of two counteract-
ing forces. Agents with a higher risk aversion changes their portfolio towards risk-free
bonds, decreasing the need of observing the stock market. At the same time, more risk
averse agents have a stronger desire for consumption smoothing, which induces them to
keep track of their investments more frequently. In the model, the rst channel osets the
second one, implying a longer duration of inattention for more risk averse agents.
2.5.2 Stock Market Participation
The observation cost induces a large fraction of households not to own any stock. As
reported in Table 2.5.4, 26.6% of households do not participate to the equity market. Fav-
ilukis (2013) shows that in 2007 the actual share of stockholders equals 59.4%. Hence, the
observation cost accounts for 44.8% of the observed number of non-stockholders. Unlike
in Saito (1996), Basak and Cuoco (1998), and Guvenen (2009), here the limited participa-
tion does not arise exogenously. Indeed, in the economy without inattention virtually all
households access the market. Therefore, the observation cost is de facto a barrier to the
investment in stocks, as the xed participation cost does in the environment of Gomes and
Michaelides (2008). This result points out to a new rationale to the limited stock market
participation: it is not just the presence of trading costs that matters, but also the fact that
processing all the information required to invest optimally in the nancial markets is not a
trivial task at all. In addition, the model successfully predicts that stockholders are on av-
erage wealthier than non-stockholders. As Figure 2.5.2 shows, stockholders tend to be the
wealthiest agents of the economy. For example, the poorest 7.3% of households do not hold
any risky capital because they are the most inattentive agents of the economy. However,
the model fails in reproducing the higher consumption growth volatility of stockholders
with respect of non-stockholders. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) nd that the consumption
growth of stockholders is 1.6 times as volatile than the one of non-stockholders. Instead,
in the benchmark model the ratio of the consumption growth of stockholders over the
one of non-stockholders equals 0.78. Indeed, stockholders turn out to be wealthy agents
that are still able to self-insure their consumption stream, experiencing thereby a lower
volatility than non-stockholders. I nd that even higher observation costs and risk aver-
sion cannot fully account for the observed participation rate and the higher consumption
growth volatility of stockholders. Also Guvenen (2009) nds that a low participation rate
is not enough to generate a higher volatility of consumption for stockholders, unless it
is assumed that stockholders have a higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution than
non-stockholders.
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Table 2.5.4
Participation to the stock market
Variable χ = 0.024 χ = 0 χ = 0.048 θ = 8 Data
% Stockholders 73.4 98.5 70.5 64.9 40.6
σ(∆ log cS )
σ(∆ log cNS ) 0.78 0.37 0.80 0.88 1.6
Note: the variable χ denes the observation cost and θ is the risk aversion of
agents, which equals 5 in the benchmark model. The ratio σ(∆ log cS )σ(∆ log cNS ) compares
the standard deviation of stockholders’ consumption growth σ (∆ log cS) with
the standard deviation of non-stockholders’ consumption growth σ (∆ log cNS).
Data is from Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Favilukis (2013).
Figure 2.5.2
Optimal Portfolio Choices
Note: the gure plots the policy functions of investment in risky assets ga
(continuous line) and risk free bonds gb (dashed line) as a function of wealth ω.
The idiosyncratic shocks are set to e = 1 and ξ = 4. The aggregate shock is
z = zg and the aggregate capital equals its mean.
2.5.3 The Distribution of Wealth
The observation cost spreads also the distribution of households’ wealth ωt . Table 2.5.5
reports that the Gini index equals 0.41 in the economy with no inattention. This value
is exactly half the value of 0.82 that Díaz-Gímenez et al. (2011) nd in the data. Indeed,
the distribution is too concentrated around the median: there are too few poor and rich
agents. This is no surprise. Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) already discuss how heteroge-
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neous agent models have a hard time to account for the shape of the wealth distribution.
Yet, when I consider the observation cost of the benchmark model, the Gini coecient
goes up by 56% to 0.64. Inattention generates a more dispersed distribution through the
limited participation in the stock market and the higher returns to stock. Poor agents
cannot aord the observation cost and end up being more inattentive. Accordingly, they
decide not to own any stock and give up the higher return to risky capital. The model
describes well the wealth distribution at the 20-th, 40-th and 60-th quantiles, but it falls
short in replicating the tails of the distribution. Increasing the size of the observation cost
or the risk aversion of households improves just slightly the performance of the model.
Table 2.5.5
The distribution of wealth
% wealth held by χ = 0.024 χ = 0 χ = 0.048 θ = 8 Data
20th percentile 3.3 5.5 2.9 2.5 1.1
40th percentile 6.6 14.2 6.3 5.7 4.5
60th percentile 16.7 31.6 16.1 14.3 11.2
90th percentile 51.8 29.4 53.0 59.3 71.4
Gini index 0.64 0.41 0.66 0.69 0.82
Note: the variable χ denes the observation cost and θ is the risk-aversion of
agents, which equals 5 in the benchmark model. Data is from Díaz-Gímenez et al.
(2011).
2.5.4 Asset Pricing Moments
Stock and Bond Returns
The Panel A of Table 2.5.6 reports the results of the model on the level and the dynamics
of stock returns, bond returns and the equity premium. First, I discuss the standard devia-
tions because the observation cost triples the volatility of stock returns. In the benchmark
model the standard deviation of returns is 6.68%, which is around a third of the value ob-
served in the data, 19.30%. Nonetheless, without inattention the standard deviation would
be just 2.21%. The observation cost boosts the volatility of returns because it acts as a cap-
ital adjustment cost. Indeed, inattention makes the supply of capital to be inelastic along
two dimensions. On one hand, inattentive agents follow pre-determined path of capital
66 Asset Pricing With Heterogeneous Inattention
investment and cannot adjust their holdings to the realizations of the aggregate shock. On
the other hand, the limited participation in the equity market shrinks the pool of poten-
tial investors. As far as the volatility of the risk-free rate is concerned, I nd a standard
deviation of 3.57%, which is lower than its empirical counterpart, that equals 5.44%. Note
that standard models usually deliver risk-free rates which uctuate too much. For exam-
ple, Jermann (1998) and Boldrin et al. (2001) report a standard deviation between 10% and
20%. The mechanism that prevents volatility to surge is similar to the one exploited by
Guvenen (2009). Poor agents have a strong desire to smooth consumption, and their high
demand of precautionary savings osets any large movements in bond returns. Although
in Guvenen (2009) the strong desire for consumption smoothing is achieved through a
low elasticity of intertemporal substitution, here it is the observation cost that forces poor
and inattentive agents to insure against the risk of infrequent planning. When looking at
the level of the equity premium reported in Panel B of Table 2.5.6, I nd that the model
generates a wedge between stock returns and bond yields which is too low. It equals 0.93%
while in the data it is 6.17%. Since the model does not suer of the risk-free rate puzzle of
Weil (1989), the weakness is entirely in the level of stock returns. In the model the average
stock returns is 3.16%, around a third of the value observed in the data. Again, the obser-
vation cost goes a long way forward in explaining the equity premium, because the model
with no inattention has a dierential between stock and bond returns of 0.01%. Indeed,
the limited participation in the stock market concentrates the entire aggregate risk of the
economy on a smaller measure of stock-holders, who accordingly demand a higher com-
pensation for holding equity. Furthermore, inattention exacerbates the curvature of the
value function of the agents. Figure 2.5.3 - 2.5.4 show that the value function of agents in
an inattentive economy is much more concave that in the absence of any observation cost.
Moreover, the curvature of inattentive agents is much more responsive to aggregate con-
ditions. Indeed, while the risk aversion of agents in attentive economies is rather constant
along the cycle, the risk aversion of inattentive agents rises dramatically in recessions. As
a result, inattention amplies the risk associated to holding stocks, especially in bad times.
These mechanisms explain why inattention generates an equity premium several orders
of magnitude higher than in a model without observation costs. Yet, the improvements
are not enough to explain the puzzle. Doubling the size of the observation cost does not
yield any better result: the Sharpe ratio barely changes. So, observation costs should be
unreasonably high to provide a premium as it is in the data. Only a higher risk aversion
of θ = 8 seems to deliver better asset pricing moments, with an average stock returns of
3.85% and a 0.18 Sharpe ratio which implies an equity premium of 1.25%. These results
conrm the ndings of Gomes and Michaelides (2008) and Guvenen (2009), in which lim-
ited participation in the stock market is not sucient to imply a high equity premium.
Both papers introduce heterogeneity in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to in-
crease the volatility of consumption growth of stockholders and generate a high price of
risk.
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Table 2.5.6
Asset pricing moments
Variable Moment χ = 0.024 χ = 0 χ = 0.048 θ = 8 Data
A. Stock and bond returns
Stock return Mean 3.16 1.13 3.37 3.85 8.11
Std. dev. 6.68 2.21 6.86 7.08 19.30
Risk-free return Mean 1.84 1.12 1.86 2.04 1.94
Std. dev. 3.57 2.61 4.02 4.33 5.44
B. Equity premium
Equity premium Mean 0.93 0.01 1.01 1.25 6.17
Std. dev. 6.44 1.11 6.68 6.97 19.49
Sharpe ratio Mean 0.14 0.01 0.15 0.18 0.32
C. Cyclical dynamics
Stock returns Std. dev. - good times 6.52 0.55 6.79 6.94 -
Std. dev. - bad times 6.64 0.55 7.91 7.16 -
Equity premium Mean - good times 0.90 0.01 0.98 1.22 -
Mean - bad times 0.96 0.01 1.06 1.31 -
Note: the variable χ denes the observation cost and θ is the risk-aversion of agents, which equals 5 in the
benchmark model. All statistics are computed in expectation and reported in annualized percentage values.
Annual returns are dened as the sum of log monthly returns. The equity premium is the re = E
[
ra – rb
]
.
The Sharpe ratio is dened as the ratio between the equity premium and its standard deviation. Good times
denote the periods in which the aggregate productivity shock is z = zg and bad times denote the periods in
which the aggregate productivity shock is z = zb. Data is from Campbell (1999) and Guvenen (2009).
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Figure 2.5.3
Slope of the Value Function - Attentive Economy
Note: the gure plots the slope of agents’ value function as a function of
wealth ω. in an economy with observation cost χ = 0. Good times (dashed line)
and bad times (continuous line) denote periods in which the aggregate
productivity shock is z = zg and z = zb, respectively. The idiosyncratic shocks
are set to e = 1 and ξ = 4. Aggregate capital equals its mean.
Figure 2.5.4
Slope of the Value Function - Inattentive Economy
Note: the gure plots the slope of agents’ value function as a function of
wealth ω. in an economy with observation cost χ = 0.024. Good times (dashed
line) and bad times (continuous line) denote periods in which the aggregate
productivity shock is z = zg and z = zb, respectively. The idiosyncratic shocks
are set to e = 1 and ξ = 4. Aggregate capital equals its mean.
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Cyclical Dynamics
Inattention generates countercyclical variations in stock returns volatility and the equity
premium, as shown in Panel C of Table 2.5.6. Since the observation cost bites more strongly
in recessions, there are very few active investors in the economy which implies that the
quantity of capital is low and very responsive to the investment of the marginal atten-
tive stockholder. Instead, when the observation cost goes to zero the volatility becomes
acyclical. Therefore, in this setting the observation cost mimics the role of countercycli-
cal uncertainty in Veronesi (1999), which induces the volatility to be asymmetric over the
cycle, peaking in recessions. Also the equity premium is countercyclical and displays a
sizable variation over the cycle. It equals 0.90% in good times and 0.96% in bad times. This
result is in line with the empirical evidence on a positive risk-return trade-o.13 Again,
this dynamics is driven by inattention since the equity premium does not move over the
cycle in the economy with no observation costs. Hence inattention generates counter-
cyclical variations in the price of risk which are usually obtained through consumption
habits and long-run risk.
The model implies one further successful prediction: both the level and the volatility
of the excess returns can be predicted using the consumption-wealth ratio. This result
is in line with the broad literature that provides evidence in favor of the predictability of
stock returns, see for example Campbell (1991) and Cochrane (1991). Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001) exploit the insight of Campbell and Mankiw (1989) on the cointegrating relation-
ships between consumption growth and wealth growth to show that the consumption-
wealth ratio does predict future stock returns. Basically, when the log consumption-
wealth ratio increases, either the expected consumption grows less quickly, or future re-
turns are expected to be high. Table VII shows that in the model the consumption-wealth
ratio predicts the excess return at a four year horizon, despite there is no predictability
at shorter frequencies. The picture on the volatility of the equity premium is completely
reversed: the consumption-wealth ratio can predict it just at a horizon of one year, but not
afterwards. When the observation cost equals zero, there is no predictability at all.
Consumption Growth
I report in Table 2.5.7 the prediction of the model on the dynamics of consumption growth.
Panel A shows that inattention does not substantially increases the standard deviation of
aggregate consumption growth, which keeps around 0.60 while in the data it equals 0.76.
Indeed, despite inattention forces agents to sharp changes in consumption at planning
dates, in a general equilibrium agents are aware of it and optimally respond to the obser-
vation cost by choosing even smoother consumption paths. Overall, these two counter-
13The evidence on the sign of the risk-return relationship is mixed. Lettau and Ludvigson (2010) shows
that while the unconditional correlations are weakly negative, the conditional correlation provides evidence
in favor of a strong positive relationship.
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acting forces oset each other. Nonetheless, in the model attentive agents experience a
slightly lower volatility of consumption growth than inattentive agents. Indeed, as long as
inattentive agents and non-stockholders overlap, the counterfactual prediction that stock-
holders insure relatively better their stream of consumption turns into a lower volatility
for attentive agents. More interestingly, the observation cost disconnects the movements
in stock returns and aggregate consumption growth. For example, in the model without
inattention, the correlation between stock returns and consumption on a quarterly basis
is 0.77. This number falls to 0.38 in the benchmark model and further down to 0.31 with
the higher risk aversion coecient, getting closer to the empirical value of 0.22. Stock
returns and consumption are not so correlated because inattentive agents do not react
to changes in the current realizations of the productivity shocks, and in turn to current
values of asset prices. The mechanism reminds of Lynch (1996), in which the the lack of
synchronization across agents weakens the correlation between equity and consumption.
There is also another newsworthy pattern that emerges out of Panel B. Attentive agents
display higher than average correlations between consumption growth and stock returns.
Indeed, as long as inattentive agents follows pre-determined path of consumption, they
do not react to realizations of the aggregate shock and tend to consume too much in bad
states and too low in good states. Such behavior generates an additional source of risk
since attentive agents are forced to give up consumption in recessions, which are times
in which their marginal utility of consumption is highest. As a result, they command a
higher premium for clearing the goods market. This mechanism is akin to the one stud-
ied in Chien et al. (2011, 2012), where passive investors which do not re-balance their
portfolio raise the risk bore by active investors. When looking at the dynamics of ag-
gregate consumption growth, Panel C shows that the model delivers a series which is
not i.i.d. As in Peng (2005), the frictions in the dissemination of information rationalizes
the presence of predictability in consumption growth. One one hand, Hall (1978) posits
that consumption growth paths formed by rational agents should be unpredictable. On
the other hand, Campbell and Mankiw (1990) nd the presence of serial dependence. In
the model, the consumption growth paths of agents conditional on their information sets
are unpredictable. Still, an econometrician - who can observe all the information of the
economy which has not been updated by agents yet - can nd evidence of sizable positive
autocorrelations. Therefore, it is the dierent information set between the econometri-
cian and the agents which determines or not the predictability of consumption. Finally,
the model fails in generating a dynamics of aggregate consumption growth consistent
with the data, because consumption growth is homoskedastic and too persistent. Indeed,
a Lagrange Multiplier test rejects the presence of heteroskedasticity in the simulated se-
ries of consumption growth at any condence level. Furthermore, in the model the rst
autocorrelation of consumption growth measured at the quarterly frequency is 0.31, while
in the data it equals 0.20.
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Table 2.5.7
Moments of aggregate consumption growth
χ = 0.024 χ = 0 χ = 0.048 θ = 8 Data
A. Standard deviations
Average 0.63 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.76
Attentive agents 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.63 -
Inattentive agents 0.68 - 0.69 0.72 -
B. Correlation with stock returns
Average 0.38 0.77 0.36 0.31 0.22
Attentive agents 0.41 0.77 0.39 0.34 -
Inattentive agents 0.33 - 0.34 0.28 -
C. Time-series dynamics
Autocorrelation 0.31 0.09 0.33 0.37 0.20
ARCH Eects No No No No Yes
Note: the variableχ denes the observation cost and θ is the risk-aversion of agents,
which equals 5 in the benchmark model. All statistics are computed in quarterly
values. In the model, the series of consumption and output growth are derived tak-
ing the Hodrick-Prescott lter of the logarithm of the simulated series aggregated at
the quarterly frequency. The correlation of attentive agents’ consumption growth
with aggregate output growth is computed pooling the average of the individual
correlations of attentive agents over time. The same applies to the correlation of
inattentive agents. The autocorrelation reports the persistence of an AR(1) model
tted to the series of consumption growth. ARCH eects are evaluated using a
Lagrange Multiplier test upon the t of a ARMA(1,1)-ARCH(1) model. If the test
statistics is greater than the Chi-square table value, the null hypothesis of no ARCH
eects is rejected. Data is from Campbell (1999) and Guvenen (2009).
2.5.5 Decomposing the Price of Risk
The observation cost is not enough to generate an equity premium as high as it is in the
data, because in a general equilibrium households take it into account when making their
optimal portfolio choices. As in Heaton and Lucas (1996), agents respond to the additional
uctuations in consumption due to inattention by reducing their exposure to aggregate
risk. In this Section, I disentangle the four main mechanisms through which households’
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optimal reaction to the observation cost impedes the price of risk to rise: 1) adjustments in
the duration of inattention; 2) switches across consumption and precautionary savings; 3)
changes in the composition of the nancial portfolio and 4) shifts in the set of the agents
pricing stocks and bonds. To identify these channels, I follow Pijoan-Mas (2007) by com-
paring six dierent equilibria. First, I consider the economy with no observation cost.
Second, I formulate an economy where the observation cost equals χ = 0.024 and take as
given the optimal choices of agents in the economy with no inattention. So, households
suer the observation cost but cannot react to it. Third, I compute a new equilibrium
by allowing agents to react to the observation cost by setting their optimal duration of
inattention. Fourth, I derive the model by allowing agents to modify the composition of
the nancial portfolio, but not the allocations in consumption and savings. As a result,
households can adjust the share of risky assets in their portfolio, but cannot increase the
buer of precautionary savings. Fifth, I consider the benchmark model with observation
costs where agents can entirely decide their optimal policies. Finally, I take the last equi-
librium focusing only on households with interior solutions, which are eventually those
pricing the two assets. Table 2.5.8 shows the coecient of variation of the marginal value
of wealth over dierent percentiles of its distribution under all these scenarios.
The price of risk peaks when moving from the economy without observation cost to
one in which χ = 0.024 and the agents are forced to follow the optimal policies of the
economy without inattention. For the median households, it surges from 0.002 to 0.49,
reaching even 0.74 on the right tail of the distribution. Since agents cannot modify their
choices, they command a very high premium to bear the risk of being inattentive and
owning stocks. The price of risk decreases as long as we allow agents to modify rst their
portfolio and then the whole set of choices (i.e., consumption/savings and the composition
of the portfolio), and it eventually reaches 0.13 for the median agent that prices risk in the
benchmark economy. I therefore uses the entries of Table 2.5.8 at the median to disentan-
gle the dierent channels through which households’ reaction reduces the prices of risk.
The most important one is the reaction of consumption to the observation cost, which
explains 51.2% of the fall in the price of risk. Indeed, households take into account the
risk of being inattentive by increasing precautionary savings. The second most important
channel is the adjustment in the duration of inattention, which decreases the price of risk
by 20.9%. Households temper the eects of the observation cost by deciding to incur in it
less often. The third channel is given by changes in the nancial portfolio, which accounts
for 18.6% of the dierence in the price of risk. Inattentive agents shifts their portfolio to-
wards the risk-free bond, to diversify away the risk of stocks. Finally, the changes in the
set of agents pricing risk matter too, accounting for 9.3% of the dierence in the price of
risk between the two setups considered here. Indeed, in this environment the equilibrium
prices are dened by the stochastic discount factor of the households with interior solu-
tions for both bonds and stocks. As far as stockholders are wealthy, they can self-insure
their stream of consumption, implying a low price of risk. If the volatility of consump-
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tion growth of stockholders were higher than the one of non-stockholders, the changes
in the set of households pricing risk would have boosted the equity premium rather than
tempering it.
Table 2.5.8
Price of risk under different scenarios
Economy / Percentiles 25th 50th 75th 95th
χ = 0 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
χ = 0.024 - Choices as in χ = 0 0.46 0.49 0.55 0.74
χ = 0.024 - Consumption and portfolio as in χ = 0 0.40 0.41 0.46 0.66
χ = 0.024 - Consumption as in χ = 0 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.48
χ = 0.024 - Optimal policies 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.31
χ = 0.024 - Pricing agents 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.20
Note: This Table reports the price of risk of wealth along some percentiles of its distribution
under dierent economies. The variable χ denes the observation cost. The pricing agents have
interior policy functions for both bonds and capital. The rst equilibrium derives agents’ price of
risk in an environment without observation costs. The second equilibrium derives agents’ price
of risk in an environment with observation costs, taking as given agents’ optimal policy function
from the economy without observation costs. The third equilibrium derives agents’ price of risk
in an environment with observation costs by allowing agents to set their optimal duration of
inattention, taking as given the policy functions of consumption and portfolio choices from the
economy without observation costs. The fourth equilibrium derives agents’ price of risk in an
environment with observation costs by allowing agents to set the duration of inattention and
the optimal share of risky assets, taking as given the policy function for consumption from the
economy without observation costs. The fth equilibrium derives agents’ price of risk in an
environment with observation costs by allowing agents to set all their optimal choices. The
sixth equilibrium derives the agents’ price of risk in an environment with observation costs by
focusing on households with interior policy solutions for both bonds and capital.
2.5.6 The Role of Borrowing Constraints
Chen (2006) considers a Lucas-tree economy where heterogeneous agents face an obser-
vation cost, nding that the equity premium is zero and inattention does not prevent
agents from owning stocks. Instead, in my model the equity premium is around 1% and
the number of agents that do not participate on the equity market is substantial. In this
Section I show that such contradictory results can be rationalized by the interaction be-
tween the observation cost and the borrowing constraints. In what follows, I compare
three economies which dier only for the level of the borrowing constraints. The rst one
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is the benchmark model, where the borrowing constraints equal minus two times the av-
erage monthly income. In the second case, I consider an economy in which agents cannot
borrow at all while in the last set up the constraints are loose and equal minus four times
the average monthly income of households.
Table 2.5.9
The role of borrowing constraints
Variable Benchmark Tight Constraints Loose Constraints
A. Inattentive economy - χ = 0.024
% Stockholders 73.4 60.5 90.1
Gini index wealth 0.64 0.73 0.49
Equity premium 0.93 6.06 0.08
B. Attentive economy - χ = 0
% Stockholders 98.5 91.2 98.7
Gini index wealth 0.41 0.54 0.36
Equity premium 0.01 4.85 0.004
Note: The variable χ denes the observation cost. In the “Benchmark” model, bor-
rowing constraints equal minus two times the average monthly income of house-
holds, that is, f = –2E [lt]. The “Tight Constraints” model does not allow short
sales, that is, f = 0. In the “Loose Constraints” model borrowing constraints equal
minus four times the average monthly income of households, that is, f = –4E [lt].
In Panel A of Table 2.5.9, I report the fraction of stockholders, the Gini coecient
of the distribution of wealth and the equity premium implied by these three economies.
When agents cannot borrow at all, the stock market participation falls to 60.5%, further
spreading the distribution of wealth, whose Gini index is 0.73, and the equity premium is
6.06%. These numbers match almost perfectly their empirical counterparts. Instead, in the
economy with loose nancial constraints, almost all households own stocks. Furthermore,
the wealth distribution is more concentrated and the equity premium is around zero. This
exercise highlights that the denition of the borrowing constraints changes starkly the
results of the model. Most importantly, the interaction between borrowing constraints
and the observation cost plays a non negligible role. Indeed, Panel B of Table 2.5.9 shows
the result of the same exercise applied to an economy without observation cost, that is,
χ = 0. In this case, tight constraints do increase the equity premium but just up to 4.85%.
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Therefore, borrowing constraints can generate a high price of risk not only per se, as
pointed out in Pijoan-Mas (2007) and Gomes and Michaelides (2008), but also for their
interaction with the observation cost.
2.6 Conclusion
A recent strand of literature studies the role of agents’ infrequent planning and limited
attention to the stock market on asset prices, nding inconclusive results. Although inat-
tention unambiguously increases the wedge between stock and bond returns, it is not
clear yet whether it can account for the equity premium puzzle. In this paper, I evaluate
the quantitative performance of inattention on asset prices in a production economy with
heterogeneous agents and uninsurable labor income risk. I consider a monetary obser-
vation cost which generates a level of households’ inattention and infrequent planning
which is endogenous, heterogeneous across agents and time-varying. To discipline the
role of infrequent planning, I calibrate the observation cost to match the actual duration
of inattention of the median household. I nd that the observation cost improves the
performance of the model over several dimensions. Inattention spreads the wealth dis-
tribution toward realistic values and induces households not to to hold stocks, pointing a
new rationale for the limited stock market participation. Households do not own stocks
because investing in equity is not a trivial task at all. Then, I show that inattention in-
duces the volatility of stock returns to be high and countercyclical. It also generates sizable
countercyclical variations in the equity premium. Indeed, on one hand the aggregate risk
is concentrated on a small measure of agents. On the other hand, inattentive agents create
a residual risk by consuming too much in recessions and too little in expansions. Thus,
attentive agents that actively invest in stocks command a countercyclical compensation
to bear such additional source of risk. Nevertheless, any eect of inattention on the dy-
namics of stock prices vanishes as long as borrowing constraints are loose enough. This
result suggests that models featuring inattention should carefully take into account the
imperfections credit markets to deliver predictions consistent with the data. Furthermore,
the model fails in delivering a consumption growth for stockholders less volatile than the
one of non-stockholders, and an aggregate consumption growth which is homoskedas-
tic and too persistent. Also the equity premium is still too low, around 1%. Raising the
observation cost barely alters the Sharpe ratio. Indeed, in such a case households reduce
the equilibrium price of risk by extending the duration of their inattention, accumulating
more precautionary savings and disinvesting out of stocks. Overall, although inattention
improves the performance of the model, it cannot quantitatively account for the observed
dynamics of stock prices and excess returns yet.
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2.A Appendix: Computational Algorithm
This Section describes the steps and the details of the computational algorithm I used to
numerically solve the model. The algorithm is an extension to the case of inattention
of the standard heterogeneous agent model with aggregate uncertainty and two assets,
which has been already implemented by Krusell and Smith (1998), Pijoan-Mas (2007) and
Gomes and Michaelides (2008).
It is well known that the numerical computation of heterogeneous agent model with
aggregate uncertainty and two assets is very cumbersome. The reason is twofold. First,
one of the endogenous aggregate state of the problem is given by the distribution of the
agents over their idiosyncratic states γ, which is an innite-dimensional object. Indeed, as
noted by Krusell and Smith (1997), agents need to know the entire distribution γ in order
to generate rational expectations on prices. To circumvent this insurmountable curse of
dimensionality, the state space has to be somehow reduced. I approximate the entire distri-
bution γ by a set of moments m <∞ of the stock of aggregate capital K , as in Krusell and
Smith (1997), and the number of inattentive agents in the economy in every period ζt . On
one hand, the approximation with a nite set of moments of K can be interpreted as if the
agents of the economy were bounded rational, ignoring higher-order moments of γ. As in
previous studies, I nd that m = 1 is enough to have an almost perfect approximation of γ.
That is, the mean of aggregate capital K¯ is a sucient statistics that capture virtually all
the information that agents need to forecast future prices. On the other hand, the variable
ζ signals agents about the degree of informational frictions in the economy. Indeed, when
every agent is attentive, the model shrinks down to the standard Krusell and Smith (1998).
Instead, where there is a (non-negligible) measure of inattentive agent, which is the case
at the core of my analysis, the model departures from the standard setting. As far as the
presence of observation costs pin down dierent equilibria, and therefore dierent path
of futures prices, agents are required to be aware of the extent of the frictions in the econ-
omy whenever taking their optimal choices on consumption and savings. Second, when
extending the basic Krusell and Smith (1997) algorithm to the case of an economy with
two assets, the market for bonds does not clear at all dates and states. Indeed, the total
bondholdings implied by the model is almost a random walk. As far as total bondholdings
experience large movements over time, it is not always possible to achieve the clearing of
the market. I therefore follow the modied algorithm of Krusell and Smith (1998), where
agents perceive the bond return as a state of the economy. The equilibrium bond return is
then the one in which the bond return perceived by the agents and the one implied by the
optimal decisions of the agents coincide. The presence of the observation cost adds a fur-
ther complication. Agents have to decide their optimal duration of inattention. This step
requires the derivation of the household’s maximization procedure not just in one case
(i.e., today vs. the future), but in a much wider set of alternatives. Indeed, the household
can decide whether to be attentive today and tomorrow, whether to be attentive today
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and inattentive for the following period, or to be attentive today and inattentive for the
following two periods, and so on and so forth. Accordingly, I dene a grid over all the
potential durations of inattention that agents can pick up, solve the model over each grid
points and eventually take the maximum among the dierent value functions to derive
the optimal choice of inattention.
The computation of the model requires the convergence upon six forecasting rules
which predict the future mean of the stock of aggregate capital, the future price of the bond
and the future number of inattentive agents for both the aggregate shocks zb and zg . The
procedure yields a set of twenty two dierent parameters upon which to converge. This
algorithm is very time-consuming and makes at the moment computationally infeasible
any extension of the model that inates either the mechanisms or the number of states.
For example, the assumption that inattentive agents do not gather information about their
idiosyncratic shocks is required by this computational constraint.
In what follows, I rst describe the computational algorithm in Section 2.A.1. Then, I
discuss the problem of the household given the forecasting rule on future prices in Section
2.A.2. Finally, Section 2.A.3 concentrates on the derivation of the equilibrium forecasting
rules. I also show that the substitution of the entire distribution γ with the rst moment
of aggregate capital K¯ and the number of inattentive agents ζ yields an almost perfect
approximation.
2.A.1 Algorithm
The algorithm works around nine main steps, as follows:
1. Guess the set of moments mt of aggregate capital Kt upon which to approximate
the distribution of agents γt ;
2. Guess the functional forms for the forecasting rule of the set of moments mt , the
number of inattentive agents in the economy ζt and the risk-free return to bond rbt ;
3. Guess the parameters of the forecasting rules;
4. Solve the household’s problem;
5. Simulate the economy:
(a) Set an initial distribution of agents over their idiosyncratic states ω, e and ξ;
(b) Find the interest rate rb∗ that clears the market for bonds. Accordingly, guess
an initial condition rb,0, solve the household’s problem in which agents per-
ceive the bond return rb,0 as a state, and obtain the policy functions gc
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ , rb,0
)
,
gb
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ , rb,0
)
, ga
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ , rb,0
)
and gd
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ , rb,0
)
. Use
the policy functions on bondholdings gb to check whether the market clears,
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that is, whether the total holdings of bond equals zero. If there is an excess
of bond supply, then change the initial condition to rb,1 < rb,0. If there is an
excess of bond demand, then change the initial condition to rb,1 > rb,0. Iterate
until the convergence on the interest rate rb∗ that clears the market.
(c) Derive next period distribution of agents over their idiosyncratic statesω, e and
ξ using the policy functions gc
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ , rb∗
)
, gb
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ , rb∗
)
,
ga
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ , rb∗
)
and gd
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ , rb∗
)
and the law of motions for
the shocks z, e and ξ.
(d) Simulate the economy for a large number of periods T over a large measure of
agents N . Drop out the rst observations which are likely to be inuenced by
the initial conditions.
6. Use the simulated series to estimate the forecasting rules on mt , ζt and rbt implied
by the optimal decisions of the agents;
7. Check whether the coecients of the forecasting rules implied by the optimal deci-
sions of the agents coincide with the one guessed in step (3). If they coincide, go to
step (8). Otherwise, go back to step (3);
8. Check whether the functional forms of the forecasting rule as chosen in step (2) give
a good t of the approximation of the state space of the problem. If this is the case,
go to step (9). Otherwise, go back to step (2);
9. Check whether the set of moments mk of aggregate capital K yields a good ap-
proximation of the distribution of agents γ. If this is the case, the model is solved.
Otherwise, go back to step (1).
2.A.2 Household’s Problem
I solve the household’s problem using value function iteration techniques. I discretize the
state space of the problem as follows. First, I guess that the rst moment of aggregate
capital and the number of inattention agents are sucient statistics describing the evo-
lution of the distribution of agents γ. Later on, I evaluate the accuracy of my conjecture.
Then, I follow Pijoan-Mas (2007) by stacking all the shocks, both the idiosyncratic and
the aggregate ones, in a single vector , which has 8 points: four points - one for unem-
ployed agents and three dierent level for employed agents - for each aggregate shock z.
For the wealth ω I use a grid of 60 points on a logarithmic scale. Instead, for the possible
durations of inattention d, I use a grid of 30 points: the rst 25 points are equidistant and
goes from no inattention at all, 1 month of inattention until 2 years of inattention. The
following four grid points are equidistant on a quarterly basis. In this respect, the assump-
tion made in the model on when inattention breaks out exogenously are very helpful in
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the denition of the grid. Indeed, agents will not choose too long durations of inattention
because they take into account the probability of being called attentive due to a change
in their employment status or because they hit the borrowing constraints. For example,
in the benchmark model the largest point of the grid yields a duration of inattention of 3
years. Yet, this choice is hardly picked up by households in the simulations done to solve
the model. Without the two assumptions on the exogenous ending of inattention, then
some households could theoretically be inattentive forever, which would require a wider
grid for the choice variable d. Then, for the grids of the rst moment of aggregate capi-
tal K¯ and the number of inattentive agents ζ I use 6 points since the value function does
not display a lot of curvature along these dimensions. To sum up, any value functions
is computed over a total of 518, 400 dierent grid points. Furthermore, the state space is
inated in the case of the problem in which households perceive the bond return as a state
of the economy. I use a grid for rb formed by 10 points, which yields a total of 5, 184, 000
grid points. Decisions rules o the grid are evaluated using a cubic spline interpolation
around along the values of wealth ω and a bilinear interpolation around the remaining
endogenous state variables. Finally, the solution of the model is simulated from a set of
3, 000 agents over T=10,000 time periods. In any evaluation of the simulated series, the
rst 1, 000 observations are dropped out.
The household’s problem used in step (4) of the algorithm modies the standard struc-
ture presented in the text to allow for the approximation of the measure of agents µ with
the rst moment of aggregate capital K¯ and the number of inattentive agents ζ . Then, I
postulate three forecasting rules (R1, R2, R3) for aggregate capital K , the number of inat-
tentive agents ζ and the return of the bond rb, respectively. The household’s problem
reads
V (ωt , t ,Kt , ζt) = max
d,
[
ct ,cλ(d)–1
]
, at+1, bt+1
Et
[ λ(d)∑
j=t
βj–t U
(
cj
)
+ . . .
· · · + βλ(d)–t V
(
ωλ(d), eλ(d), ξλ(d); zλ(d), γλ(d)
)]
s.t. ωt + lt (t ,Kt , ζt) = ct + at+1 + bt+1
ωλ(d) =
(
at+1 + bt+1
) λ(d)∏
k=t+1
rpk (k ,Kk , ζk;αt+1) + . . .
· · · +
λ(d)–1∑
j=t+1
[(
lj – cj
) λ(d)∏
k=j+1
rpk (k ,Kk , ζk;αt+1)
]
– χlλ(d)
Kλ(d) = R1
(
Kt , ζt , [zt , zλ(d)]
)
, ζλ(d) = R2
(
Kt , ζt , [zt , zλ(d)]
)
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rbλ(d) = R3
(
Kt , ζt , [zt , zλ(d)]
)
aj+1 ≥ a, bj+1 ≥ b, ωj+1 ≥ ω, ∀j ∈ [t,λ(d) – 1)
λ(d) = min
j∈[t,d]
{
d, ej 6= ej–1, bj+1 < b, aj+1 < a,
(
aj+1 + bj+1
)
< f
}
Instead, in step (5b) of the problem the households perceive the return of the bond rb
as a state of the economy, as follows
V
(
ωt , t ,Kt , ζt , rbt
)
= max
d,
[
ct ,cλ(d)–1
]
, at+1, bt+1
Et
[ λ(d)∑
j=t
βj–t U
(
cj
)
+ . . .
· · · + βλ(d)–t V
(
ωλ(d), eλ(d), ξλ(d); zλ(d), γλ(d)
)]
s.t. ωt + lt
(
t ,Kt , ζt , rbt
)
= ct + at+1 + bt+1
ωλ(d) =
(
at+1 + bt+1
) λ(d)∏
k=t+1
rpk
(
k ,Kk , ζk , rbk ;αt+1
)
+ . . .
· · · +
λ(d)–1∑
j=t+1
[(
lj – cj
) λ(d)∏
k=j+1
rpk
(
k ,Kk , ζk , rbk ;αt+1
) ]
– χlλ(d)
Kλ(d) = R1
(
Kt , ζt , [zt , zλ(d)]
)
, ζλ(d) = R2
(
Kt , ζt , [zt , zλ(d)]
)
rbλ(d) = R3
(
Kt , ζt , [zt , zλ(d)]
)
aj+1 ≥ a, bj+1 ≥ b, ωj+1 ≥ ω, ∀j ∈ [t,λ(d) – 1)
λ(d) = min
j∈[t,d]
{
d, ej 6= ej–1, bj+1 < b, aj+1 < a,
(
aj+1 + bj+1
)
< f
}
I use this problem to simulate the economy given the return to the bond rb as a per-
ceived state for the households. I follow Gomes and Michaelides (2008) by aggregating
agents’ bond demands and determining the bond return that clears the market through
linear interpolation. This value is then used to recover the implied optimal decisions of
the agents, which are then aggregated to form the aggregate variables that becomes state
variables in the following time period.
2.A.3 Equilibrium Forecasting Rules
I follow Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) by dening log-linear functional forms for the
forecasting rules of the mean of aggregate stock capital K¯ , the number of inattentive agents
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ζ and the bond return rb. Namely, I use the following law of motions:
log K¯ = α0(z) + α1(z) log K¯ + α2(z) log ζ
log ζ = β0(z) + β1(z) log K¯ + β2(z) log ζ
rb = γ0(z) + γ1(z) log K¯ + γ2(z) log ζ + γ3(z)
(
log K¯
)2 + γ4(z) (log ζ)2
The parameters of the functional forms depend on the aggregate shock z. Indeed, there
is a set of three forecasting rule for each of the two realizations of the aggregate shock z,
resulting in a total of six forecasting rules and twenty two parameters, upon which to nd
convergence.
I nd the equilibrium forecasting rules as follows. First, I guess a set of initial condi-
tions
{
α00(z),α01(z),α02(z), β00 (z), β01 (z), β02 (z), γ00 (z), γ01 (z), γ02 (z), γ03 (z), γ04 (z)
}
. Then, given
such rules I solve the household’s problem. I take the simulated series to then re-estimate
the forecasting rules, which yields a new set of implied parameters
{
α10(z),α11(z),α12(z), β10 (z),
β11 (z), β12 (z), γ10 (z), γ11 (z), γ12 (z), γ13 (z), γ14 (z)
}
. If the two sets coincide (up to a numerical
wedge), then these values correspond to the equilibrium forecasting rules. Otherwise, I
use the latter set of coecients as a new initial guess.
For the benchmark specication of the model, I nd the following equilibrium fore-
casting rules for z = zg
log K¯ = 0.101 + 0.976 log K¯ – 0.249 log ζ with R2 = 0.993761
log ζ = –0.208 + 0.037 log K¯ + 0.861 log ζ with R2 = 0.995890
rb = 1.042 – 0.077 log K¯ + 0.016 log ζ+
+ 0.011
(
log K¯
)2 + 0.006 (log ζ)2 with R2 = 0.998717
and the following equilibrium forecasting rules for z = zb
log K¯ = 0.084 + 0.986 log K¯ – 0.240 log ζ with R2 = 0.994014
log ζ = –0.229 + 0.040 log K¯ + 0.851 log ζ with R2 = 0.997081
rb = 1.036 – 0.073 log K¯ + 0.021 log ζ+
+ 0.009
(
log K¯
)2 + 0.009 (log ζ)2 with R2 = 0.998965
Note that the R2 are all above 0.99. This result points out that approximating the dis-
tribution of agents γ with the rst moment of aggregate capital K¯ and the number of
inattentive agents ζ implies basically no discharge of relevant information that agents can
use to forecast future prices.

chapter 3
Financial Development, Default
Rates and Credit Spreads1
3.1 Introduction
We study the joint dynamics of corporate default and credit spreads from 1950 to 2012. We
document that, over the last thirty years, defaults rates rose by 467% while credit spreads
barely moved. We refer to this evidence as the diverging trend between rising default rates
and constant credit spreads.
We provide statistical support for the presence of one structural break in the uncon-
ditional mean of default rates around 1984. This date splits the series of default rates in
two samples with strikingly dierent characteristics. On one hand, during the 1950’s and
1960’s the US economy recorded almost no bankruptcies: the average default rate from
1950 to 1983 equals 0.3%. On the other hand, from the 1980’s on we observe a dramatic
rise in the number of defaults: the average number of corporate bankruptcies from 1984 to
2012 equals 1.7%. Hence, default rates have increased by 467% throughout the last thirty
years. Conversely, the time series of credit spreads does not display any structural shift in
its unconditional mean. The average credit spread over the period 1950-1983 records 91
basis points whereas the average spread from 1984 to 2012 amounts to 102 basis points.
We run a battery of tests and show that this 11 basis points increase is not statistically
signicant.
At a rst glance, it is hard to reconcile the dierent behavior of default rates and credit
spreads. Anecdotal evidence would suggest the two time series to move together. The
credit spread is a market measure of default risk and for this reason it should capture
relevant information about default rates1. Therefore, such a steep rise in default rates
should allegedly be mirrored by credit spreads. However it does not.
To understand this phenomenon, we propose an explanation based on a structural
change in the supply side of credit. Although we acknowledge that changes in nancial
factors, such as shocks to liquidity or to the credit ratings, could account for this diverg-
ing trend, we provide a theory that is based just on fundamentals. We conjecture that the
1This Chapter is a joint work with Alessandro Peri.
1Longsta et al. (2005) document that 71% of the Baa yield is explained by default risk.
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reduction in the cost of borrowing due to the widely documented process of deregulation
and innovation incurred by the nancial sector in the 70s might explain this empirical
evidence. Apropos, we construct a dynamic equilibrium model where two features, the
development of credit markets and the limited enforceability of debt, can be accounted
for the diverging trend between default rates and credit spreads. We model the develop-
ment of credit markets in a reduced form, as an exogenous reduction of the xed cost of
borrowing. We nd that nancial development can explain 64% of the observed increase
in average default rates and predict just a 2 basis points increase in the credit spreads. As
a robustness check, our explanation quantitatively accounts for a number of trends that
have characterized public rms over the last decades: the fall in the number of rms dis-
tributing dividends, the rise in the degree of dividend smoothing, and the increase in the
idiosyncratic volatility of public rms.
In order to illustrate the model mechanism let us rst discuss the implications of the
main friction in our economy: limited enforceability of debt contracts. In the model there
is a distribution of heterogeneous rms that can default on their debt. In such an event the
credit intermediary seizes the assets of the rm. This environment generates endogenous
borrowing constraints which depend on the level of capital of the rm, its idiosyncratic
eciency and the demanded amount of debt. In particular, rms with less collateral face
tighter constraint because upon default credit intermediaries incur in higher losses. Sec-
ondly, less ecient rms face tighter borrowing constraints because they have a higher
probability to default in the next period2. Finally, larger loans increase the probability of
default, by raising the number of scenarios where the rm will not be able to repay its
debt. Accordingly, the interest rate which is charged on the loan by the credit intermedi-
ary reects these dierent determinants of the expected default cost. In conclusion, large
or ecient rms can borrow more (or borrow the same quantity at a cheaper price) with
respect to ceteris paribus smaller or less ecient ones. In addition to these features, we
assume the presence of a xed borrowing cost that further reduces the nancing ability
of all rms, hitting disproportionately small rms.
What happens with the development of the credit markets? What happens when xed
costs of borrowing are reduced? A reduction in the xed cost of borrowing has both direct
and indirect eects. The direct eect is straightforward and twofold. First of all, there is a
reduction in credit rationing. Firms can now benet from the possibility of accessing small
amount of loans, before unfeasible because of the presence of a xed borrowing cost3.
Secondly, rms can either raise the same amount of debt at a cheaper price or, equivalently,
2Since the idiosyncratic shock is persistent, rms’ actual status predicts their future productivity. If we
assume independent idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the borrowing constraint would not depend on the
actual eciency of the rm.
3For example, suppose that before the credit market development a rm optimal loan (given the interest
rate) was 100$ gross of the borrowing cost, and suppose that the cost of the borrowing process was 200$.
The cost of the process is higher than the total amount of the loan required, therefore the rm would have
not entered that contract. After nancial development, there will be less rms constrained in this fashion.
3.1 Introduction 85
access at the same price an higher amount of loan (just reallocating the resources before
devoted to the payment of the borrowing cost to increase the amount of actual loan).
The indirect eect is the result of the dynamic response of rms to the new environment.
To understand it, we need to look more closely at the optimizing behavior of a rm in
presence of endogenous borrowing constraints. In our model rms maximize the expected
discounted value of the stream of dividends. The presence of endogenously convex loan
price schedules makes the value function of the risk-neutral rms to be concave. For this
reason, rms seek to smooth dividends against idiosyncratic shocks. Debt is a channel
for doing so. Nonetheless the higher the xed borrowing cost, the tighter the borrowing
constraint, and, accordingly, the more dicult for the rm to use eciently debt for this
purpose. In order to partially overcome this obstacle rms try to build up physical capital.
Physical capital is in fact the collateral against which rms can borrow at a cheaper price.
The result is that rms which have been lucky in experiencing a raw of good productivity
shocks tend to accumulate for precautionary reasons more physical capital than what
might be motivated just by eciency reasons. Therefore, the higher the level of xed cost
of borrowing, the higher the amount of physical capital devoted for this purpose. Indeed,
the collateral value of capital decreases with the xed cost of borrowing. Conversely, rms
which have not been lucky/small rms struggle to optimally exploit protable investment
opportunities, given the high cost of debt. As a conclusion in this economy ineciently
large rms coexist with small rms which struggle to grow.
By reducing the xed cost of borrowing, nancial development signicantly aects
those dynamics. The reduction of borrowing costs eases rms’ access to debt. Ecient
small rms can nance more investment and grow, while inecient rms can reduce
their size without being penalized as much as before on their interest rates, due to the
lack of collateral. Hence, inecient large rms shrinks down their scale of operation. As
a consequence, given the higher collateral value of capital, rms can borrow more debt
for the same amount of capital, implying an increase in leverage. Together with a higher
volatility of debt, this implies a higher volatility of leverage. Higher level and volatility
of leverage boost the likelihood that rms end up in states of the world where they nd
optimal to default, pushing up the overall default rate of the economy.
Why the rise in default risk does not translate in an increase of the credit spreads? This
question requires a quantitative answer, because the change in credit spreads is driven by
two counteracting forces which exert their inuence through three channels: the xed
cost of borrowing, the quantity of risk and the loss given default for the credit interme-
diaries. On the one hand, rising default rates increase the quantity of risk bore by credit
intermediaries with the consequence that credit spreads have to rise too. On the other
hand, there are two channels through which nancial development reduces the credit
spreads: the xed cost of borrowing and the loss given default. First of all, ceteris paribus
nancial development reduces by construction the xed cost of borrowing, and therefore
the interest rate charged on the loan. The impact on the interest rate is stronger the higher
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is the expected probability of default of the rm, contributing to the reduction of the credit
spread. Secondly, and more importantly from a quantitative point of view, nancial de-
velopment make less stringent the borrowing constraint by allowing rms to operate at a
more ecient scale. As a result, the average size and prots increase, implying larger ex-
ante liquidation values in case of default. This channel tempers the loss given default for
the credit intermediaries, pushing down credit spreads. In the model, nancial develop-
ment makes default to rise from 0.3% to 1.2%. Yet, credit spreads rise just by 2 basis points
because the higher default risk is oset by a 24% upsurge in the median expected recovery
rate. The bulk of this increase comes from a boost in the prots of the rm, which go up
by 21.73%. The median size of capital rises too, by 9.34%.
The model also predicts a number of trend that characterized public rms over the
recent decades. First, we show that the reduction of the xed credit costs changes rms’
optimal decisions of dividend payout. After nancial development rms are in fact more
able to smooth dividends over time, and they can trade o this reduction in volatility
with a decrease in the level of dividends. The reduction of the borrowing costs makes the
measure of rms distributing dividends to shrink down by 34%. This number accounts for
the 73% of the decline documented for the U.S. by Fama and French (2001). Furthermore,
in the model rms also increase the degree of dividend smoothing by a magnitude which
is remarkably close to the values estimated by Leary and Michaely (2011) on US public
rms. Second, we study the volatility of rms’ returns and sales. Indeed, Campbell et
al. (2001), Comin and Mulani (2006), Comin and Philippon (2006) show the presence of a
secular upward trend in the volatilities of rms. We suggest that this empirical evidence
can be (at least partially) accounted for by nancial development. Indeed, the model is
able to reproduce a rise of 72 % in the volatility of sales and 67% for rms’ returns.
3.1.1 Related Literature
This paper adds to the literature on the role of credit markets on rm dynamics. The sem-
inal paper in this eld is Cooley and Quadrini (2001), which augments the environment of
Hopenhayn (1992) with nancial frictions, namely an equity issuance and a bankruptcy
deadweight loss. The authors present a model where the dynamics of rms, in terms of
growth, job reallocation and exit, is negatively correlated with their initial size and age,
as it is in the data. Following Cooley and Quadrini (2001), many papers attempted to
understand qualitatively and quantitatively the role of nancial frictions on rm char-
acteristics, rm dynamics and the behavior of macroeconomic aggregates. Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) show how the limited enforceability of rms’ debt might generate en-
dogenous borrowing constraints, which aects not only the dynamics of individual rms,
but even the behavior of aggregate nancial and real variables. Jermann and Quadrini
(2006) use a similar model to show that nancial development can be accounted for the
rise in volatility of aggregate nancial variables and the decline of the volatility of real
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economic activity. All these models share a common feature: despite rms are allowed to
renege on their debt, there is no default in equilibrium. This result stems from the presence
of an enforcement constraint, which binds in equilibrium, impeding the rms to default.
Recently, few papers have relaxed this condition allowing for equilibrium default. Arel-
lano et al. (2011) build a general equilibrium model which allows for equilibrium default,
where nancial frictions interact with increases in uncertainty at the rm level to generate
a contraction in the economic activity. Khan et al. (2012) and Gomes and Schmid (2010a)
instead use equilibrium default to show that credit shocks account for a sizable part of the
business cycle uctuations and generate recessions similar to the recent nancial crisis of
2007-2009. Finally, Gomes and Schmid (2010b) develop a model with equilibrium default
to explain the relationship between rms’ leverage, book assets and stock prices.
Despite the dierent panorama of questions involved, these papers share the same
idea on the role of equilibrium default. In all of them, equilibrium default is just a nan-
cial friction, valued in the extent in which is able to produce dynamics which are relevant
for investigating phenomena other than default. In other words, it is the instrumental na-
ture rather than the default phenomenon per se to be appraised. This paper reverses this
logic. In particular it contributes on the literature investigating the phenomenon of cor-
porate default per se. In so doing, we restrict our attention on the relationship between the
magnitude of default in the economy (default rate) and the price of risk which is associated
to it (credit spreads). From a modeling point of view, this paper builds on Arellano et al.
(2012), despite the emphasis of the two paper is on completely dierent questions. In par-
ticular, Arellano et al. (2012) focus on the role of nancial development on rm dynamics,
showing how nancial development reduces the dierences in leverage and growth rates
among large and small rms.
In conclusion, despite this paper is the rst documenting the diverging trend between
the rise in corporate default rates and constant credit spreads, the increase in default rate
is not a new stylized fact. Among others, Campbell et al. (2008) show that corporate
bankruptcies have increased by 150% or 300%, depending on how default is measured. A
similar upward trend is instead found by Livshits et al. (2010) in the consumer bankrupt-
cies in the United States. They show that, from 1970 to 2002, personal bankruptcies in
the United States have increased by around 500%, which is analogous to the number we
report on corporate bankruptcies.
3.2 Data
In this section we document the diverging trend between rising corporate default rates
and constant credit spreads from the period 1950-2012. This empirical evidence builds
upon the contribution of Giesecke et al. (2011) in the measurement of the average default
rates and credit spreads of the economy.
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3.2.1 Corporate Default Rates
We take the data on US public rms corporate default rates from the Moody’s Analytics
Default and Recovery Database. The data set covers the credit experiences of over 18,000
corporate issuers that sold long-term public debt at some time between 1920 and 20124.
On the one side, an appealing feature of the Moody’s data is its broad denition of default
which includes not only formal bankruptcy procedures (Chapter 7,Chapter 11) but also
informal ones (distressed exchange5). We think this is the most relevant denition of
default for our analysis, which focuses on economic consequences of default6. On the
other side, this data set presents some drawbacks. First of all, the index made available to
the public by Moody’s is issuer-weighted, while a value-weighted index would be a more
appropriate measure for gauging the economic impact of default. Second, the sample of
rms in consideration (the denominator of the ratio from which we obtain the default
rates) is the sample of rms rated by the rating agency, while we would need a broader
measure of the public rms population. Third, this index is a global index, which includes
not only US rms, contaminating the statistic with foreign default cycles. In conclusion,
the index includes also nancial and utilities rms, which we would like to depurate, given
the dierent capital structure characteristics. A solution to these problems, would be to
use the data of Giesecke et al. (2011), which shares similar properties to the one under
study in this paper, and are cleaned of these shortcomings. Hence, until these better data
become available, our results should be mostly viewed as suggestive.
Figure 3.2.2 displays the annual issuer-weighted corporate default rates for U.S. public
rmsfrom 1950 to 2012. Visual inspection of the picture foregrounds a dramatic upsurge
in default rates starting from the 1980’s on, following a period of almost no default in the
1950’s and 1960’s. To test for the presence of a break in the data generating process behind
the times series of corporate default rates we apply the Bai and Perron (1998)’s SupLR test
statistics. This procedure checks the presence of multiple structural changes, occurring at
random dates. The test statistic is obtained by running an OLS regression. We test for the
existence of at most three break dates. Following Carvalho and Gabaix (2013), we assume
that every date T lies in a range [T1, T2], with T1 = 0.2n and T2 = 0.8n, where n denotes the
sample size. The choice of a 20% trimming parameter is recommended by Bai and Perron
(2006) to reduce the size distortions which is present when allowing for serial correlation
4As of January 1, 2012 approximately 5,000 corporate issuers held a Moody’s long-term bond, loan, or
corporate family rating, see Moody’s (2012, p. 16)
5A distressed exchange is one of three events which Moody’s denes as a default for the purpose of its
default rate statistics. It is any of the following two events: 1) the issuer can make a tender oer, agreeing to
pay cash for all or a portion of an outstanding debt security, usually at a price above the trading price, but
well below the face amount; 2) the issuer can make an exchange oer, through which an oer is made to
substitute the current outstanding securities for a new package of securities which may include: cash, new
bonds, stocks, other securities, or a combination thereof, see Moody’s (2002).
6Financial intermediaries care about the ultimate economic consequence of a delinquent loan, and not
about the form of legal bankruptcy or informal default that the debt obligation might have turned into.
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in the error.
As a data generator process for the default rates, we consider a rst order autoregres-
sive model plus a constant. We run two dierent test to check for a break in the constant
and a joint break in the constant and in the autoregressive coecient. Table 3.2.1 shows
that we reject the null hypothesis of no break for both cases at a 5% signicance level.
Either case, the SupLR test statistic indicates the existence of a single break, which is esti-
mated at 1983 and 1984. We nd statistical evidence of these breaks even after controlling
for lagged GDP growth rates and lagged stock returns volatility. These tests tell us that
default rates did change their dynamics in the early 1980’s. Hereafter, we follow the vast
literature on the Great Moderation that indicates the existence of a break in the volatility
of US GDP growth around 19847. We will then compare two intervals of time, one going
from 1950 to 1983 and the second from 1984 to 20128. In Table 2 we report the mean values
of the corporate default rates over the two intervals of time. Default rates rose from an
average value of 0.3% during the period 1950-1983 up to 1.7% over the last thirty years.
This corresponds to a 467% increase in average default rates. Surprisingly, this number
almost equals the 500% increase in consumer bankruptcy documented over the same time
period by Livshits et al. (2010).
Figure 3.2.1
Corporate Default Rate
Note: this graph plots the annual corporate default rate (in percentage points) in the United States from
1950 until 2012. The circle line plots the average annual corporate default rate from 1950 until 1983, while
the dashed line plots the average annual corporate default rate from 1984 until 2012. Shaded area denotes
recession.
7Among others, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Stock and Watson (2002), Carvalho and Gabaix
(2013) and reference therein. In particular, Stock and Watson (2002) document a wide-spread decline in
aggregate volatility, analysing the time series of 124 macro variables since 1960.
8The results of the paper do not change when considering 1983 as the break date.
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Table 3.2.1
Break Test for Default Rates
Defaultt = a + ρDefaultt–1 + t
H0: No Break in a H0: No Break in a and ρ
SupLR Stat 8.70 18.14
5% Critical Values 8.22 10.98
Null of No Break Reject Reject
Estimated Break Date 1983 1984
Note: this table reports the results of the Bai and Perron (1998) structural break
test on annual default rates given by Moody’s Default and Recovery Database.
We assume that default rates follow an AR(1) process and we test two null hy-
potheses: either no break just in the constant or no break in both the constant
and the autoregressive parameter. The table reports the test statistics (Su-
pLR stat), the 5% Critical Values, whether the test reject or accepts the null
hypothesis, and the estimated date of the break in case the null is rejected.
Table 3.2.2
Average Default Rates
1950-1983 1984-2012 ∆ 1984-2012/1950-1983
0.3% 1.7% +467%
Note: this table reports the average of annual default
rates given by Moody’s Default and Recovery Database,
over two dierent periods, from 1950 until 1983, and from
1984 until 2012.
3.2.2 Corporate Credit Spreads
We measure the intensity of corporate default risk using the default rates of the public
rms in the economy. Accordingly, we would need an analogous measure of the average
price of bond risk. Unfortunately, such a series does not exist. As in Giesecke et al. (2011),
we choose the series of spread of a hypothetical average bond, which is considered to
be within the Aaa and the Baa credit rating. Therefore, we compute the spreads as the
dierence between Moody’s Baa and Aaa Seasoned corporate all rms bond yields, and
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available at the FRED database9. Our implicit assumption is that the Baa bond proxies
for the risky asset in the economy and the Aaa bond is the risk-free asset. We argue that
this credit spread is the relevant measure for this analysis. First of all, Baa and Aaa rated
corporate bonds belong to the investment-grade class. This class is the most representa-
tive form of corporate bond in terms of bond issuance10 (supply side) and have peculiar
liquidity properties11. The fact that both the risky asset and safe asset belong to the same
class allows us to control (in the data) for common shift in the supply of liquidity for
investment-grade bonds (demand side).
The reason why we preferred the Aaa corporate bond to the Treasury-Bill yield as a
proxy of the risk-free rate is manifold. First of all, we study the relation between the dy-
namics of corporate default and the risk-based-dierential in the rms cost of nancing.
Accordingly, an homogeneity argument would support the choice of a rm safe corpo-
rate bond yield as a proxy of the risk free rate. Moreover, our explanation of the joint
dynamics is based on a structural break in the rms cost of nancing. While we can em-
pirically support that nancial development has aected the rms cost of debt nancing,
we cannot claim the same for the government cost of debt nancing. Therefore we would
unsoundly model the impact on a leg of the credit spread, missing the fact that nancial
development aects both the cost of risky rm and safe rms. Secondly, we can safely
arm that Aaa corporate bonds and Treasury Bills are dierent securities. Apart from
sharing the same rating class, they do not have much in common: they display dierent
market microstructure, taxation, and they are exposed to dierent sources of risk12. All
these aspects translate in an average credit spread between Aaa bonds and Treasury Bills
amounts to 84 basis points (bp) over the period 1950-2012, which cannot be explained by
a simple default risk story we are proposing here13.
9For more information about the series, see Appendix 3.B.3.
10Investment grade bonds account for 2/3 for issuance volume in 1996, and more than 90% in 2006, see
Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008, p.28)
11“For regulated nancial service rms, such as banks and life insurance companies, required reserves
are greater for noninvestment grade bonds. Further, many nancial institutions, including pension and
mutual funds, face restrictions on amount of non-investment grade debt they can hold”. Bessembinder and
Maxwell (2008, p.5)
12First, Corporate bonds are (an order of measure) less liquid than Treasury bill. The Treasury bill Av-
erage Daily Trading Volume in the U.S. Bond Markets in 2001 amount to 297.9$ billions compared to only
17.9$ billions for the whole corporate bond sector. In 2006 the volumes of T-bill almost doubled (524.7$),
while the volumes of corporate bonds raises only to 22.7$, see Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008, p. 29). Sec-
ond, Corporate bond yields are subject to state taxation, while U.S. Treasury securities are exent. Longsta
(2011) shows that tax risk is an important determinant in the pricing of assets. Third, other than the com-
mon default risk and liquidity risk, sovereign bonds present a sizeable recovery rates risk. Due to the high
uncertainty which characterise enforcement of international debt contracts sovereign bonds display a size-
able heterogeneity in the recovery rates. For example, the credit loss of the 1983-1986 debt restructuring
in Argentina was 30%, while the one of the 2001-2002 crisis amounted to 72%. The other major sovereign
default crisis, which involved Russia in the August of 1998, was characterized by a credit loss of 63%. On the
contrary, recovery rates of Moody’s Aa and Baa corporate bonds are stable around 40%, see Moody’s (2012,
p.26).
13Huang and Huang (2012) show that the expected Aaa-Treasury Bill spread should be around 1 bp, given
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Figure ?? plots our series of credit spreads, measured in basis points. We can observe
how credit spreads were low in the 1950’s and 1960’s, before peaking up to 232 bp in the
1982. From the 1980’s on, credit spreads have been declining to values comparable to the
one of 1950’s and 1960’s. Concomitant with the last nancial crisis, credit spreads hike up
to 199 bp in the 2009.
Figure 3.2.2
Corporate Credit Spreads
Note: this graph plots the annual corporate credit spread (in basis points) in the United States from 1950
until 2012. The circle line plots the average annual corporate credit spread from 1950 until 1983, while the
dashed line plots the average annual corporate credit spread from 1984 until 2012. Shaded area denotes
recession.
As above, we apply the Bai and Perron (1998)’s test to check for structural changes
in the credit spreads. Again, to comply with the assumption of the Bai-perron test, we
proxy the credit spreads process as a rst-order autoregressive model plus a constant, and
- in conclusion - we test whether there is a break either just in the constant or both in
the constant and the autoregressive parameter. Table 3 shows that we cannot reject the
null of no break in either cases. Controlling for lagged GDP growth rates14 and lagged
stock returns volatility, testing for breaks using quarterly data and using the Chow test
with 1983 or 1984 as pre-determined break date does not alter our nding15. Table 4 re-
ports the mean values of the credit spreads over the two periods of interest, 1950-1983 and
1984-2012. From the 1950’s to the 1970’s, the average value of the credit spread was 91
bp. This average barely changed over the following three decades, reaching 102 bp. On
the 0.03% expected 5-year average cumulative credit loss of Aaa corporate bonds.
14Gomes and Shmid (2010a) investigates the endogenous link between macro aggregates and credit
spreads.
15We apply the Chow test to quarterly data using as a pre-determined data any quarter between 1982:1
and 1984:1, and in all cases we reject the presence of a break at the 5% signicance level.
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Table 3.2.3
Break Test for Credit Spreads
Spreadt = a + ρSpreadt–1 + t
H0: No Break in a H0: No Break in a and ρ
SupLR Stat 5.68 5.62
5% Critical Values 8.22 10.98
Null of No Break Accept Accept
Estimated Break Date - -
Note: this table reports the results of the Bai and Perron (1998) structural break
test on annual credit spreads, measured as the dierence (in basis points) be-
tween Moody’s Baa and Aaa bond yields. We assume that credit spreads fol-
low an AR(1) process and we test two null hypotheses: either no break just in
the constant or no break in both the constant and the autoregressive param-
eter. The table reports the test statistics (SupLR stat), the 5% Critical Values,
whether the test reject or accepts the null hypothesis, and the estimated date
of the break in case the null is rejected.
the ground of the evidence provided by the break tests, we interpret this 11 bp increase
as not statistically signicant. To check whether these 11 basis points are economically
signicant, we follow Giesecke et al. (2011) by using a back-to-the-envelope to estimate
the average annual credit losses, assuming 50% recovery rate16. We nd that a 1.4% in-
crease in default rates should have pushed up credit spreads by 70 bp instead of the 11 bp
observed in the data. Secondly, despite default rates have increased to a record number
of 5.45% in the recent nancial crises, the credit spread reached a peak of 199 bp. Yet, the
global maximum over the over-all period in consideration, equals 232 bp and was reached
in 1982 with a default rate of only 1.16%. This over period max-max comparison provides
further economical support of our claim that something has structurally changed in the
dynamics of default rates and credit spreads. As a conclusion, the change in average credit
spreads over the two periods is insignicant from both an economic and a statistical point
of view.
16The back-to-the-envelope estimate multiplies the physical probability of default to the expected loss
upon default. We consider a 50% recovery rate, which is the average senior unsecured recovery rates on
investment grade bond for the period 1982-2011, see Moody’s (2012, p. 9). As a result, a 1% default rate
translates into 50 basis points.
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Table 3.2.4
Average Credit Spreads
1950-1983 1984-2012 ∆ 1984-2012/1950-1983
91 bp 102 bp +11 bp
Note: this table reports the average of annual credit
spreads, measured as the dierence (in basis points) be-
tween Moody’s Baa and Aaa bond yields, over two dif-
ferent periods, from 1950 until 1983, and from 1984 until
2012.
3.2.3 Diverging Trend
In summary, starting from the early 1980’s default rates rose by 467% while credit spreads
kept constant. We refer to this evidence as the diverging trend between default rates
and credit spreads. Longsta et al. (2005) nd that default risk explains 71% of the Baa
bond yields. Therefore, a 467% increase in default rates should come at a neat rise in the
credit spreads. In addition, even if actual average default rates in both periods are low in
absolute value, such a steep increase in default rates should be mirrored in credit spreads
for two reasons. First, Almeida and Philippon (2007) show that the risk-adjusted cost of
default is four-ve times larger than what the physical bankruptcy rates would suggest.
Indeed, default is more likely to occur in bad times, which makes risk-averse agents to
care more about nancial distress than is suggested by physical credit losses. Second,
though the average default in the last thirty years equals 1.7%, now nancial distress has
become more likely for the median rm too. In this sense, the rise in default rates cannot
be diversied away and should, therefore, be translated in the pricing of debt.
3.2.4 Financial Development
In this paper we quantitatively investigate how nancial development can aect average
default rates and credit spreads, by inuencing the economic decision of all the rms.
Following the seminal papers of King and Levine (1993) and Rajan and Zingales (1998), a
vast literature attempted to study the interaction between nancial development and the
real economy, an idea that actually traces back to Schumpeter (1911).
We focus on the process of deregulation and innovation that characterized the nancial
sector during the 1970s. This decade saw the introduction, among others, of ATMs, phone
transfers for savings balances at commercial banks, the International Banking Act, the
modication on the Regulation Q on the banking system, the Financial Institutions Reg-
ulatory and Interest Control Act, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, the 1979 Bankruptcy
Reform Act, NOW (negotiable order of withdraw) accounts, the securitization of debt col-
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lateralization, the introduction of the Securities Protection Act and the introduction of
Asset Backed Securities (ABS), which has recently became the rst source of funding for
U.S. corporate rms, undertaking corporate bonds.
The deregulation in the nancial sector has improved the access to credit for corporate
rms, especially the small ones, and decreased the cost of external nancing. Nowadays
rms can borrow more and cheaper than 30 years ago. This view is supported by the
empirical evidence provided by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Demyanyk et al. (2007),
among others. Accordingly, in our analysis we will model nancial development in a
reduced form, as an exogenous reduction in the xed costs of borrowing.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Environment
In the economy there are two types of agents: rms and credit intermediaries. Firms
have decreasing returns to scale production technologies and experience in each period a
persistent idiosyncratic productivity shock and an i.i.d stochastic xed cost of operation.
They are run by risk neutral managers which maximize the expected discounted stream of
dividends. Firms articulate in two types: incumbents and entrants. At each point of time,
there is a distribution of heterogeneous incumbents, which are dened as the producing
rms of the economy. Incumbents nance investment and dividends using internal and
external funds: retained prots, new equity issuance and one-period non-contingent loans
from the credit intermediaries. Incumbents can renege on their obligations and default.
The presence of default risk generates endogenous borrowing constraints for the rms
and makes loans’ interest rates to be rm-specic. Less ecient rms and/or rms with
less collateral face tighter borrowing constraints and access to loans at higher interest
rates than more ecient rms and/or rms with more collateral.
Every period a mass of rms enters the economy and starts the production with a time-
to-build lag. Entrants solve a problem identical to the incumbents with the dierence that
they resort uniquely to external funds.
There is also a competitive nancial sector. Each nancial intermediary oers a menu
of loan sizes and interest rates to rms wherein each loan makes zero expected prots.
When a rm defaults, creditors can seize its assets and prots net of a liquidation loss.
3.3.2 Firms
In the economy there are two types of rms: incumbents and entrants. Henceforth we
denote with the i subscript an incumbent rm, while e stands for an entrant rm. We
omit the subscript when the distinction is not necessary.
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Firms use capital k ∈ K ⊂ R+ to produce an homogeneous consumption good y ∈
Y ⊂ R+ using a decreasing returns to scale technology17,18
y = xkα (3.3.1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) captures the degree of concavity of the production function and x is an
uninsurable idiosyncratic shock. The idiosyncratic productivity x ∈ X ⊂ R+ follows a
rst-order Markov processes whose transition function is px (x′|x). In each period rms
incur in a stochastic xed cost of operation. The operating prots before interest and
depreciation are dened as:
pi = xkα – χ (3.3.2)
where χ ∈ χ ⊂ R+ is the i.i.d. xed cost of operation drawn from the cumulative dis-
tribution H (χ). This shock is intended to create a link between negative cash ows and
the rms’ decision of going bankrupt. Without this feature, rms would always have
non-negative prots. However, in the data defaulting rms experience negative prots.
Physical capital depreciates at a rate δ ∈ (0, 1) and accumulates with the law of motion
k′ = (1 – δ)k + i (3.3.3)
where k and k′ denotes, respectively, the actual and next period stock of physical capital
and i is the capital investment.
Entrants nance dividends and investment with one-period non-contingent loans and
new equity issuance. Incumbents can resort, in addition, to retained prots. Because of
limited enforceability, rms can renege on their debt. Then, loan contracts depend on
those rms’ characteristics that are informative about the default probability and the loss
given default. When an incumbent rm defaults, it partially meets its obligations with the
creditors. In such a case, the rm is liquidated and the creditors seize both its prots and
undepreciated capital
L(k, x) = max{(1 – ψ) (pi + (1 – δ)k) , 0} (3.3.4)
suering a liquidation clearance loss ψ ∈ (0, 1). The recovery rate is then L(k, x)/b, where
b refers to the rm outstanding debt.
Every period, after observing the realization of the shocks, incumbents choose whether
to enter into a one-period non-contingent loan contract. A contract formalizes in a 4-
tuple
(
xi, k′i , l′i , r ′i
)
, which delivers a loan l′i whose repayment value is b′i =
(
1 + r ′i
)
l′i , to
17Diminishing returns to scale at the rm-level may be explained with the span of control models of
Rosen (1982) and Lucas (1978).
18Decreasing returns to scale technologies and perfect competition prevent the most productive rms
from taking over the market completely and allow for the existence of heterogeneity in equilibrium. Since
rms can be replicated, returns to scale are constant at the aggregate level.
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rms with idiosyncratic eciency xi and future stock of physical capital k′i . Contracts(
xi, k′i , l′i , r ′i
)
belong to a set of debt schedules Ω
(
xi, k′i , l′i
)
. This specication highlights
the dependence of interest rates on three rms’ key characteristics: 1) the productivity, 2)
the size of assets and 3) the size of the loan. If the actual productivity is high, next period
productivity is more likely to be high19. This decreases the probability of default and the
interest rates. Similarly, rms with more capital have a larger collateral and therefore
lower interest rates. Finally, larger loans increase the probability of default, implying a
higher interest rate. It is worth noticing that the future levels of capital and outstanding
debt are chosen at the same time, and they jointly determine the interest rate required by
the credit intermediaries. Entrants face the same loan contracts with the dierence that
their debt schedules and interest rates do not depend on the idiosyncratic shock xe.
Firms issue new equity when their dividends d are negative. The equity issuance comes
at an additional proportional cost, γ > 1. The total cost of distributing dividends d ∈ R is
then
g(d) = dI{d≥0} + (γd)I{d<0}
where I{y} is an indicator function that takes value 1 when y is true. The implication
of the issuance cost is twofold. It prevents rms from distributing dividends and raising
equity at the same time and it does not allow rms to issue as much equity as they need
to circumvent the nancial frictions due to bonds’ limited enforceability20. Then, the
equity issuance cost makes rms to prefer the use of retained prots and debt to equity,
in accordance with the pecking order theory.
Firms can also save in the market portfolio of corporate bonds (l′ < 0). Since the
idiosyncratic uncertainty washes out in the aggregate, the gross return on the market
portfolio of corporate bonds is the risk-free rate 1 + rF . Thus, the repayment value b ∈
B ⊂ R, is
b =
(
[1 + r]I{l>0} + [1 + rF ]I{l<0}
)
l
Incumbents
An incumbent begins with an amount of net-wealth ωi ∈W ≡ X×K×χ×B ⊂ R3+×R,
which is a by-product of its holdings of physical capital and outstanding debt, that is
ωi = pii + (1 – δ)ki –
(
[1 + ri] I{li>0} + [1 + rF ] I{li<0}
)
li
At each point of time, there is a large measure λ of incumbents, which are dened as the set
of rms that either were operating or entered in the previous period. λ is the probability
19This argument holds as long as rms’ idiosyncratic productivity shocks are persistent. In case of i.i.d
productivity shocks the interest rate would not depend anymore on the actual x, as it happens for the xed
cost shock χ.
20The presence of the equity issuance cost and the bankruptcy deadweight loss make the Modigliani and
Miller (1958) theorem not to hold in this framework.
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measure over (ωi, xi), dened on the Borel algebra J generated by the open subset of the
product space J = W× X ⊂ R4+ × R.
We assume that an incumbent rst observes the realization of the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock xi and the stochastic xed cost of operation χi, and then produces. At
this point, each rm maximizes the expected present value of future prots in a two stage
decision problem. First, a rm decides whether to default or not. The default implies the
exit of the rm and an outside opportunity of not operating equals zero. Therefore, rms
default whenever their continuation value is negative. Second, if the rm does not default,
it nances the entire value of its outstanding liabilities (1+ ri)li, and decides the amount of
dividends to distribute di, the new level of physical capital k′i , and the new level of debt l′i ,
given the debt schedules
(
xi, k′i , l′i , r ′i
) ∈ Ω (k′i , l′i , xi). Figure 3.3.3 summarizes the timing
of the model.
Figure 3.3.3
Timing of the Model
The states of the economy for an incumbent rm are, therefore, (ωi, xi). The incum-
bents’ problem can be written as
Vi(ωi, xi) = max
φD,i∈{0,1}
(1 – φD,i)V ci (ωi, xi) (3.3.5)
where φD,i = φD(ωi, xi) is an indicator function that takes value φD,i = 1 in case of default,
and V ci (ωi, xi) denotes the continuation value of an incumbent rm which does not default,
V ci (ωi, xi) = max
di ,k′i ,l′i
di + βEH (χ′i),x′i |xi
[
Vi(ω′i , x′i )
]
(3.3.6)
s.t. g(di) = ωi + l′i – k′i
ω′i ≡ ω′i(k′i , l′i , x′i ,χ′i) = pi′i + (1 – δ)k′i –
( [
1 + r ′i
]
I{l′i>0} + [1 + rF ] I{l′i<0}
)
l′i (3.3.7)(
xi, k′i , l′i , r ′i
) ∈ Ω(k′i , l′i , xi) (3.3.8)
where: 1) β denotes the subjective time discounting rate of the rm’s manager; 2)EH (χ′i),x′i |xi
denotes the expected value over the independent processes of χ′i and x′i , where the real-
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ization of x′i is conditional on xi; 3) equation (3.3.7) denotes the law of motion of rm’s
net worth. ω′i is a random process which inherits the rst-order Markov property from
the idiosyncratic productivity shock x′i , augmented by the independent i.i.d process of χ′i.
Formally ω′i follows the transition function p(x′i |xi)H (dχ′i)21.
Analogously to the analysis of entry and exit in Hopenhayn (1992), we can describe
the optimal default policy as a threshold on the idiosyncratic productivity shock. Here
the denition of the threshold is complicated by the dependence of the continuation value
of the incumbents on both22 the idiosyncratic productivity shock and the wealth. Using
the weakly increasing property of the continuation value on both arguments, Khan et al.
(2012) prove that for each level of ωi there exists a schedule xi = x(ωi) such that a rm
with net-wealth ωi defaults if and only if its productivity is lower than xi. Such a threshold
xi is dened as the value of x wherein V c(ωi, xi) = 0.
Likewise, it might be shown that when rms default, their net-wealth is negative.
Intuitively, when the net-wealth is non-negative, a rm is always able to pay back the debt
without resorting to any additional external fund. In turn, this implies that the liquidation
value (3.3.4) which the creditors seize out of defaulted rms is always less than the due
repayment values of the loans. This result guarantees that creditors always incur in a loss
when rms default.
Before concluding, it is worth noticing that the negative net-wealth is a necessary but
not sucient condition for the rm to default. Indeed, a rm with negative net-wealth can
nd optimal not to exit and decide to issue equity and roll over debt to fund its operations.
Entrants
The model features exogenous entry. At each point of time there is a mass Ξt of rms
which enters in the economy, merely substituting the measure of rms which default.
Production takes place with a lag, as a time-to-build restriction. The entrants begin the
period with an amount of physical capital ke. They then decide the amount of dividends
to distribute de, the new level of physical capital k′e, and debt l′e (or savings if l′e < 0)
with (k′e, l′e, r ′e) ∈ Ω
(
k′e, l′e
)
to maximize the expected present value of future prots. The
entrants can also decide to raise equity at the proportional cost γ. Once entrants have
solved for their optimal choices, they draw next-period idiosyncratic shock x′e from a cu-
mulative distribution G
(
x′e
)
. The state of the economy for an entrant is then ke. Hence,
21Where we assume that the pdf of H (χ′i) exists and it is atomless.
22In Hopenhayn (1992), the continuation value depends only on the productivity shock.
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the entrants’ problem can be written as
Ve(ke) = max
de ,k′e ,l′e
de + βEH (χ′e),G(x′e)
[
Vi(ω′e, x′e)
]
(3.3.9)
s.t. g(de) = ke + l′e – k′e
ω′e ≡ ω′i(k′e, l′e, x′e,χ′e) = pi′e + (1 – δ)k′e –
( [
1 + r ′e
]
I{l′e>0} + [1 + rF ] I{l′e<0}
)
l′e (3.3.10)(
k′e, l′e, r ′e
) ∈ Ω(k′e, l′e) (3.3.11)
3.3.3 Credit Intermediaries
In the economy there is a competitive nancial sector which lends to rms (or borrows
from rms, in case they save). The credit intermediaries oer a menu of loan sizes and
interest rates, wherein each loan makes zero prots. For each loan the intermediaries have
to pay a xed cost ζ . As suggested by Arellano et al. (2012), the xed credit cost can be
interpreted as any nancial intermediation cost that creditors incur when issuing a loan, as
costs to obtain information about rms’ default probability and overhead costs. The higher
the value of ζ , the larger the costs rms incur in borrowing from the credit intermediaries,
the less developed is the nancial sector of the economy. Following Arellano et al. (2012),
we consider this cost as a proxy for nancial development.
The credit intermediaries price rms bonds by dening debt schedules which con-
tingent on rm characteristics. The latter captures the probability of default and the
amount of insurance in case of default. Formally, the credit intermediary oers a set of
incumbent-specic contracts
(
xi, k′i , l′i , r ′i
) ∈ Ω (k′i , l′i , xi) which read: in absence of arbi-
trage opportunities, the incumbent-specic (xi, k′i) interest rate r ′i associated to a required
amount of loan l′i is dened by the zero prot (break-even) condition of the intermediaries
Ω
(
k′i , l′i , xi
)
:
(
l′i + ζ
)
(1 + rF ) = EH (χ′i),x′i |xi
[
(1 – φD,i)(1 + r ′i )l′i + φD,iL(k′i , x′i )
]
(3.3.12)
where ζ denotes the xed cost of borrowing and L(k′i , x′i ) is the liquidation value of the
rm in case of default, as dened in (3.3.4). In case of an entrant, the mapping is identical
but for the expectation, which is taken unconditionally over the idiosyncratic shock xe.
The availability and the interest rates of each loan depend on the default risk, on the
amount of insurance provided by the expected liquidation value and on the borrowing
costs ζ . While the rst two channels generate endogenous borrowing constraints which
are rm specic, the presence of xed credit costs limits all rms access to credit. As
pointed out above, the xed cost has a further asymmetric eect: small and less ecient
rms suer disproportionately more from it.
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3.4 Characterization of the Equilibrium
3.4.1 Denition of Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium in this economy is given by the optimal choices of the incumbents
(φD,i, k′i , l′i , di), optimal choices for the entrants (k′e, l′e, de), an exogenous risk-free rate rF
and the rm-specic contracts
(
xi, k′i , l′i , r ′i
)
,
(
k′e, l′e, r ′e
)
, such that:
1. given the exogenous risk-free rate rF , the rm-specic contracts
(
xi, k′i , l′i , r ′i
)
,
(
k′e, l′e, r ′e
)
satisfy the zero ex-ante prot condition of the credit intermediary (3.3.12)23, for any
choice of (k′i , l′i) and (k′e, l′e);
2. given the exogenous risk-free rate rF and the rm-specic contracts
(
xi, k′i , l′i , r ′i
)
,
the incumbent rms choose (φD,i, k′i , l′i , di) to maximize their problem described in
(3.3.5);
3. given the exogenous risk-free rate rF and the rm-specic contracts
(
k′e, l′e, r ′e
)
, the
entrant rms choose (k′e, l′e, de) to maximize their problem described in (3.3.9);
4. given the exogenous risk-free rate rF , the rm-specic contracts
(
xi, k′i , l′i , r ′i
)
,
(
k′e, l′e, r ′e
)
,
the optimal choices of the incumbents (φD,i, k′i , l′i , di) and the optimal choices for the
entrants (k′e, l′e, de), the law of motion of the distribution of rms is given by
λ(ω′i , x′i ) =
∫ (
1 – φD,i
)
Q
((
ω′i , x′i
)
, (ωi, xi)
)
H (χ′)px
(
x′i |xi
)
λ(dωi, dxi)
+
∫
φD,iQe
(
ω′e, x′e
)
H (χ′e)G
(
x′e
)
λ(dωi, dxi)
where Q
((
ω′i , x′i
)
, (ωi, xi)
)
denotes a transition functions such that
Q
((
ω′i , x′i
)
, (ωi, xi)
)
=
1, if ω′i(ωi, xi) = ω′i , x′i (xi) = x′i0, if otherwise
The same applies to Qe(ω′e, x′e).
3.4.2 The Role of Financial Development
In this section we investigate analytically the eect of changes in the borrowing cost ζ .
The idea is to isolate in the simplest framework the eects of nancial development on the
23Recall the variant of the zero ex-ante prot condition of the credit intermediary (3.3.12) for the en-
trant requires to use in the expectation the unconditional distribution G(x′e) to determine the next period
idiosyncratic shock.
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borrowing constraints, and the leverage in the economy. We consider a simple economy
without uncertainty, where there is a continuum of rms which are born with dierent
idiosyncratic productivity x¯i, henceforth constant. Incumbents do not suer stochastic
xed cost of operation. Entrants are endowed with no capital and debt. Output is produced
using capital, which fully depreciate each period. Firms cannot save or issue equity. The
following Propositions follow the results in Arellano et al. (2012). The interested reader
can refer to Appendix 3.A for the detailed proofs.
Proposition 3.4.1. In this economy there is a unique equilibrium which is characterized as
follows. In equilibrium:
1. The policy functions of the rms are constant, (φ∗D,i, k′∗i , l′∗i , d∗i )
2. Firms do not default. φ∗D,i = 0
3. Firms can borrow at the risk free rate, corrected for the xed cost of borrowing. In
formula:
(1 + r∗i )l∗i = (1 + r∗)l∗i + (1 + r∗i )ζ (3.4.13)
4. Firms demand capital up to equalize their marginal product to the risk-free interest
rate. Let me name this level of capital as the rst-best level of capital, kfb,i:
kfb,i =
(
αx¯i
1 + ri
) 1
1–α
(3.4.14)
Notice there is a one-onto-one increasing relationship between kfb,i and x¯i.
5. Firms are subject to endogenous borrowing constraints.
The endogenous borrowing constraints arise from the necessity of making incentive
compatible for the rms not to default. In particular:
Proposition 3.4.2. A no defaulting equilibrium strategy for a rm i is sustained for level
of debt l∗i ∈ [0, lD,i], where lD,i represent the equilibrium rm-specic debt limit and it is
dened as:
lD,i =
1 + ri – α
riα
kfb,i –
(1 + ri)
ri
ζ (3.4.15)
We name this level of debt, rm specic debt-limit, and it is dened as the level of debt for
which it is incentive compatible for the rm not to default.
The endogenous nature of the debt-limit rationalizes the label endogenous borrowing
constraint. Proposition 3.4.3 investigates the sensitivity of lD,i to nancial development
and (through the optimal choice of capital), to the level of idiosyncratic productivity of
the rms.
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Proposition 3.4.3. In equilibrium:
• ∂lD,i∂ζ = –
1+ri
ri < 0: the debt-limit is increasing in the level of nancial development. The
lower the level of nancial development (the higher is ζ), the lower is the level of debt
for which the rm is indierent whether to default or not.
• ∂lD,i∂kfb,i(x¯) =
1+ri–α
riα > 0: the debt-limit is increasing in the optimal choice of capital,
which depends uniquely on the original idiosyncratic eciency. Then, the higher is the
idiosyncratic productivity, the higher is the debt limit.
In equilibrium the leverage evaluated at the debt-limit can be expressed as:
levi =
lD,i
kfb,i
= 1 + ri – α
riα
– (1 + ri)
ri
ζ
kfb,i
(3.4.16)
Similarly to what we have just done, Proposition 3.4.4 explores the sensitivity of the
leverage, levi, to nancial development.
Proposition 3.4.4. In equilibrium:
• ∂levi∂ζ = –
1+ri
ri
1
kfb,i
< 0: the leverage is strictly increasing in the level of nancial devel-
opment. The more developed is the credit intermediation (the lower is the ζ), the higher
is the equilibrium leverage of the rms.
• ∂levi
∂kfbi (x¯)
= 1+riri
ζ
(kfb,i)2
> 0: the leverage is strictly increasing in the amount of capital.
The higher is the productivity of a rm, the higher is the optimal level of capital, the
higher is the equilibrium leverage.
3.5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we study the quantitative implications of nancial development on the
joint behavior of default rates and credit spreads and on other relevant dynamics of the
US economy. To that end, we compute two equilibria whose parameters dier only for
the value of the xed borrowing costs. The rst equilibrium is calibrated to proxy the
behaviour of some relevant facts of the US economy over the period 1950-1983. The second
equilibrium approximates the US economy over the period 1984-2012; it takes as given
the estimated and calibrated parameters from the rst period but for the xed costs of
borrowing, which are lowered. In line with the calibration strategy adopted by Buera and
Shin (2013), we discipline this cut by matching the higher leverage of the rms over the
period 1984-201224. As mentioned above, the decline in the xed cost of borrowing is a
24Buera and Shin (2013) studies the role of nancial frictions on the so-called miracle economies. In their
calibration, the authors pin down the exogenous size of nancial development by matching the evolution
of external nance to GDP ratios in the data.
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reduced form way of modelling nancial development25. This modelling strategy allows
us to isolate and study the implications of nancial development, and to test whether it
might have been a relevant structural explanation of the diverging trend observed in the
data.
3.5.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model over the period 1950-1983. In the model, one period corresponds
to one year.
Uncertainty in the Economy
In order to proceed we need to impose more structure on the stochastic properties of
the uncertainty in the economy: the idiosyncratic productivity shock and the stochastic
xed cost of operation. The idiosyncratic productivity shock of the incumbents follows
an AR(1) process, such that
xt = ρxxt–1 + et , et ∼ N (0,σ2e ) (3.5.17)
In the context of the calibration, we transform (3.5.17) into a discrete-state Markov chain,
with 2 points in the support, using the standard Tauchen (1986) algorithm. Then, we
assume the distribution G(x) from which the entrants draw their rst realization of the
idiosyncratic shock is a Pareto distribution with exponent c. The choice of such a dis-
tribution is in accordance with the empirical evidence that the rms’ size distribution is
very heavy tailed, see Gabaix (2011) among others. Finally, we assume that the stochastic
costs of operation follows an i.i.d. process, where H (χ) is modeled as a Bernoulli random
variable which takes the valueχwith probability pχ and the value 0 with probability 1–pχ.
Estimated Parameters
Table 3.5.5 reports the estimated parameters and the source whence they are taken. Fol-
lowing Gomes and Schmid (2010b) and Arellano et al. (2012), we set the parameters gov-
erning the decreasing returns to scale of the rms’ production function to α = 0.6526.
The depreciation rate of capital is set to 10% per year. The risk-free interest rate is set
to rF = 0.04 according to the actual value of the annual real interest rate in the United
States from 1950 to 1983. As in Arellano et al. (2012), we set the subjective discount
rate parameter to β = 0.9605 per year. This value is slightly lower than its frictionless
equilibrium value of 11+rF , as a proxy of the impatience of the risk neutral manager. This
25Other examples of models where nancial development is modeled as an exogenous reduction of the
economy’s nancial frictions are Buera et al. (2011) and Arellano et al. (2012).
26This value is on the lower bound of reasonable parameters for the Cobb-Douglas production function
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Table 3.5.5
Estimated Parameters
A. Firms
α = 0.65 Production Function Returns to Scale Arellano et al. (2012)
δ = 0.10 Capital Depreciation Arellano et al. (2012)
ψ = 0.30 Bankruptcy Deadweight Loss Gomes and Schmid (2010a)
rF = 0.04 Real Risk-Free Interest Rate Data (see Appendix B.4)
β = 0.96 Time Discounting Parameter Arellano et al. (2012)
ρx = 0.80 Idiosyncratic Shock Persistence Foster et al. (2008)
γ = 0.35 Equity Issuance Cost Cooley and Quadrini (2001)
B. Incumbents
pχ = 0.06 Probability Operational Cost Armenter and Hnatkosvka (2012)
C. Entrants
c = 2 Pareto Exponent Axtell (2001)
Note: this table reports the values, the description and the source of the estimated parameters.
feature supplements the absence of nontax deducibility of interest rate payments in pro-
viding the rms with an incentive to borrow. As in Gomes and Schmid (2010a) we set the
bankruptcy deadweight loss to ψ = 30%27. The value of the equity issuance costs γ = 0.35
is borrowed from Cooley and Quadrini (2001). We take the value of the autoregressive
parameter ρx = 0.80, from Foster et al. (2008), who estimate the production function and
the Solow residual at the rm level. In line with the evidence of Axtell (2001) and Gabaix
(2011) that the distribution of rm size is heavy tailed, we choose a Pareto exponent of
2. Finally, we set the probability of receiving a positive operational cost to 6% to match
the transition rate from positive to negative cash ows for US public rms estimated by
Armenter and Hnatkosvka (2012).
27Warner (1977) estimates that the direct and indirect costs associated to corporate bankruptcy equal
30% of the book value of the rm.
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Calibrated Parameters
There are four parameters to be calibrated: 1) σe, the standard deviation of the idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock; 2) χ, the magnitude of the stochastic costs of operation; 3) ζ ,
the borrowing xed cost; and 4) ke, the physical capital endowment of an entrant. Ac-
cordingly, we need (at least) four targets. Consistently with the structural break observed
in the data, we calibrate our model economy to statistics computed over the period 1950-
1983. In principle, these targets should capture relevant information about the process
driving the default phenomenon in the US economy. In this spirit, we choose: 1) the aver-
age debt to asset ratio, bi/ai, where the assets in the model are given by ai = xikαi +(1–δ)ki;
2) the cross-sectional standard deviation of the average ratio of debt over asset; 3) the av-
erage default rate from 1950 to 1983; and 4) the growth rate of entrants. Apart from the
last target - which is taken from Arellano et al. (2012) - the statistics are computed using
Compustat data. Appendix 3.B describes in the detail the construction of the data.
Results of the calibration. Table 3.5.6 reports the value of the calibrated parameters
while Table 3.5.7 compares the targets in the data with the one computed in the model.
The stochastic operational cost is calibrated to χ = 9. In relative terms, it represents 9%
of the assets of the median rm. As far as the targets are concerned, on one hand, the
average debt to asset ratio in the model is slightly overestimated at 0.29, compared to
the actual value in the data of 0.24. In the model, rms borrow a little too much. On
the other hand, the cross-sectional standard deviation of the ratio is much closer to the
actual one, with a value of 0.17 compared with the 0.16 in data. The average default rate is
perfectly matched: in the model the 0.3% of the rms defaults, as it is in the data. This is a
successful matching since it is well known that models with equilibrium default struggle
in providing quantitatively reasonable amount of default in the economy. As instance, in
Arellano et al. (2012), the average default rate implied by the model is zero. Conversely,
this model does not suer the same weakness. The reason of this relevant dierence rests
on the introduction of the stochastic xed cost of operation. Finally, we perfectly match
the growth rate of the entrants.
3.5.2 Results: Financial Development and the Diverging Trend
We study the quantitative implications of nancial development on the dynamics of de-
fault rates and credit spreads. To that end, we exogenously cut from 0.6 to 0.4 the xed
borrowing costs calibrated in the rst equilibrium. We discipline this reduction by match-
ing the higher ratio of total debt to asset observed over the period 1984-2012. This struc-
tural change leads a median rm leverage ratio of 0.36 in the second equilibrium, close to
the 0.33 measured in the data. To conrm the plausibility of the magnitude of these values,
note that the ratio of the xed borrowing costs over the loan value for the median rm
is 0.5% in the rst equilibrium and 0.13% in the second equilibrium. Those gures are in
line with the results in Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), which study a panel of 628 industrial
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Table 3.5.6
Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description
σe = 0.65 Standard Deviation Idiosyncratic Productivity Shock
χ = 9 Stochastic Operational Cost
ζ = 0.60 Borrowing Fixed Costs
ke = 145 Capital Entrants
Note: this table reports the values and the description of the
calibrated parameters.
Table 3.5.7
Calibration Targets
Target Data Model
Average Debt to Asset Ratio 0.24 0.29
Standard Deviation of Debt to Asset Ratio 0.16 0.17
Average Default Rate 0.3% 0.3%
Growth Rate Entrants 0.95% 0.95%
Note: this table reports the targets of the calibration exercise.
The Debt to Asset Ratio is computed in the model as the total
amount of debt over the sum of rm’s prots and undepreci-
ated capital, and in the data as the book value of assets over
the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities.
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rms from 1990 until 1997 and nd that the xed cost of debt issuance for public debt
equals on average around 0.1% of the debt principal. As a byproduct, this result provides
a robustness check of the consistency of our calibration. Hereafter, we refer to the (rst)
equilibrium with borrowing xed costs of ζ1 = 0.6 as the pre-1984 steady-state, and the
(second) equilibrium with borrowing xed costs of ζ2 = 0.4 as the post-1984 steady-state.
Table 3.5.8
Predictions of the Model
Moment pre-1984 post-1984 ∆ post-1984/pre-1984
Fixed Borrowing Cost Model 0.6 0.4 –33%
Data - - -
Median Debt to Asset Ratio Model 0.29 0.36 24%
Data 0.24 0.33 37%
Aggregate Default Rate Model 0.3% 1.2% 300%
Data 0.3% 1.7% 467%
Aggregate Credit Spread Model 75bp 77bp 2bp
Data 91bp 102bp 11bp
Median Expected Recovery Rate Model 37% 46% 24%
Data – – –
Note: this table reports the results of the model in two equilibria. The rst one, labeled as “pre-
1984”, denotes the version of the model with high xed costs of borrowing, ζ = 0.6. The second one,
labeled as “post-1984”, denotes the version of the model with low xed costs of borrowing, ζ = 0.4.
The Median Debt to Asset Ratio is computed as the median value among rms’ total amount of
debt over the sum of rm’s prots and undepreciated capital. The Median Expected Recovery Rate
denes the median across rms of the sum of rms’ prots and undepreciated capital over the total
amount of debt over the states in which the expected probability of default is positive.
Table 3.5.8 reports the quantitative predictions of the model and the eects of nan-
cial development on default rates and credit spreads. The model successfully explains the
dramatic rise in default rates. The post-1984 steady-state is characterized by an average
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default rate of 1.2%, implying a 300% increase between the two periods. Therefore, nan-
cial development accounts for the 64% of the total increase of default rates observed since
the early 1980’s. This result uniquely stems from the interplay between nancial develop-
ment and the stochastic xed cost of operation. On one hand, the reduction in the xed
cost of borrowing tempers the non-linearities of the value function of the rms28, making
the debt a cheaper source of nancing. As a result, ecient rms can nance through debt
investment and build a more ecient size; conversely, inecient rms can disinvest part
of their capital, without being penalized as much as before due to the lack of collateral.
Then, the reduction of the xed cost of borrowing increases both the average level and
volatility of rms’ debt. On the other hand, given the higher collateral value of capital,
rms can borrow more debt against the same amount of capital, implying an increase in
leverage. Together with a higher volatility of debt, this implies a higher volatility of lever-
age. Indeed, the leverage of the median rm goes up from 0.29 to 0.36, while its volatility
rises from 0.17 to 0.20. Thence, it becomes more likely that rms end up in states of the
world where they nd optimal to default, pushing up the overall default rate of the econ-
omy.
Yet, the idiosyncratic productivity shock alone is not sucient to imply the default of the
rms because of the persistency property of the idiosyncratic productivity shock process
and the forward-looking nature of the borrowing constraint. Indeed, the persistent nature
of the shock makes it highly predictable. A fortiori since the shock is highly persistent,
the intermediary anticipates that a low-ecient rm will keep being inecient in the
next period, and, therefore, curtails the amount of loans for which the rm might nd
tempting to default. Intuitively, this is the reason at the base of the failure experienced
by equilibrium default models in providing default in equilibrium. On the other hand, the
rare event (small probability) and unpredictable (i.i.d) nature of the stochastic operational
cost provides a modeling expedient for introducing a signicant amount of unpredictable
uncertainty in the economy, which eventually produces defaults in equilibrium.
On the other side of the picture, Table 3.5.8 reports a 2 bp increase in the credit spread,
in line with the empirical evidence. With respect to the level, in both equilibria average
credit spreads are around 20 bp lower than the real ones, which are around 90 bp. This
result is not a surprise. Traditionally, macro-models have been having hard time in provide
quantitatively reasonable credit spreads. Indeed, Chen et al. (2009) stress how models
which are not able to provide sizable equity premium would never be able to predict the
right amount of credit spreads, linking the equity premium puzzle to what they call the
credit spread puzzle. In order to overcome these diculties and match the level of credit
spreads, we should add aggregate uncertainty in the model, as in Chen (2010). In this
way, we would add a countercyclical default, countercyclical price of risk and procyclical
liquidation values, which, in turn would deliver sizable credit spreads.
28In particular, it decreases the marginal utility cost of increasing debt, where utility is measured in terms
of expected discounted feature prots.
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Table 8 shows that the model does predict the dramatic rise in default rates and the con-
stancy of credit spreads. What is the rationale for this result? The answer to this question
is purely quantitative, and stems from the magnitude of three counteracting eects that
nancial development has on credit spreads. To clarify this point, let us restate Equation
(3.3.12) as
l′i(1 + rF ) + ζ(1 + rF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fixed Cost Channel
= EH (χ′i),x′i |xi
[
(1 – φD,i)(1 + r ′i )l′i + φD,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Default Risk Channel
L(k′i , x′i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insurance Channel
]
When pricing a debt, the credit intermediaries evaluate the xed cost of issuing a loan
(xed cost channel), the probability of default of the rm (default risk channel) and the
amount of insurance provided by the liquidation value in case of default (insurance chan-
nel).
As seen before, nancial development increases (on average) the probability of en-
dogenous default. Therefore, in absence of any form of insurance in case of default, credit
spreads would have to increase, tracking monotonically the rise in default rates observed
in the data. Nonetheless, there are two channels through which nancial development
reduces the credit spreads: the xed cost of borrowing and the loss given default. First of
all, nancial development reduces by construction the xed cost of borrowing, and there-
fore the interest rate charged on the loan. The impact on the interest rate is stronger the
higher is the expected probability of default of the rm, contributing to the reduction of
the credit spread. Secondly, nancial development increases (on average) the liquidation
value. Because of the reduction in the nancial frictions in the economy, rms behave
more optimally (literally, rms are less constrained in their optimization decisions) and
increases their size of operation. As a consequence, rms (on average) produce higher
prots and have a larger size. To attach some numbers on these dynamics, in the model
rms’ median prot and median size increase, respectively, by 21.73% and 9.34% when
passing from the pre-1984 to the post-1984 equilibrium. Both these two components enter
the denition of the liquidation value L(k′i , x′i ), and increase the insurance component of
the credit spread. Indeed, the expected recovery rate hikes up by 24%, from a value of 37%
in the rst equilibrium to a value of 46% in the second one. Ergo, nancial development
produces (on average) a dramatic increase in the liquidation value which osets the in-
crease in the probability of default, producing just a 2 bp increase in the credit spreads in
the second equilibrium.
3.5.3 Further Results
In the model, nancial development is able to account for a number of trends - other than
the rise in default rates - which characterized public rms over the last decades. Namely,
the model gives relevant predictions on the number of rms distributing dividends, the
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way rms decide to smooth these dividends over time, and the level of rms’ volatility.
Dividend Payout.
First of all, the way public rms pay dividends has substantially changed over time. As re-
ported by Fama and French (2001), the number of publicly traded non-nancial non-utility
rms distributing dividends was 66.5% in 1978 compared to only 20% in 1999. The decline
in percentage of dividend payers is attributed with equal importance to both a tilt of the
publicly traded population towards rms with characteristics of rms that have never
payed (low earnings, strong investment and small size), and to a general lower propensity
to pay. Our model adds insights to both these channels. Secondly, Leary and Michaely
(2011) document a steady and substantial increase in the degree of dividends smoothing
over the past century. In the model, nancial development account quantitatively for these
changes in the dynamics of dividends.
As explained above, although the objective function of the rms is linear, due to the
presence of endogenous borrowing constraints (and price schedules) their value functions
are strictly concave. Therefore, when deciding the value of dividends to distribute, rms
trade o level with volatility. In the model - as in the data - the rms distributing divi-
dend are large rms. In the rst equilibrium, credit frictions are tight and rms cannot
smooth dividends as they wish. This extra volatility is then compensated by a higher level
of dividends. When nancial development tempers the credit frictions of the rms, they
become better able at insuring dividends from the eects of the persistent idiosyncratic
shocks. Hence large rms change their payout policy by increasing the smoothing of div-
idends while reducing their average level. At the same time, nancial development allows
for the presence of an higher number of small rms, therefore further reducing (through
the distribution) the ratio of dividend payers. As shown in Table 9, nancial development
makes the number of rms distributing dividends to shrink down by 34%. This mechanism
explains the 73% of the decline in the number of rms paying dividends observed in the
data.
Meanwhile even the degree at which rms smooth dividends rise substantially. For mea-
suring the degree of dividend smoothing, we follow Lintner (1956) by estimating the fol-
lowing regression
∆di,t = di,t – di,t–1 = α + β1di,t–1 + β2yi,t + i,t
where di,t denotes the dividend of the i-th rm in time t, while yi,t is the value of the rm’s
sales. We then estimate the speed of adjustment of dividends by –βˆ1. When this value
equals 0, dividends are perfectly smoothed and follow a random walk. As reported in Table
9, in our model nancial development makes the estimated speed of adjustments to decline
from 0.43 to 0.22, which implies a substantial increase in the degree of rms’ dividend
smoothing. These values provided by the model are remarkably close the estimates of
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Leary and Michaely (2011), which nd an estimated speed of adjustment of about 0.3
during the 1960’s and 1970’s and about 0.2 for the most recent years. Moreover, the theory
we propose is corroborated by (one of) the main ndings in Leary and Michaely (2011).
After testing several extant explanations of the smoothing motive29, the authors nds
smoothing to be prevalent among rms that appear to have the least constrained access
to external capital and highest dividend levels, which have all the characteristics of the
large rms described in our model.
Firm Volatility.
Campbell et al. (2001) provide evidence on an upward trend in the volatility of public
rms’ return, which has more than doubled from the 1960’s to the late 1990’s. Comin and
Mulani (2006) and Comin and Philippon (2006) complement this nding by documenting
an increase in idiosyncratic volatility of rm’s real variables, such as real sales and em-
ployment. All these papers conjecture the origin of such trends and suggest that increased
competition, R&D innovations, changes in the corporate governance of the rms and the
institutionalization of equity ownership could have spurred the volatility of rms.
Here we show that nancial development could have been another source of such steep
increases of volatility. Actually, in the model the rise in the volatility of rms’ sales and
returns is the other side of the coin of the evidence reported above on dividends. Indeed,
rms achieve a higher degree of dividend smoothing by increasing the volatility of their
debt, which in turn spurs the uctuations in investment, and eventually rms’ sales and
returns. We compute our measure of volatilities as in Comin and Mulani (2006), as
σ(xi,t) =
√∑t+5
τ=t–4
(
xi,τ – x¯i
)2
10
where x¯i, is the average of the variable xi,t between the periods t – 4 and t + 5. In what fol-
lows, we compute the volatility of two variables:rms’ sales yi,t and rms’ cum dividend
returns reti,t =
V (ωi,t ,xi,t )+di,t
V (ωi,t–1,xi,t–1) . The bottom of Table 9 shows that, in the model, the median
volatility of sales rise from a value of 0.14 to 0.24, and the one of returns from 0.12 to 0.20.
As a further robustness check, one of the implications of our theory is that the increase
in volatility is pervasive across all the quantiles of the size distribution, as observed by
Comini and Mulani (2004). Therefore, nancial development causes an increase in the
volatility of rms’ sales and returns which equals 72% and 67%, respectively.
29Theory based on asymmetric information, agency considerations external nancing costs and tax plan-
ning.
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Table 3.5.9
Results on Dividend Payout and Firm Volatility
Variable pre-1984 post-1984 ∆ post-1984/pre-1984
A. Dividend Payout Policy
N. Firm Paying Dividend 58.2% 38.4% -34%
Degree Speed of Adjustment 0.43 0.22 -49%
B. Firm Volatility
Median Sales Volatility 0.14 0.24 72%
Median Stock Return Volatility 0.12 0.20 67%
Note: this table reports the results of the model in two equilibria. The rst one,
labeled as “pre-1984”, denotes the version of the model with high xed costs of bor-
rowing, ζ = 0.6. The second one, labeled as “post-1984”, denotes the version of the
model with low xed costs of borrowing, ζ = 0.4. The Degree Speed of Adjustment
denes the degree at which rms smooth dividends over time. We take the simulated
data of the model, run the regression ∆di,t = di,t – di,t–1 = α + β1di,t–1 + β2yi,t + i,t ,
and consider –βˆ1 as the estimate of the speed of adjustment.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we document a diverging trend between default rates and credit spreads
in the US economy over the last 60 years. On one hand, we nd evidence in favour of
the presence of one structural break in the unconditional mean of default rates in 1984.
This date splits the series of default in two samples with very dierent characteristics.
Indeed, the average corporate default rate rose from an average of 0.3%, during the period
1950-1983, to a value of 1.7% over the period 1984-2012. On the other hand, the average
credit spreads barely moved, recording a 11 basis point increase. We run a battery of
tests to show that this movement in credit spreads is statistically insignicant. Therefore,
over the last three decades, default rates experienced a 467% increase, while credit spreads
kept constant. Hence, nowadays corporate bankruptcies are more and more frequent than
thirty years ago, but this came at no eect on the average borrowing cost.
We present a dynamic equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms where the devel-
opment of credit markets and limited enforceability of debt contracts can be accounted for
the diverging trend between rising default rates and constant credit spreads. We model
the development of credit markets through an exogenous reduction of xed costs of bor-
rowing, as a reduced form for the development of the U.S. nancial system during the
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1970’s and 1980’s. The predictions of the model are quantitatively appealing. Financial
development accounts for the 64% of the rise in the default rates, which is accompanied
by an increase in credit spreads of just 2 basis points. Indeed, the reduction in the xed
borrowing costs make debt cheaper: Firms can access larger loans to invest more in capital
and grow up in size. At the same time, rms that become inecient can disinvest with-
out being as penalized as before in their interest rates, due to the lack of collateral. So,
the volatility of investment goes up, just because debt becomes more volatile too. Hence,
nancial development increases the level of debt, its volatility and makes eventually de-
fault more likely. On the other hand, credit spreads barely move because the insurance
channel due to the nancial development prevails on the default risk channel. Indeed, if
on one side the cut in the borrowing xed costs increases (on average) the endogenous
probability of default in the economy, on the other side it reduces (on average) the wedge
between the actual rms’ optimal choices and the frictionless ones. As a consequence, -
nancial development increases both the median size of capital by 9.34% and median prots
by 21.73%. The upsurge in the expected liquidation value of the rms osets the dramatic
rise in default rates, leaving the credit spreads unchanged.
Furthermore, we show that in the model nancial development can account for a num-
ber of trends - other than the increase in default rates - that characterized public rms in
the last thirty years. First, we show that the reduction of the xed credit costs changes
rms’ optimal decisions of dividend payout. Since rms are now better able to smooth
dividends over time, they can trade o this reduction in volatility with a decrease in the
level of dividends. As a result of nancial development, the measure of rms distributing
dividends shrinks down by 33%. This number accounts for the 73% of the decline docu-
mented for the U.S. by Fama and French (2001). Furthermore, in the model the median
degree of dividend smoothing increases of a magnitude which is remarkably close to the
values estimated by Leary and Michaely (2011). Second, we study the volatility of rms’
returns and sales. Indeed, Campbell et al. (2001), Comin and Mulani (2006), Comin and
Philippon (2006) show the presence of a secular upward trend in the volatilities of rms.
We suggest that this empirical evidence can be (at least partially) accounted for by nan-
cial development. Indeed, the model is able to reproduce a 72% in the volatility of sales
and a 67% for rms’ returns.
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3.A Appendix: The Role of Financial Development
Assumptions 1. Let us assume the following:
1. δ = 1: full depreciation. This assumption implies that capital is not anymore a state.
2. ψ = 1: full clearance loss which implies no liquidation value.
3. xi = x¯i: each rm initially experiences (is endowed with) a dierent idiosyncratic
shock, henceforth constant. For example, rms are born of a particular type, where
the type captures dierent levels of productivity.
4. Firms do not suer the stochastic xed cost of operation.
5. Firms cannot issue equity.
6. Entrants are endowed with no debt and no capital.
7. The subjective time discounting parameter β equals 11+rF .
Under these assumptions, operating prots and the rm net-worth reduces to:
pii = xikαi
wi = pii – (1 + ri)li
Let us now characterize the equilibrium properties of this economy. Since there is no
uncertainty in the model, in equilibrium the rms optimal policies are constant, (φ∗D, k′∗,
l′∗, d∗). In principle there are two putative equilibria where rms choose with probability
one to default (φ∗D = 1) or not to default (φ∗D = 0). On one hand, we can show that the
defaulting equilibrium is not an equilibrium for the rm. The proof is trivial and is made
by contradiction.
Proof. Let us assume that a rm defaults in equilibrium; this means that it exits without
distributing any dividend. This strategy violates the prot maximizing condition. We
can nd a feasible strategy that delivers an higher payo. In particular not defaulting,
producing at the rst best level of capital each period, distributing the rest in dividend
(without using debt) is a feasible strategy with constant policies which provides an higher
payo.
On the other hand we can show that the No-Defaulting equilibrium holds only for a
bounded set of loans. Despite the proof is more involved, the intuition is straightforward.
An increase in the accorded level of debt increases the incentive for the rm to deviate
from the equilibrium policy of not defaulting, distributing a big dividend in the current
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period and defaulting the period later. In particular in what follows we will show that
there exists a threshold value of debt, l∗D,i above which rms will nd optimal to deviate
from the no default equilibrium strategy. Let us prove it.
Proof. The proof articulates as follows:
1. Proposition 3.A.1 states the zero-prot condition of the intermediary under Assump-
tions 3.A
2. We plug the result of Proposition 3.A.1 in the problem of the incumbents and we
nd the optimal policy of capital
3. We dene the incentive compatibility constraint of the rm given the above policy
functions
4. We dene from the incentive compatibility constraint of the rm the debt-limit
Proposition 3.A.1. Under Assumptions 3.A, the equilibrium zero prot condition (l∗i , r∗i ) ∈
Ω(l∗i , x¯i;λ) can be rewritten as:
(1 + r∗i )l∗i = (1 + r∗)l∗i + (1 + r∗)ζ (3.A.1)
Proof. The credit intermediary zero prot condition reduces to:
l′i + ζ =
Ex′|x
[
(1 – φD,i)(1 + ri)l′i + φD,iL(k′)
]
1 + r
l′i + ζ =
(1 – φD,i)(1 + r ′i )l′i + φD,iL(k′)
(1 + r)
l′i + ζ =
(1 – φD,i)(1 + r ′i )l′i
(1 + r)
The rst step is a result of the absence of idiosyncratic uncertainty while the second one
comes from the absence of liquidation value. Since we showed before that the rm does
not default in equilibrium, the equilibrium level of debt obeys:
l∗i + ζ =
(1 + r∗i )l∗i
(1 + r∗) (3.A.2)
which concludes the proof.
Hence the rms in equilibrium can borrow at the risk free rate, corrected for the xed
cost of borrowing. This result stems from the fact that rms do not default in equilibrium.
However, this result does not imply that rms can borrow as much as they want. This
point is made clear following the proof.
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In order to derive further insights on the rms optimal behaviors let’s analyze the
problem of the incumbents. Under Assumptions 3.A it reduces to:
Vi = max
{k′i ,l′i }
di +
1
1 + r Vi(x
′
i ;λ′)
s.t di = x¯ikαi – k′i + l′i – (1 + ri)li(
l′i , r ′i
) ∈ Ω(l′i ,λ)
Substituting the zero prot condition (3.A.1):
V = max
{k′i ,l′i }
di +
1
1 + r Vi(x
′
i ;λ′)
s.t di = x¯ikαi – k′i + l′i – (1 + r)li – (1 + r)ζ
The rst order necessary conditions reads:
rCl1 =
αx¯i(k′i)α–1
1 + r (ki)
1 = 1 + r1 + r (bi)
from which we obtain:
rCl1 + r = αx¯i(k′i)α–1 (ki)
Hence in equilibrium rms can equal their marginal product to the risk free rate, choosing
the rst best level of capital:
k∗ = kfb,i =
(
αx¯i
1 + r
) 1
1–α
(3.A.3)
Notice that the rms still suer a dead-weight loss due to the x-cost of borrowing ζ ,
but this burden does not aect the optimal choice of capital which is taken at the margin.
At this point we can dene the rm incentive compatibility constraint as the feasible set
of policies strategies for which the rm does not want to default. In equilibrium:
Φ(ω∗i , x¯i;λ) =
{
(d∗i , l∗i , k∗i ) ∈ R2 × R+ : ω∗i + d∗i + l∗i – k∗i ≥ 0
}
(3.A.4)
Given the monotonicity properties of the rms value function there exists a rm specic
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debt limit lD,i, such that any accorded level of debt higher than this debt limit, will provide
an incentive for the rm to deviate and default. This interpretation rationalizes the label
endogenous borrowing constraint.
The debt limit is dened as the level of debt for which the optimal policy functions deliver
a zero-net worth:
x¯ikαfb,i – kfb,i + lD,i – (1 + r)lD,i – (1 + r)ζ = 0
which simplies to:
x¯ikαfb,i – kfb,i – rlD,i – (1 + r)ζ = 0 (3.A.5)
Proposition 3.A.2. A no defaulting equilibrium strategy for a rm i is sustained for level
of debt l∗i ∈ [0, lD,i], where lD,i represent the equilibrium rm-specic debt limit and it is
dened as:
lD,i =
1 + r – α
rα
kfb,i –
(1 + r)
r
ζ (3.A.6)
Proof. Substituting (3.A.3)
lD,i =
x¯ikαfb,i – kfb,i – (1 + r)ζ
r
=
x¯i
(
1+r
αx¯i
) α
α–1 –
(
1+r
αx¯i
) 1
α–1 – (1 + r)ζ
r
=
x¯
– 1α–1
i
(1+r
α
) 1
α–1 +1 –
(
1+r
αx¯i
) 1
α–1 – (1 + r)ζ
r
=
(
1+r
αx¯i
) 1
α–1
[
1+r
α – 1
]
– (1 + r)ζ
r
=
(
1+r
αx¯i
) 1
α–1
[
1+r–α
α
]
– (1 + r)ζ
r
=
[
1+r–α
α
] (
1+r
αx¯i
) 1
α–1
r
– (1 + r)ζ
r
= 1 + r – α
rα
kfb,i –
1 + r
r
ζ
Now, we can easily derive the following derivatives:
rCl
∂lD,i
∂ζ
= –1 + ri
ri
< 0
∂lD,i
∂kfb,i
= 1 + ri – α
rα
> 0
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reported in Proposition 3.4.3. First, the debt-limit is increasing in the level of nancial
development. The lower the level of nancial development (the higher is ζ), the lower is
the level of debt for which the rm is indierent whether to default or not. Second, the
debt-limit is increasing in the optimal choice of capital, which, in this context, is function
uniquely of the original idiosyncratic shock. The higher is the idiosyncratic shock (quality
of production), the higher is the debt limit, i.e. the threshold of debt for which a rm is
indierent whether to default or not.
Let us now dene the leverage at the debt limit as:
lD,i
kfb,i
= 1 + ri – α
riα
– 1 + ri
ri
ζ
kfb,i
(3.A.7)
From which we can easily derive the following derivatives:
rCl
∂
lD,i
kfb,i
∂kfbi
= 1 + ri
ri
ζ
(kfb,i)2
> 0
∂
lD,i
kfb,i
∂ζ
= –1 + ri
ri
1
kfb,i
< 0
reported in Proposition 3.4.4. First, the leverage is strictly increasing in the amount of
capital. The higher is the productivity of a rm, the higher is the optimal level of capital,
the higher is the equilibrium leverage. Second, the leverage is strictly increasing in the
level of nancial development. The more developed is the credit intermediation, the lower
is ζ , the higher is the equilibrium leverage of the rms.
3.B Appendix: Data
3.B.1 Firm Characteristics.
Data on rms characteristics are taken from Compustat, fundamental annual data from
1950 to 2006. Compustat includes public rms listed on the three US exchanges, NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq, with a non-foreign incorporation code.
Following Covas and DenHaan (2011), we exclude: 1) American Depository Receipts (ADRs)
- securities created by U.S. banks to permit a U.S.-based trading of stocks listed on foreign
exchanges; 2) nancial rms (SIC classication between 6000 and 6999); 3) utilities (SIC
classication between 4900 and 4949); 3) rms involved in major mergers (Compustat
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footnote code AB30); 4) rms with missing value for the book value of assets.
Entrants are dened as rms which are showing up on Compustat for the rst time.
The assets, (a ≡ kit + xkαit ), in the model, are computed as the book value of assets (Com-
pustat data item 6 - mnemonic AT).
The total debt, (bit) in the model, is computed as long-term debt (item 9 , mnemonic ) plus
debt in current liabilities (item 34, mnemonic), since there is no distinction among the two
in the present model.
3.B.2 Default Rate.
Data on corporate default rates are taken from Giesecke et al. (2011).
3.B.3 Credit Spreads.
Data on credit spreads are taken from the St Louis FRED. Credit spreads are computed us-
ing the monthly seasonally not-adjusted Moody’s Seasoned Corporate Bond Yield, from
1950 to 2012. The series follows an investment bond that acts as an index of the perfor-
mance of all bonds given a specic rating by Moody’s Investment Firm. Annual series are
constructed by averaging the monthly percent bond yields. The spread is then computed
as the dierence of the natural logarithm of BAA and AAA bond yields.
3.B.4 Ex-post Real Risk Free Interest Rate.
The ex-post real risk free interest rates are computed using data on 1) the Treasury Con-
stant Maturity Rate bill, from the St Louis FRED, and 2) the Personal Consumption Expen-
ditures (PCE) Chain-type Price Index, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The ex-post real risk free interest rate is computed as the dierence between the three-
month Treasury bill rate minus the realized ination in the subsequent quarter.
We use the three-month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, at monthly frequency. We then
build annual data averaging (equal weights) the monthly rates.
For the ination, we use the seasonally adjusted quarterly rate of the Personal Consump-
tion Expenditures (PCE) Chain-type Price Index. The annualized growth for PCE deator
is computed by taking 400 times the rst dierences of the natural logs of the PCE deator.
The series of ex-post real interest rate so constructed goes from 1950 to 1985.
3.B.5 GDP growth.
We take the data on real GDP from St Louis FRED. We compute the GDP growth from
1949 until 2011 as the log dierence of the raw GDP data. As a robustness check, we also
30Compustat assigns a footnote AB to total sales if sales increase by more than 50 percent in response to
a merger or an asset acquisition.
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use HP-ltered data (λ = 6.25).
3.B.6 Stock Returns Volatility.
We take daily data on stock returns from CRSP. We compute the annual volatility from
1949 until 2011 by computing the standard deviation of returns within a year. Since the
measure is computed over non-overlapping spans of time, the measurement errors are
uncorrelated and do not bias the estimates of volatility.
3.C Appendix: Computational Algorithm
The computation adopts the discrete choice method. Grids on bond and capital consist of
200 grid points.
The computational algorithm articulates as follows:
1. It starts with the guess of: 1) the continuation value function of the incumbents; 2)
the default policy function of the incumbents; 3) the debt schedules of the incum-
bents. In line with Arellano et al. (2012) the initial guess of the debt schedules is the
risk free interest rate.
2. It iterates over the continuation value function of the incumbents in the xed point
algorithm till convergence.
3. The implied continuation value function is used for updating, through the optimal
default decision rule (3.3.5), the default policy function. Clearly the convergence of
the value function implies the convergence of the default policy functions, but not
viceversa.
4. The implied default policy functions are used to update the endogenous probability
of default, which in turns is used for updating the feasible correspondence Ω-set
and, therefore, the debt schedules (3.3.12).
5. Points 2, 3, 4 are iterated till convergence of the debt schedules.
Technical Details:
• The levels of tolerance for the convergence of the value function and of the debt
schedules are set to 1e-6.
• The grids are controlled not to be binding in equilibrium.
• The statistics reported in Table 3.5.8 are obtained using the (ergodic) distribution at
period T=1000, obtained simulating 15000 rms over 1000 periods, .
122 Financial Development, Default Rates and Credit Spreads
• The Tauchen (1986) algorithm truncates the ± inf values of the support of the nor-
mal distribution at ±20σlog(x).
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